Middle East Experts on the U.S. Role in Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

On February 7th the Israel Policy Forum assembled a team of prominent Middle East experts-Robert Malley, Aaron David Miller, Ambassador Edward S. Walker, Toni G. Verstandig-to brief journalists on the current status of U.S.-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The discussion was moderated by Steven L. Spiegel. Some of the discussion's remarks are included below.

How do the current Israeli-Palestinian dynamics affect the current negotiating process?

Rob Malley: There are numerous elements to the current dynamic, but perhaps none so central as what has happened to the Palestinian national movement. It is undergoing one of the most serious crises of its history-certainly the most serious crisis in its recent history-marked by territorial, political, and social fragmentation. We are witnessing the last chapter of the era that began with Yasser Arafat's emergence as leader of the Palestinian movement and it is very unclear what the next chapter will be.

Aaron David Miller: The divisions in the Palestinian polity are represented by two conflicting visions, the religious manifestation of Palestinian nationalism of Hamas, and the secular manifestation of Fatah. The government of Israel is at war with half of the Palestinian house and trying to make peace with the other half. This situation presents so many conundrums for Israelis, Palestinians, and Americans that the chance of unwinding any of this anytime soon is remote.

How have the current Israeli and American policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians changed the situation on the ground?

Ambassador Edward S. Walker: During the election cycle, American concentration is focused on domestic policy. However, if we do not pay attention to the situation, it will continue to deteriorate.

Israel's policy of isolating the Gaza strip is designed to put pressure on the Hamas government, but it does not seem to be working. I think that we have to find a way of ensuring that the people of the Gaza strip and the West Bank do not become the victims of a tug of war between Israel and Hamas. It can only hurt the Abu Mazen government and the prospects for stability.

We have a big stake in that region. What happens in Gaza and what happens in the West Bank has an impact around the Arab world. We cannot just walk away from it.

Toni G. Verstandig: The president's first trip, as sitting president, to Israel really raised expectations. Hamas is doing a very good job of creating real facts on the ground. What has Abu Mazen been able to deliver to the Palestinian people in his presidency and since he embarked on the dialogue? That is the question that needs to be addressed in these waning months of the Bush administration.

Is it possible to have an agreement that engages Hamas in one way or another?

Aaron David Miller: There will be no dialogue, formal or informal, between this administration and Hamas, and there is likely to be no formal dialogue between Israel and Hamas. The next president is unlikely to engage Hamas either.

Toni G. Verstandig: I do not support engaging Hamas at this point. First, I would like to see a more level playing field between Hamas and Fatah.

Rob Malley: The starting point must be that the current policy is failing. Hamas and other militant groups continue to launch Qassam rockets on Israel, Israeli military activity in Gaza persists, the humanitarian conditions in Gaza are deteriorating, and neither Fatah nor Abbas is being strengthened. In fact, there is a real risk of a major confrontation developing in Gaza which inevitably would deal a serious political blow to Abbas. And so, when I hear people saying that now is not the time to reconsider the policy toward Hamas because Abu Mazen must first be strengthened, my answer is: look at the trend lines. At this rate, the more we strengthen Abbas, the weaker he risks becoming.

The point is not for the United States to engage Hamas, which is in any event politically unfeasible. But others may well evolve. In Israel, for example, some of the more hawkish leaders-the former head of Mossad, a former defense minister, and a former head of the National Security Council-are calling for engagement with the Islamists. Several European officials privately question the current approach. And so, the point is for the United States not to stand in the way if efforts get under way to reach a new deal between Fatah and Hamas. The United States should step aside and say: "We are not encouraging a National Unity Government; but, if you reach it, we will see what you come up with and test you on your actions." That government should be judged on whether it is prepared to adhere to and impose a mutual cease-fire, whether it endorses the Arab peace initiative, and whether it provides Abbas with a mandate to negotiate with Israel.

Ambassador Edward S. Walker: We currently deal with Fatah, which also has a terrorist organization that has been responsible for bombings in Israel. This never comes on the agenda, whereas Hamas is always blamed for everything that happens in terms of terrorism.

Hamas is not a unified organization and it has numerous strains within it. As long as you isolate Hamas, you force its different factions together. I am not suggesting that we open up negotiations with Hamas publicly, but I do recall that we previously held indirect negotiations with the PLO when we were not suppose to be talking to them. I do not see, therefore, why we cannot start to open up a dialogue with elements in Hamas, which might serve us well in the future.

