Annapolis Update

While government officials, policy makers, and analysts are abuzz with opinions about the upcoming Annapolis conference, uncertainty prevails regarding the details of the conference, from the date and guest list to the issues that will be discussed.

The date for the meeting has not been set nor have invitations been sent. Originally expected to take place in late November, Secretary Rice recently said the meeting would be held sometime in the fall, adding "that there are two months left in the fall . . ."

Neither Rice nor Mahmoud Abbas have been able to secure the attendance of Jordan, Syria, or Saudi Arabia. Egypt has agreed to attend the conference, but its Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit said that American inability to guarantee a substantive declaration "gives substance to the idea of postponing the meeting to a more opportune date."

There have been continuing doubts about whether Palestinians and Israelis will have reached sufficient agreement in advance of a conference to even make one worthwhile. Israel would like a general statement of understanding, while Mahmoud Abbas has insisted on a document with substance and a timetable for negotiations, saying, "It's impossible to go to the conference at any price."

For Abbas, the price of returning from the conference empty handed is extremely high. Hamas is in control of Gaza, including its security forces, and could threaten the conference by engaging in attacks on Israel. While recent polls show Hamas' popularity in Gaza as declining, failure in Annapolis would not bode well for either Fatah's control over the West Bank or a reunification of Gaza and the West Bank. Khalil Shikaki, the director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, stated in the Forward on October 3, that if the peace process does not move forward, "Abbas could face the collapse of his administration in the West Bank or alternatively a permanent separation from Gaza."

In the meantime, Gaza is in dire economic straits. According to a World Bank report issued last month, the economic isolation imposed on Gaza since the Hamas takeover in June led to the suspension of 90 percent of its industrial production. The situation could deteriorate further if Israel imposes additional sanctions on Gaza in response to continued rocket attacks on Sderot as is expected.

Prime Minister Olmert's ability to negotiate may have also been weakened this week by the revelation of a plot to assassinate him in June.

On Sunday, Israel's security chief told the cabinet that Palestinian gunmen had plotted to assassinate Olmert during a meeting with Abbas in Jereicho. (The meeting was canceled for unrelated reasons, the plot was foiled, and the gunmen were arrested).

The story of the plot is particularly troubling because the plotters were members of Fatah's armed Tanzim brigade and because they were released. Palestinian officials said that Olmert was never in imminent danger and accused Israel of exaggerating the gravity of the plot to divert attention from the upcoming Annapolis meeting.

As Avi Issacharov of Haaretz explained, for Israelis, the revelation of this plot revived the concept of the Palestinian Authority's "revolving door." This is the Israeli term to describe the PA's arrest of wanted men followed almost immediately by their secret release. The plot, not surprisingly, reignited fears in Israel that Abbas does not have the authority to control his own security forces and may therefore not be a reliable negotiating partner.

Following the leak of the assassination story, calls to either cease negotiations with Abbas or to cancel the conference altogether were raised both from Olmert's opposition and from within his own party, Kadima. These calls follow threats by two key members of Olmert's coalition-Avigdor Lieberman (leader of the right-wing Russian party Israel Beitenu) and Eli Yishai (leader of the religious Sephardic party Shas)-to pull out of the government if key final status issues are on the agenda.

The timing of this revelation, four months after the plot was foiled, raises questions about why the government wanted this information out at this particular moment. According to Herb Keinon of the Jerusalem Post, the plot's revelation at this time is not accidental and provides Olmert with wiggle room in case he is looking for an excuse not to go to Annapolis .

Internal battles within Israeli and Palestinian society and the conflicts between them have not made American mediation easy. Rice returned from her most recent trip unable to announce a declaration of principles, improvement in Palestinian daily life, or the participation of key Arab states. These results disappointed some Palestinians who accused Rice of being overly concerned with internal Israeli dynamics. According to Hani al-Masri of the Palestinian daily Al-Ayyam, instead of using her position to influence Israeli behavior, Rice acted as "a messenger whose mission is to convey the Israeli position to the Palestinians and to try to convince them of it."

That is a Palestinian perspective. The truth of the matter is that Abu Mazen's very weakness (as illustrated by the mess over the assassination plot) makes it harder for Rice to do what the Palestinians want. Another Secretary of State engaged in shuttle diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, had an easier time because he was dealing with governments in full charge of their own countries-Egypt and Syria.

Both Abbas and Olmert need their public's support to be able to compromise with each other on final status issues. If it appears that Abbas is in a weak position vis-à-vis the Israelis, Palestinians may be less willing to compromise on issues, such as the right of return, that hold a prominent and emotional position in Palestinian discourse. If skepticism continues to prevail in Israeli public opinion-65 percent of the Israeli population believe that Olmert and his government are too weak to sign a peace deal with the Palestinians according to a Tel-Aviv University poll-Israelis may be more hesitant about any accommodation of the Palestinians on the issue of Jerusalem.

Nevertheless, Israeli author Tom Segev argues that the issue of sharing Jerusalem with the Palestinians, as suggested by Olmert, did not produce the firestorm many expected. A subject once deemed taboo, sharing Jerusalem, was discussed and, "no one quit the cabinet, the coalition did not even crack, no one went out to demonstrate, nary a bumper sticker was printed." To paraphrase Segev, the sky didn't fall and neither did the government.

At this point, no one can predict what will happen in Annapolis or even if the meeting will take place. The only thing that is certain is that strong American leadership is needed if this latest peace initiative does not die prematurely. If Annapolis fails, or does not take place at all, not only will the Bush administration sustain a critical failure in the Middle East but, almost certainly, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process will be placed on hold until the end of Bush's term. In other words, the entire effort that commenced with Bush's roadmap speech of 2003 will have collapsed.

That should not be allowed to happen.

With no agreement in sight in the run-up to the Annapolis conference, grave disputes remain over what should be done to avert failure. The only agreement over the diplomatic actions that should be taken seems to be that there should be more of them. The Bush administration now faces a major test. The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians will all be infinitely better off if the administration passes it.

By Sadie Goldman with Jason Proetorius and IPF staff