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January 12, 2012
The views shared on The Mideast Peace Pulse are those of the author(s) and not those of Israel Policy Forum.
Ambassadors Lewis and Eran on President Obama's Meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu
On Monday, May 18, Israel Policy Forum held a conference call briefing to discuss that day's White House meeting between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu. The panelists were Ambassadors Samuel Lewis and Oded Eran. Professor Steven L. Spiegel moderated the call. The following is a summary of that conversation.
Ambassador Samuel Lewis: Former U.S. Ambassador to Israel; Former Director of Policy Planning, U.S. State Department; Senior Policy Advisor, Israel Policy Forum
Ambassador Oded Eran: Former Israeli Ambassador to Jordan and the European Union; Director, Institute for National Security Studies
How did the Obama-Netanyahu press conference go over? Was it a success for either President Barack Obama or Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu?
Ambassador Eran: Prime Minister Netanyahu was speaking to his own galleries in the Knesset during the press conference with President Obama. President Obama, on the other hand, was speaking to the rest of the world, the Arab states, and, to some extent, to Israelis.
On his end, Netanyahu can go home and say, "I did not give up on any of my principles. I mentioned that Iran was a major threat. And, I did not mention the two-state solution." Nobody will leave his government coalition because of what he said to the press. Had he said "two-state solution," a couple of government ministers would have defected immediately. So, politically speaking, he passed the first hurdle. But the press conference will not be the end of the story.
Ambassador Lewis: Obama also came off well at the press conference. He did not give in on any of his views either, but rather represented the American position in a very graceful and diplomatic fashion.
Both Obama and Netanyahu likely achieved what they needed to do for their own domestic agendas. It's less clear, however, that they got the ball rolling on the two key issues that they discussed: Iran, and getting a realistic Israeli-Palestinian peace process going again.
Judging from the press conference, do you think that Obama and Netanyahu made progress in their private meeting?
Ambassador Eran: Both Obama and Netanyahu wanted, at the very least, to give the perception of a strong Israeli-American relationship. They can both say, "we achieved exactly what we wanted." The test will come in the next few weeks, and especially on June 4, when President Obama will make a speech in Cairo. We'll see then whether, and how, this meeting will be reflected in that speech.
Ambassador Lewis: My guess is that there was a lot more frankness and directness in the private meeting than was reflected in public. After all, the private meeting was scheduled to go on for an hour-and-a-half, but was extended to two hours. To me, that suggests there was quite a lot of serious fencing going on.
Was anything new revealed about what a renewed peace process might look like?
Ambassador Eran: Nothing new was said at the press conference. Netanyahu has said from the beginning of his term that he wants to restart negotiations with the Palestinians. He spoke about the Palestinians governing themselves, but that does not mean much on its own.
However, the first session between the president and the prime minister will not tell us the whole story. First of all, there was an omission. Nothing was said about Syria. I am sure that Syria came up in private so it is interesting that they both refrained from mentioning it publicly.
What might be the effect of Prime Minister Netanyahu's statement that Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state is a precondition for peace?
Ambassador Eran: An interesting question is whether Netanyahu made the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state a precondition, because he sincerely believes in the issue. Of course, we don't know whether it is a tactical point to make negotiations more difficult for the Palestinians or whether it was designed to raise a sort of quid pro quo that will come up down the road in the negotiations, if there are ever negotiations. This is a controversial issue, even inside Israel itself, where some people say that they don't care how the other side defines them.
Ambassador Lewis: It's an interesting debate because the phrase does not actually appear in Israel's declaration of independence, and quite deliberately. When Israel was first recognized by the United States and other countries, they were not recognizing it as a Jewish state but as the State of Israel.
It's a red herring that has been thrown into the debate-perhaps to cause trouble or perhaps because it is a genuine concern. But it is an issue that has come up before in Israel's negotiating style. Back in 1982, for example, Ariel Sharon suddenly introduced the idea that the negotiations must take place in Jerusalem in order to stall Israeli-Lebanese negotiations.
How did President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu deal with the issue of Iran, its potential nuclear capability, and the idea of setting a deadline on American-Iranian engagement?
Ambassador Lewis: By talking about a length of time in which he would assess Iran's posture, President Obama handled the question of Iran with a lot of skill. Without calling it a deadline, he met most of what Prime Minister Netanyahu was asking for.
Ambassador Eran: Obama was very skillful in dealing with the issue, and even said some of what the Israelis have been saying, that if Iran pursues a nuclear capability then that would not only be an Israeli problem, but a regional problem. The trouble for some Israelis is that while he spoke about a range of measures if Iran doesn't meet his timetable, he never spoke about military action.
There will be those on the far right who will ask, "Well, where is the U.S. commitment to take clear and tough measures against Iran?" But Netanyahu could respond with, "the United States recognizes the threat, and understands that there is a time limit to dialogue with Iran."
What might happen on the ground between now and President Obama's June 4 speech in Cairo on issues like freezing Israeli settlement construction, getting humanitarian aid to Gaza, and allowing freedom of movement for Palestinians in the West Bank?
Ambassador Eran: It will be interesting to see what happens next on the issue of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. For example, will teams be created to examine the issue? That was reported by the Israeli press to be an Israeli suggestion to the Americans. If that is the case, then there is likely to be some sort of progress on that issue. The major initial test will be how the Israeli government deals with the settlement outposts that are unauthorized by Israel and that the Sharon government committed to remove in 2004.
Ambassador Lewis: The question of removing roadblocks that impede movement in the West Bank is not new. But it is not something that Netanyahu can do on his own. That is the purview of Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who has been extraordinarily wary of carrying out many promises that were made by other prime ministers. He doesn't want to be held responsible for a terrorist attack and be perceived as having let his guard down. So anything that happens to improve the situation in the West Bank, more freedom of movement or greater economic development, is going to have to have Defense Minister Barak really on board. And that is also true for getting more humanitarian aid into Gaza as well.
Overall, the most important objective in this first official encounter, for both men, was to assess how much they can trust each other. The unusually informal, conversational setting for the press conference achieved Obama's need as well as Netanyahu's strong desire to underscore the continuing strength of the U.S.-Israel special relationship. However, nothing either one said shed much light on how the private meeting went, or how much or how little trust was engendered. We cannot know the answer from the public exchanges. That will become apparent only over the next few months, both from leaks to favored journalists and from subsequent public and private meetings.








