Can the Syrian Track Come Back? : A Conversation with Moshe Ma’oz

On Monday, March 24th, IPF National Scholar Steven L. Spiegel moderated a conference call question and answer session with Moshe Ma'oz, Professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University and author of "Syria's Role in the Region: Media, Peace Maker or Aggressor."  The following is a summary of his remarks:

Are Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations possible, or even advisable, now?

Syria is currently at a crossroads between talking to Israel and joining the U.S.-backed Sunni Arab coalition with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, or staying in the Shia axis with Iran and Hezbollah.

The Syrian regime is secular, and most of its population is Sunni, while the Iran-Hezbollah axis is Shiite and religious. Therefore, Syria's coalition with Iran is strategic not ideological. The regime's first priority is to remain in power. To survive, the regime would like to get the Golan Heights, and to have some influence in Lebanon.

Syria would prefer to have it both ways-to be a part of both the Arab and the Iranian axes. However, if Syria has to choose, it will choose the pragmatic coalition because going with Iran would mean an eventual war. And, in a war, Syria will lose.

In return for the Golan, I believe that Syria would be willing to curb Hezbollah and Hamas. Syria has influence on Hezbollah; it can stop Hezbollah from getting weapons. It can also stop fighters from going through Syria and into Iraq, which has been partly stopped.

Assad can get public support for such moves because they will also improve social and economic conditions in Syria. And the Syrians are in great need for these kinds of improvements.

Are Syrian leaders, such as President Bashar Assad and Foreign Minister Walid Moallem, serious about making peace with Israel?

The Israelis were spoiled by their experience with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Before Sadat came to Jerusalem in 1977, almost 90 percent of Israelis were against giving the Sinai to Egypt for peace. Sadat came and he changed public opinion dramatically.

Bashar Assad is not Sadat. He is not a leader, and he is not a boy scout. He wants something in return for every concession that he makes. This was also the position of his father, Hafez Assad, but he's not as strong of a leader as his father was.

However, Assad did send his deputy foreign minister to Annapolis. And his foreign minister, Walid Moallem, said only a few days ago that he wanted new negotiations with Israel. The Syrians understand that negotiations are about getting the Golan Heights back, as well as diplomatic relations with Israel and economic ties. And Assad wants the pride that he would get with a return of the Golan Heights, as well as its strategic importance. He also understands, however, that to get "goodies" Syria will have to change its regional policy vis-à-vis Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran.

Are Israelis willing to give up the Golan Heights?

The majority of the Israeli public is against giving back the Golan Heights, even in exchange for peace with Syria. The Golan is very beautiful, its wine is very popular, and 17,000 Jews live there (along with 17,000 Druze). Israelis are afraid, furthermore, of a repeat of conditions in the 1950s and 1960s when the Syrians were threatening them.

This situation is not the same, however, within the Israeli leadership. It is split about the prospect of talking to Damascus. Ariel Sharon was intensely against any deal with Syria. But Ehud Olmert is more open, as are many of Israel's cabinet ministers and senior army officials, some of whom are pushing for talks.

Remember the example of Egypt. The majority of Israelis were against giving back the Sinai, even for peace with Cairo. And then, when there was peace, 85 percent supported it. There are differences, of course, between the Sinai and the Golan, between Egypt and Syria. But Israelis basically want peace. They are suspicious of Bashar, but if their suspicions are dispelled, there could be a chance.

One of the issues of conflict is psychological. There is a fundamental psychological barrier between the two nations. This creates ignorance of one another's history, culture, and society, which, in turn, breeds all kinds of stereotypes and prejudices.

It is the work of intellectuals and political leaders to inform the people about the chances and the stakes for making peace and to show them the way forward because the alternative is worse.

Why did the Syrian-Israeli talks fail in 2000?

The talks collapsed in 2000 over a few hundred meters on the bank of Lake Tiberias.

Of course, this strip of land is symbolic and holds psychological and political significance, but there was an opportunity that was missed by both sides.

