The Crisis in Gaza and President-Elect Obama's First 100 Days: A Discussion with Amb.Samuel W. Lewis and Amb. Edward S. Walker

On Wednesday, January 7  IPF National Scholar Steven L. Spiegel moderated a discussion with IPF Advisory Council Members Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis and Ambassador Edward S. Walker. Ambassadors Lewis and Walker discussed the current crisis in Gaza and a newly released policy paper developed with contributions from IPF's Policy Roundtable of distinguished academics, diplomats and former government officials.

Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis: former U.S. Ambassador to Israel; former Director of Policy Planning at the State Department.

Ambassador Edward S. Walker, Jr.: former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs; former United States Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.

The following is a summary of their remarks.

What is the status of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire that is currently being negotiated?

Ambassador Lewis:

An Israeli delegation is on its way to Cairo. Egypt and France have a joint proposal that is likely to work in two stages: a very brief pause in order to get humanitarian aid into Gaza, and negotiations over a longer-term ceasefire with some very tough provisions to prevent Hamas' rearmament across the southern border.

Egypt is the key to a successful long-term ceasefire, though international observers can be helpful. An enforceable ceasefire depends on whether or not Egypt can undertake more robust efforts to stop the arms flow across its Sinai territory before it gets to the tunnels into Gaza.

Why would Egypt be able to stop smuggling now if it has not before?

Ambassador Walker:

It is possible to stops arms from reaching Gaza through the Sinai Peninsula. While it is an enormous territory, it has a nine mile border that is controllable. In the past, Egypt's mandate to operate against arms smuggling in the Sinai Peninsula was limited.

What is needed now is a strong security position there, whether it is Egyptian or international, with a mandate that allows them to engage any party that is bringing in weapons. That is a very different mandate than that of an observer.

There must also be a will to stop smuggling. Egypt has been constrained in the past by Hamas' popularity in the Arab world. But, the will is there now. The trick is to pin down the ceasefire-and its enforcement mechanisms-so that everybody knows what its rules are. Right now we don't have any concept of what the rules are.

Should other Arab or Middle Eastern actors be involved?

Ambassador Lewis:

The United States does not hold all the cards. It is important to encourage the diplomatic efforts of the Europeans, the Turks, and others who are trying to bring about a ceasefire. And the involvement of Egypt and other Arab capitals is critical.

The images of the awful suffering in Gaza have whipped people up throughout the Arab world. They are becoming increasingly critical of their governments that have, so far, remained relatively mild in their condemnations of Israel. The longer the situation goes on without a ceasefire the more pressure there will be on the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Saudi government from their populations. That is certainly not in America's interest.

Ambassador Walker:

This is not merely an Israel-Hamas problem. Hamas is supported by others outside of Gaza. It has its leadership in Damascus. It gets supplies from Iran. This is a regional problem and must be dealt with from the perspective of the region.

Is there a role for the Arab Peace Initiative?

Ambassador Lewis:

The Arab Initiative is much more significant than it has ever been given credit for here. For the first time in the history of the conflict, the Arab states promised to make peace and develop normal relations with Israel. The price is a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem and in line with the 1967 borders, plus a carefully worded commitment concerning the refugees abroad. The situation has evolved over the years so that you can no longer just deal with Israeli-Palestinian or Israeli-Syrian relations. The next phase of peacemaking has to involve the region much more broadly. The fact that you can now wrap more narrow negotiations under the mantle of the Arab Peace Initiative could make it much more attractive to Israel. For the first time, it would give Israel the sense that it could have peace with the entire Arab world.

How effective can diplomacy in Gaza be if the U.S. does not talk to Hamas?

Ambassador Walker:

The Bush administration policy of not talking to Hamas has caused some diplomatic constraints, which are now inherited by the new administration. But, there is a big distinction between who the President talks to and who some of his people talk to. And there are many different channels to have contact with people and get their opinions.

Ambassador Lewis:

The fact that the U.S. does not officially talk to Hamas does not mean that no one else can. There are plenty of people in the Middle East and Europe who can put ideas forward with Hamas. Hamas is in touch with many different official and unofficial players. And we are in touch with those same players.

But the minute we speak officially to Hamas, after years of ostracism, we will undermine the legitimacy of Mahmoud Abbas, who is still the President of the Palestinian Authority which we recognize as the legitimate government in Gaza as well as the West Bank. The symbolism of American official recognition of Hamas, at this stage, could be devastating to Abbas, whose position is already precarious.

What can President-elect Obama do?

Ambassador Lewis:

From his very first public speech after the inauguration, President-elect Obama can make clear what he has said in the past-that he will put a high priority on a comprehensive peace diplomacy effort that includes not only Gaza, but also all of Palestine, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.

Then, soon after the dust settles from the Gaza war and Israel's upcoming election, the President-elect should give a speech that lays out a comprehensive approach that would set the groundwork for a renewal of a real peace process. That process could not only extend the ceasefire, but also turn it into something more approximating peace.