Akiva Eldar on the Bush Trip

On Thursday, January 10, Israel Policy Forum held a conference call with Akiva Eldar, chief political columnist and editorial writer for Ha'aretz. The following is a summary of his remarks.

The Israeli press reacted with cynicism to President Bush's visit, and people joked that Israel is probably the only place where politicians think that a photo-op with George Bush can help them politically.

As a matter of fact, everybody is holding their breath, not to see if the Bush visit will bring a breakthrough to the peace process, but to see how it will affect the final Winograd report on last summer's war in Lebanon.

It is widely expected that the report will not recommend that Olmert resign. However, of the three people who were in charge during the war-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, former Minister of Defense Amir Peretz, and the former Chief of Staff Dan Halutz-Olmert is the last one who is still in power. The report will likely place most of the blame for the last 60 hours of the war when Israel lost 33 soldiers on the "gang of three" (Olmert, Peretz, Halutz). And since Olmert is the only one who's left, there is going to be some public pressure, if not also political pressure, on him to step down.

Politically, therefore, the Bush stopover was very important for Olmert. The visit of an American President to Israel is a major accomplishment, the first in the last ten years. While the visit was a political accomplishment for Olmert, he has not accomplished very much in his negotiations with the Palestinians. Aside from not dealing with the core issues-borders, Jerusalem, and refugees-he has not removed illegal outposts, and he has released very few prisoners. There have been many promises, but the proof is in the pudding and I haven't tasted the pudding yet.

Sooner or later, Olmert will have to jump into the cold water and take political risks with or without the support of his coalition. Olmert could be helped in this by the fact that he has a good relationship with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas-Abu Mazen. "There is a lot of trust between me and Abu Mazen" he has said. He has even said that Abu Mazen has a good sense of humor and, more importantly, that he doesn't leak to the press.

For his part, President Bush really believes that making peace is good for Israel. He also believes-and I think Condoleezza Rice did a good job here-that the two-state solution is good, while its alternative is bad. Bush believes that he can leave a positive footnote on his legacy, and on the mission he got from God, to bring peace to the Middle East. At the same time, however, it was very clear from his visit that, unlike Bill Clinton, he will not personally sit down and work out a detailed agreement.

One difficulty in implementing such an agreement, and the Americans reiterated that roadmap implementation is still a key to the process, will be Abu Mazen's ability to deal with terrorism in both the West Bank and Gaza, while he is dealing with the effects of severe unemployment (60 percent in the West Bank and 70 percent in Gaza) and the 500 checkpoints that stop people from moving freely. Reportedly, the reason that Abu Mazen went to Annapolis was to get to the subsequent Paris donors conference that pledged over $7 billion to the Palestinians. Palestinian families expect some of those funds. If the money doesn't reach them, Hamas will tell them that the money has gone to the "bank accounts, Mercedes and fancy restaurants" of corrupt Fatah members.

The way to help Abu Mazen successfully implement Palestinian security requirements is to let the Palestinians live. The economy is at the core of the matter. UNRWA, the UN agency for Palestinian refugees, just reported on Palestinians who could not get supplies for their businesses and therefore had to close them. Those peoples' children went to Hamas because that was their avenue to somehow get paid.

To help Abu Mazen, therefore, Israel will have to take some risks. Keeping 500 checkpoints to protect Israeli settlers will not help the process, even if it has minimized the risk of attacks to 2 percent. You could put up 1,000 checkpoints and minimize the risk of attack to zero. As Salaam Fayyad, the Palestinian Prime Minister, told me a few months ago, "the soldier at the checkpoint is more powerful than I am." And this is something that must be remembered: if you don't take risks today, you will pay for it in the future. If students can't go to school and they can't get jobs, they will turn out to be the next suicide bombers.

To reach all of the Palestinians, in both the West Bank and Gaza, Hamas should not be completely isolated. One way to talk to Hamas is to do it in the context of the Annapolis process. For example, an agreement could be reached between the Palestinians in which Hamas allowed the PLO to act as their representative in their negotiations with Israel. To accomplish this, the Palestinians should also explore whether they can negotiate a return to the Mecca agreement that created a Palestinian Unity Government. That will allow them to halt the violence and hopefully reach a peace agreement with Israel. Past experience shows that Hamas has the capability to stop terrorist groups such as the Islamic Jihad. Hamas is only getting stronger now. Ignoring it is not making it weaker.

The benefits of the negotiating process, however, should not be given to Hamas but to Abu Mazen. For example, prisoners should not be released to Hamas but to Abu Mazen. This type of act by Israel would give him a major achievement with which to go to his people. Hamas is not only a religious organization, but also a political party. If Israelis and Palestinians reached an agreement, Hamas would have to listen to its constituency. The majority of their voters are also interested in a two-state solution that will put an end to the occupation.

Ehud Olmert believes that he can make peace with Abu Mazen, and he knows what's at stake. The problem is that he wants to satisfy both Israeli hawks and Abu Mazen, and there is no magic formula that can satisfy both the Israeli extreme right and the Palestinian moderates. He can't have it both ways. Olmert's decision to let Avigdor Lieberman leave the government may indicate that he prefers the second option.

Some pressure from the United States could actually be useful for Olmert to take those risks. In fact, the best thing that's happened in this visit is that President Bush said that, "enough is enough" about Olmert's promises to remove the illegal outposts. American pressure could help Olmert to go back to the Cabinet and say that he cannot afford to battle with United States and must therefore make some concessions.

If, instead, nothing results from President Bush's visit, then the message to the Palestinians is going to be that they can't trust the United States. Furthermore, if the United States does not appear to be balanced, then Palestinians will say that Abu Mazen is good for nothing. He continuously trusts the Americans, but the only group that was able to get rid of the Israelis and get rid of the outposts was Hamas in Gaza.

A key to the success of the process is timing and facilitation. Each side has said that they would like to complete a deal by the end of Bush's term. However, to make use of Bush's visit, it is not enough to say that they will make an effort to finish the process by the end of the year. Olmert and Abu Mazen have a lot of work to do to implement their requirements. They cannot do it alone, however. They need clear benchmarks and American facilitators to move the process along. They need the assistance of their friend Bush, but also his pressure. Otherwise, the process won't work. The question is whether the United States is willing to use the sticks and the carrots necessary to move the two sides beyond their domestic political contexts.