Then Prime Minister Ehud Barak initially agreed to a compromise, but subsequently changed his mind. And even former President Clinton, who is a friend of Israel, said that Barak should have taken the compromise. As you may know, Barak, at the time, did not have a majority in the Knesset, and he was afraid that he was going to lose his position as prime minister.

That, however, is the test of a leader. To lead, as former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin demonstrated in withdrawing from the Sinai, means turning to your people and saying, "This is your chance- take it."

Unfortunately, we are not in the same situation now. The politicians are afraid of the public, of  public opinion. And rather than educating the public, they give up.

What might negotiations with Syria look like?

There are all kinds of ways to talk to the Syrians: officially or not; secretly or publicly. The Oslo peace process with the PLO also started semi-officially using academics. But mediation is very important. Turkey is very keen to do it. Both the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Turkish President Abdullah Gul keep saying, "We want to mediate." And they are on good terms with both countries. So, Turkey could mediate, or Egypt could, or Israel can negotiate directly with the Syrians. And they want to talk.

What has the U.S.-Syria relationship been like in the past?  What is the current U.S. policy on Israeli-Syrian talks? How might this change with the next administration?

Bush's father, Bush 41, not to mention Bill Clinton, had fairly good relations with Damascus. Now, President George W. Bush doesn't want Israel to engage with Syria. The Bush policy is very superficial and black and white. It's about good and bad, when it should be about politics. His father engaged Damascus because he needed Syria, since it was a matter of interest. Now, too, one has to show the common interest for all sides. And in my opinion, there is a common interest here.

Therefore, it is likely that the U.S. position will change with the next administration. And the backing of the United States-strategically and financially-is a crucial factor to getting Syria into the Sunni Arab coalition. But I'm afraid that for something significant to happen, we have to wait until the new U.S. administration comes into office. This is a pity because in the Middle East the status quo is very dangerous; something explosive can drag the area into a new vicious cycle of conflict. But what we can do now is to prepare the ground for an agreement with Syria. Washington can do its part by preparing American hearts and minds for the new administration.

What is the perspective of Arab states regarding Israeli-Syrian peace? Why does it not receive the same attention as Israeli-Palestinian peace?

Israeli-Syrian peace is not of the same priority as Israeli-Palestinian peace. However, the Arab League decision of 2002 that was reconfirmed recently, to offer Israel normalization in exchange for peace was not only about peace with the Palestinians, but also Syria.

Saudi Arabia, as we know, initiated this suggestion to Israel to make peace with all Arab countries, Syria included. But recently, there has been a lot of tension between Saudi Arabia and Syria because of the Iranian axis, of which Syria is a part. The fact that the Saudis are not sending a high-level envoy to the Arab Summit that will be held in Damascus on March 29th, demonstrates this. But, if Syria changes its posture, Saudi Arabia will change its own, and this could be financially beneficial for Syria.

The Palestinian issue is, rightly, the most important issue in the Arab-Israeli arena. But, peace with Syria is also important. In fact, the Syrian-Israeli conflict is linked to the Palestinian-Israeli problem. When it comes to the issue of refugees, 300,000 of whom are in Syria, the conflicts are linked. They are also linked on the issue of Hamas, whose exiled leadership sits in Damascus.

If Syria made a deal with Israel, it could induce Hamas to change its position, not to mention, Hezbollah. A changed Syrian position vis-à-vis Iran is less sure. However, if Syria signs a deal with Israel, Iran will cool relations with Damascus. So it would be a major change at any rate. There are also other issues of regional development, such as water, that affect all the parties. These are all regional issues.

A Syrian-Israeli deal also could help the United States improve its image in the Arab and Muslim world, which has been tarnished.

Some Israeli leaders have said that they can't pursue two peace tracks at once. But, I say, yes, we can do both. In the 1990s, we did both in Oslo and Madrid. Those attempts, unfortunately, did not work. And both sides made mistakes. But if something doesn't work once, let's try it again.