An Opening for Israeli-Palestinian Diplomacy

Iraq's declaration to the United Nations on Monday that it will allow arms inspectors to return "without conditions" now appears likely to force at least a delay of American or international military action against the regime of Saddam Hussein.  A critical maneuvering period has begun, as American diplomats further intensify their efforts to build international support for a military response to Saddam, while figuring out how to react to the Iraqi leader's gambit.  This task will likely not be completed quickly.

The international pre-occupation with Iraq has understandably relegated developments on the Israeli-Palestinian front to the back burner.  But as the maneuvering period gets underway, the Bush administration would benefit from a renewed focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  This unexpected hiatus may offer a propitious time for intensified diplomatic action in Jerusalem.

The Developments

Almost lost in the intensity of the global debate on Iraq was last week's challenge to Yasir Arafat's authority, perhaps the most significant in his career.  Last week's meeting of the Palestinian Legislative Council, culminating in the forced resignation of Arafat's hand-picked cabinet, signaled what may be the beginning of the end for Arafat's near-absolute control of the Palestinian Authority.

The action signals that a wave of discontent over alleged corruption and mismanagement is finally boiling over within Palestinian society.  While Yasir Arafat was once viewed by his public as unrelated to the shortcomings in Palestinian government, two years of a failed Intifadah have led Palestinian society to question the authority of its once unquestioned leader.  This is substantiated by the plunge in Arafat's popularity ratings, and the increasingly popular idea of a Palestinian prime minister who would assume management responsibilities, leaving Arafat as a ceremonial figure.

Furthermore, calls for an end to suicide bombings have increased, another positive signal that the Palestinian people are realizing the futility of violence.  While domestic politics continue to hamper a consensus on resolutions concerning suicide bombings, the calls issued from Palestinian Interior Minister Abdel Razek Yehiyeh and former Palestinian Authority cabinet minister Nabil Amer have not been rebuked by the Palestinian mainstream as similar calls have in the past.

Alternatives

How might America capitalize on this window of opportunity?  Several possible alternatives could be considered:

Nurturing Leadership - Through increasing official dealings with Palestinian officials other than Arafat, America might contribute to the strengthening of a new, reformed and moderate Palestinian leadership.  This is happening already, albeit slowly, through a series of high level meetings between US and international officials and senior Palestinian representatives primarily aimed at strengthening the process of Palestinian reform.

American Mediation - The U.S. could more aggressively promote the steps that will lead both sides back towards negotiations by maintaining a more tangible presence on the ground, something along the lines of the Zinni and Burns missions.

It would even be helpful to station a respected American in the region on a permanent or semi-permanent basis, an official who would deal both with Israeli-Palestinian efforts and with gaining support for American efforts on neighboring issues (i.e. Iraq and the war on terror.) In moments such as the present one when suicide bombings are picking up again, despite Israeli restraint in not aggressively targeting terrorist operatives, such a mission could well stem a rapid re-escalation of violence.

The lack of a diplomatic role on the ground is striking in contrast to the heavy U.S. security presence already in the field.  CIA experts are currently teaming with counterparts from Egypt and Jordan to train a group of Palestinian Authority officers, an integral part of the Bush plan for Palestinian reform.  Also, the prominent U.S. role in attempting to resolve the developing Lebanon water crisis re-affirms the diplomatic muscle available to American officials. (Lebanon is planning to divert increased amounts of water from the Hatzbani River, which flows through Lebanon but supplies Israel with 10% of its water.)

Multilateral Delegation - A permanent international team - perhaps under the auspices of the Quartet (Russia, the E.U., the U.N., and the U.S.), but led and chaired by America - could aggressively deal with economic, security, and humanitarian concerns.  The objective here is the same:  to maintain a concrete, high profile presence on the ground, and provide coordination to disparate efforts.

The Quartet this week set out an intriguing proposal in providing what they called the "roadmap" for implementing the Bush vision - a three year, three stage plan that includes a declaration of Palestinian statehood with provisional borders by 2003.  A delegation charged with executing and enforcing this roadmap might be the difference between gains for both sides and more deterioration.

Through any of the above means, or combinations thereof, the U.S. can show a heightened determination for progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front.  With Arafat's popularity plummeting, it might hasten the Bush Administration's desired change in Palestinian leadership to demonstrate that Arafat's continued weakness results in positive outcomes for the Palestinians.  But this is not likely to happen in the absence of more aggressive engagement.

Iraq:  Framing the Question

The strategy for implementing Bush's plan for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be framed in the coming months against the looming debate on the question of military action against Iraq.  While convincing the world of the need to use force against Saddam

Hussein will be challenging, the task would only be made easier if the United States first moved towards advancing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

This was demonstrated at Secretary-General Kofi Annan's press conference Tuesday, which was called to discuss the most recent Quartet meetings.  While reporters were eager to discuss the impact of the Iraq debate on the Quartet's "roadmap," Annan simply refused to discuss Saddam until after speaking about the Quartet resolution.  He ended the conference by saying, "I would also want to thank the ladies and gentlemen of the press for accepting my rules, that we deal with Israeli-Palestinian issues first and then move on to Iraq."

Though he was only describing the protocol of a press conference, he was making clear reference to the prevailing sentiment in the international community - that the road to Baghdad must go through Jerusalem.

Regardless of when or how the U.S. moves against Iraq, renewed efforts on the Israeli-Palestinian front would only advance the Administration's overall Mideast goals.  Diplomatic action without direct pressure on Israel but with a concerted effort to facilitate Palestinian reform and lead back to negotiations would ultimately enhance prospects for European and Arab support should military action against Saddam be undertaken.  It also might help to erase the unfair image of America as uninterested in brokering a fair peace between Israel and the Arab world, a correction that would immensely help our efforts to promote democracy in the Arab world.

This issue of Forum Fax was edited and produced by Steve Spiegel, Gilead Light, and the staff of IsraelPolicy Forum, The Washington Policy Center