What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Israelis and Palestinians currently engaged in negotiations?

Ambassador Edward S. Walker: There is unfortunate instability in Israeli politics right now. The basic belief now is that the electorate is moving to the right, and especially toward former Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu, particularly after the Olmert failure in Lebanon. So, it is in the interest of many of the political figures in the coalition to avoid new elections and to stretch things out to the extent possible.

Rob Malley: Both Abbas and Olmert appear to be personally and genuinely committed to reaching a political agreement and both need it. They also have popular constituencies that appear to favor a final status accord. And yet, the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships are weak, not so much personally as politically. Abbas is constrained because he does not control Gaza and because Hamas is on the outside. Olmert is constrained by the losses in the war in Lebanon and the fragility of his coalition. Each one is at the mercy of external actors: Hamas can escalate its attacks or try to discredit an agreement; Shas may leave the coalition and force new elections. Any agreement will entail difficult, historic compromises from both sides. For it to be accepted, implemented, and sustained over time will require strong political consensus. It is at the very least questionable whether such conditions-particularly given Palestinian divisions-currently exist.

What results might the Bush administration's peacemaking attempts leave for the incoming American administration?

Toni G. Verstandig: President Bush and Secretary Rice have come together on the Annapolis process. They both have an interest and a willingness to do something, but they have not defined what that something is. The question is will the president get into the heavy lifting that will be required to move a process forward? That is unlikely. The best we can hope for is to try and stabilize the situation, and have some sort of agreed upon framework that can be picked up with an incoming administration.

Aaron David Miller: Arguably, by the end of its term, the Bush administration could claim that, having inherited the worst hand in Arab-Israeli peacemaking ever, they have managed to leave behind a negotiating process, a somewhat improved situation on the ground, and some kind of a legacy that preserves the option of two states. They won't see a Palestinian state either, but they could get credit in the end for making a very bad situation somewhat better.

Rob Malley: One of the core problems the United States faces today is that its embrace is often more suffocating than it is supporting. Our credibility in the region has dropped precipitously, which means we hurt those we seek to help and bolster those we try to weaken. We are paying the price of years of misguided Middle East policy, from military engagement in Iraq to diplomatic disengagement from Israel-Palestine. This should change with a new administration, which is likely to benefit from greater regional good will and, one hopes, will alter the paradigm through which it regards Arab-Israeli diplomacy. If the Bush administration can leave behind a more stable situation, with significantly reduced levels of violence and an ongoing political process, then its successor will have an opportunity to move forward. But that will require an ambitious project of regional diplomacy that renews the search for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, Syria included.

Aaron David Miller: During the last sixteen years, eight under President Clinton and eight under President Bush, we lost the capacity to function as an effective broker or to be tough enough with both the Israelis and the Palestinians so as to induce real and sustainable changes in their practices on the ground. Under the current administration, we allowed the special relationship with Israel, which is critical to America's success in negotiation, to become an exclusive relationship. Regardless of whether the next president is John McCain, Barack Obama, or Hillary Clinton, we must find a better way to restore that role as an effective moderator.

Domestic politics-by that I mean the influence of the pro-Israel community-has a powerful voice but not a veto over American policy in the Middle East. When presidents lead, particularly on issues pertaining to American national interest, domestic lobbies follow-noisily, sometimes angrily, but they follow.

Dr. Steven L. Spiegel (moderator): He is professor of political science at UCLA, director of the Center for Middle East Development, and national scholar of the Israel Policy Forum. He is co-author of the just-released USIP publication, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East.

Robert Malley: He is former special assistant to President Clinton for Arab-Israeli affairs. He is currently the Middle East and North Africa program director at the International Crisis Group.

Aaron David Miller: He served at the Department of State as an advisor to six secretaries of state, as the senior advisor for Arab-Israeli negotiations, as the deputy special Middle East coordinator for Arab-Israeli negotiations, and as senior member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. He is currently public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center. His forthcoming book is entitled, The Much-Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace.

Ambassador Edward S. Walker: He served as assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs in the George W. Bush and Clinton administrations, and as U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. He is currently adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute's Public Policy Center, member of the Israel Policy Forum American Advisory Council, and professor in global and political theory at Hamilton College.

Toni G. Verstandig: She served as deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs from 1994 until 2001. She is currently senior policy advisor at the Center for Middle East Peace and Economic Cooperation.