Averting an Israel-Hamas War

Cease-fires have been implemented and broken many times, but this one was different than the others. It was the first one to take hold between Israel and Hamas while Hamas was in complete control of Gaza. It was also the longest truce in eight years.

The situation is precarious. Since the cease-fire expired on Friday, there have been barrages of rockets and mortars on Israeli towns. Since yesterday, over 60 rockets were fired into Israel--one fell near a playground. 

There have also been periods of controlled quiet. On Tuesday, Hamas acceded to Cairo's request that it stop rocket fire for an additional 24 hours while it sought a solution. Although Hamas bragged that it only fulfilled this demand to receive a shipment of needed goods, it nonetheless signaled that renewed Egyptian mediation may still have a roll to play.

Israel's Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni was asked to go to Cairo tomorrow for an emergency meeting that will likely try to reimplement the cease-fire. 

But averting bloodshed is mainly in the hands of Israeli and Hamas leaders. If they want to avoid battle, they will have to unite their own ranks, in speech and in deed, and stop them from sabotaging the process.

Hamas Rules

According to Israeli security officials, the rocket and mortar attacks that have barraged Israeli towns since Friday, were nothing compared to what they could have been. Ma'ariv quoted an Israeli security official who explained that "Hamas doesn't want to break the rules of the game with Israel, and therefore it did not fire 200 rockets on the morning the truce ended."

Hamas leaders in Gaza want to survive. They want to hang on to their political power, and they certainly do not want to be assassinated.

Ephraim Halevy, Israel's former national security advisor and Mossad chief, wrote in an op-ed in Monday's Yedioth Achronoth that Hamas leaders wanted to continue the truce, but were politically constrained from extending it automatically. "Its leaders entered into the arrangement . . . with the intention of making it the beginning of a process." They sold the cease-fire to their followers as means to achieve certain "deliverables": a prisoner release and an easing of border restrictions. But Hamas got neither, just as Israel did not achieve Gilad Shalit's release.

A recent report by the International Crisis Group entitled,  Palestine Divided, quoted a Hamas official, who said "we accepted the truce six months ago to alleviate the pain of our people. But once we got to implementation," Israel did not "live up to its commitments regarding the inflow of goods, such as gas, fuel, cement and so forth."

Arguing to its people that it tried the political approach, but that Israel rejected it, provides Hamas a justification for returning to violence. In any case, without deliverables, Hamas would be unable to restrain the rockets for long.

Israel's Response

Israel has no difficulty blaming Hamas for breaking the cease-fire. The logic sounds impeccable. If Hamas stops shooting, it will get quiet in return. From the Gazans' point of view, however, the Israeli blockade is a form of violence. How can Hamas be expected to stop its attacks if Israel keeps a million people penned up in what they view as a vast prison camp?

But Israel has its own population to protect. The residents of Sderot, and the towns around it, have been demanding a lasting-solution to years of on again, off again rocket barrages. They feel that the government has abandoned them to face attacks alone.

Will Israel attack? If rocket fire continues, the IDF might indeed attack, despite the warning of Israeli security officials that there is no workable military solution. The head of Israel's internal security service (the Shin Bet), Yuval Diskin, holds that escalation will only increase the rocket fire on Sderot, and assure that it reaches other Israeli towns. He said in a cabinet meeting on Sunday that "Hamas has not made the decision to use all of its responsive force. We believe that if we strike major targets, they will respond by long-range rocket fire."

Security officials fear a replay of the 2006 Lebanon war when, without an exit strategy, 33 Israeli soldiers were killed as a ceasefire agreement was being drafted. Writing in Ma'arivon Monday, Ben Caspit described how Lebanon could replay in Gaza, "it will be impossible to stop the rocket fire right up to the last day of fighting. Hamas has enough storehouses with Kassam rockets, the rockets are equipped with standard explosive material, their shelf life is relatively longer than in the past, and Hamas will be able to rain dozens of rockets down on Israel every single day for a long time. The range of Hamas' rockets reaches to Beer Sheva, and if things should escalate, it is certain that the organization will use all the weapons in its possession."

What Gives?

Internal divisions and political rivalries have only made the current standoff more dangerous. One false move, regardless of who makes it, could lead to horrifying, and even irreversible, results.

The fact that both sides have some interest in renewing the truce is the main reason for hope. But even if a new cease-fire is implemented, it will not last long now without a change in the Israel-Hamas status quo.

Only Israel and Hamas can make a deal, even if Egypt and the Palestinian Authority are crucial to its survival. The cease-fire ended because Israeli and Hamas promises to free Shalit and return a semblance of normalcy to Gaza went unfulfilled. The burden now lies on Israeli and Hamas leaders. Pretending that they do not have to deal with each other will only lead to more violence.

"Many already know that any leader who will be elected in Israel in February 2009 will be forced to talk to Hamas," Ephraim Halevy concluded in his Yedioth op-ed. As far as he is concerned, it begs the question: why not now?