Olmert's Bombshell

Last week's "rollout" of the Geneva initiative was successful beyond even its architects' dreams.  Considering that it is unofficial, and represents the policy of neither Israel nor the Palestinian Authority, the response received was extremely impressive.
Geneva's first week out might have ended with little else besides self-congratulations among its supporters, until Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert came along and handed the peace camp an unanticipated bonanza.

On Friday, Ehud Olmert told Yediot Ahronoth's Nahum Barnea that he favors "the unilateral evacuation of most of the territories and parts of East Jerusalem and the division of the land of Israel into two states with the border between them determined not by politics, national sentiment or religious tradition, but by demography."

Under Olmert's formula, Israel would be composed of 80% Jews and 20% Arabs, a ratio that would ensure a Jewish majority well into the future (in contrast to a predicted Arab majority by 2012 if the territories are retained).

Although Olmert did not describe the map he envisions of the two states, his 80-20 split means that the borders of Israel would adhere closely to the pre-'67 lines with nearby settlement blocs annexed to Israel.  The difference between Olmert's plan and most of the others is that he would, if necessary, move to the two-state solution unilaterally rather than in negotiations with the Palestinians.

The pitfalls in moving unilaterally are obvious.  Oslo, Camp David, Taba and Geneva all anticipated the two sides agreeing on security guarantees to guard each side against acts of aggression by the other (or third parties).  Olmert would make his unilateral move first and negotiate the guarantees later. He seems to believe that unilateral withdrawal would lead to a negotiated agreement rather than the other way around.

In any case, he would get Israel out of the territories and fast.  "We are getting close to the moment when Israel must make a strategic decision.  The things we thought are critical are losing their importance.  The support of the American administration, for example.  Let's say that President Bush tells us: I release you from all commitments to the roadmap, do what you please - and crowns it all with aggressive rhetoric about Arafat and a generous new foreign aid package.  How will that help us deal with a majority of Palestinians between the Jordan River and the sea?"

Because Olmert is part of the Likud right, and a close confidante of Sharon, his words carry particular weight.  He is not calling for Israel to get out of the territories because it is the right thing to do. (In fact, he makes clear that as a nationalist, he thinks it is the wrong thing to do.) He is calling for withdrawal because he believes it is the only way to save Israel.  As such, his words don't create mere momentum for Geneva, but an entirely different mix in which left and right may come together in support of a common program but for very different reasons.

For American supporters of Israel, Olmert's dismissal of the idea that the United States can be Israel's savior is especially significant.  For decades, Israel's friends in America have worked hard to get Presidents and Congress to go on record in favor of a stronger alliance and more foreign aid.  Olmert says that this approach is wrongheaded because it does not "help us deal with a majority of Palestinians between the Jordan River and the sea."

It is hard to exaggerate the impact Olmert's words have had in Israel.  Not only is he a Likudnik but he is thought to closely coordinate his actions with Sharon. And Sharon has not rejected Olmert's formula.  Olmert himself implies that Sharon may agree with the thrust of it.

In fact, Sharon himself is said to be planning his own unilateral moves.

According to Ha'aretz, Sharon is considering removing a number of Gaza settlements, some West Bank outposts, resuming negotiations with the Palestinians and then, if negotiations fail, annexing 43% of the West Bank while leaving the remainder to the Palestinians. (Unlike Olmert's plan, this formula comes nowhere near Palestinian demands).

Some observers say that Sharon may, in fact, move much closer to the Olmert plan.  That depends on what the Palestinians do and where public opinion is moving.

One thing is certain, however: the debate in Israel has shifted dramatically.  Three years into the intifada most Israelis seem to be coming around to the idea that realpolitik dictates not holding on to the West Bank and Gaza but giving them up.  Even the future of Jerusalem is being discussed, while not long ago the mantra on that city was "united and under Israeli control."

What has happened?  Reality happened.  Once the argument moved from issues of right and wrong to tough questions about security and hard demographic numbers, the "Greater Israel" argument was bound to collapse under its own weight.  An idea (even an ideal) that guarantees neither security nor a continued Zionist state could not stand, and cannot be sustained.

Policymakers in Washington need to follow the example of Ehud Olmert and Yossi Beilin and utter not mantras of "support" for Israel, but offer solutions that will allow Israel to live up to its potential.  If Ehud Olmert and others within Likud are bold enough (and honest enough) to address reality, Americans must be as well.  As one Congressional aide put it, "once Members of Congress get the news that Ehud Olmert favors withdrawal from the territories and sharing Jerusalem, they will have to think twice about offering their resolutions criticizing the President for daring even to consider pushing both sides. Who deputized them to be more Catholic than the Pope?"

-- Written by MJ Rosenberg, Israel Policy Forum