Sharon’s Troubles

In the midst of a bizarre, uninspiring election season stained by political scandal, voter apathy, and overall hopelessness, one ray of light managed to boost Israeli spirits.  When he boarded the space shuttle Columbia on January 16th, Colonel Ilan Ramon instantly became a symbol of Israel at its best, a triumph amidst a pervading sense of national despair.  He personified a better future, and then suddenly - like so many other Israeli dreams of late - the mission ended in a nightmare.

Ariel Sharon begins his new term as leader of a nation with quite a few dreams-turned-nightmare.  Israel faces trouble on every significant front, and the looming US-Iraq war is a wildcard.  Although polls show that the electorate does not expect major improvements in Israel's situation, political reality dictates that unless Sharon produces, his tenure could be turbulent and short.  The scene is becoming more complicated by the day, and changes can no longer be put off until the next election.

The Coalition

One place where the election simplified Sharon's task is coalition-building.  Beforehand, the pundits all predicted he would have only three choices: a narrow right wing government, a secular national unity coalition with Labor and Shinui, or a
national unity government with Labor and the religious parties, as existed before November.  These three options still exist, but Sharon did better than expected.  Furthermore, the far right and the left did worse than expected, freeing Sharon from an unpalatable choice made worse by his own refusal to accept the dictates of the far right and Labor's refusal to join, except perhaps under the dire pressures of a war with Iraq. 
 
Fortunately for Sharon, the election results permit him two more crucial options: he can begin with a nucleus of his own Likud, the National Religious Party (NRP), and Natan Sharansky's weakened Yisrael b'Aliyah (46 seats in all), and he may be able to add the One Nation worker's party (3 more, to 49).  To get above the requisite 61 seats, he can add the ultra-secular and spectacularly successful Shinui (15), which has refused generally to align with religious parties but would accept NRP, for a total of 64 seats. Or Sharon could include the two other religious parties - Shas (11) and UTJ (5) for a total of 65. 

Either a basically secular or the religious parties-included coalition produces a moderate conservative government with which Sharon can live.  Both have problems: the first might alienate Likud's traditional alliance with the religious; the second might turn off the growing number of Israelis disgusted with the largesse distributed to religious institutions.  But both may be workable - and stable - because Sharon could always threaten to turn to an alternate alliance if the parties' demands became too great.

The Political System

But the good news begins to dissipate when one considers that Sharon emerged - or perhaps more accurately, escaped - from the campaign surrounded by the cloud of a series of scandals engulfing both his party and his family.  In this sense, his reelection was more Nixon in 1972 than Reagan in 1984.  If the Attorney General's office issues indictments, the Prime Minister could be in big trouble, dissolving the aura of rock-solid strength Sharon currently exudes. 

Moreover, the fractured Knesset continues as a devastating obstacle to political stability.  A country with its third election in less than four years confronted the worst turnout in its history (68.5%) and a multitude of political parties eroding any prime minister's capacity for genuine achievements on most issues.  On the one hand, the abandonment of the direct election of the prime minister, designed to save the two major parties from further decline, did achieve limited results: between them, Likud and Labor received 57 seats, up from 45 in 1999.  And the Knesset just elected has 13 parties replacing one which began with 15 parties, and after splits and dissolutions ended with 19.
 
Nevertheless, the coming weeks will show if this election (unlike its recent predecessors) will produce a stable coalition.  More likely, it won't be long before they'll be going to the polls again.  Democracy is grand, but no country can function efficiently if government stops for months every year or two to campaign, elect, and form coalitions.

The Economy

Sharon's first term was disastrous for the economy, which continues its free-fall.  The gross domestic product is down, and the tourism industry has long since collapsed.  Unemployment (now over 10%), defense spending, inflation, and emigration are up; immigration and foreign investment are down.  Sharon does not seem to know how to stem the devastating tide, other than to seek crucial new loan guarantees from the United States.  Israel needs a new economic plan, but whatever coalition is formed is unlikely to produce one.  If Sharon does not effectively address this issue soon, his triumph at the polls could unravel quickly.

Security

Saving the worst for last, overshadowing all other issues is the question of how to stem the violence.  During Sharon's first term, more Israelis died from terrorism than during the terms of any other previous prime minister - and he was in office less than two years.  More and more Israelis have concluded that true security can not be achieved by military force alone.  Sharon seems unable to solve the issue diplomatically, as his only solution was to await the next election.  But that election is now over.  He may have a temporary reprieve before confronting the next crisis: the war in Iraq,
which may have long term security benefits for Israel, but in the short term could involve a direct attack on Israeli territory.  Though on paper, Saddam is weaker than in the last war, no one can be certain what he is actually capable of doing and whether he will do it.

But the war will end, and with it will probably come worldwide pressure for doing something about the continuing Israeli-Palestinian hostilities.  During Sharon's first term, relations with the Arab states and the Europeans deteriorated.  Sharon begins this term with better relations with the United States than ever, but he is also more dependent on American preferences than any of his predecessors. 

There are straws in the wind that hint at possible new opportunities.  President Mubarak of Egypt made a dramatic call to Sharon after the victory (his first) and suggested a meeting soon (another first).  Egypt is also reinvigorating efforts to broker a Palestinian ceasefire agreement.  Even Arafat offered to meet with Sharon in a transparent grandstand play or one that demonstrates just how desperate the Palestinian situation has become. This was followed by a Palestinian offer for the first time since the intifada began for ceasefire talks - and without preconditions. And Sharon himself has hinted at new ideas which would be consistent with the roadmap endorsed by the Quartet (US, EU, UN, Russia).  Sharon also has refused to ally with the far right over issues of a possible renewal of the peace process and the objective of a Palestinian state.  On the other hand, Amram Mitzna, the defeated Labor candidate, said, after meeting with Sharon to discuss coalition options, that Sharon has no intention to withdraw even from the isolated Gaza settlements and that  the only Palestinian state to which he would agree would consist of seven noncontiguous "cantons" linked perhaps by tunnels.

Thus, Sharon's actions also can be explained by his desire to maintain a strong relationship with the US, and even moderate concessions would require a major turnaround.  The Likud primaries produced scandals, but also a turn right within the party, further limiting Sharon's flexibility, which will be constrained even further if the scandals escalate.  And the last two years have proven that there is always an excuse for doing nothing. 

So, there are two things the election has not changed: the need for the Arab states to become more active in constraining and guiding the Palestinians and in taking confidence building measures toward Israel and the absolute necessity of greater American activism to push the Israelis and Palestinians from confrontation toward limited conciliation.  There are signs of very tentative movement by the Arabs and Israelis, but no signs, under the current Iraq pressures, of even tentative diplomatic activity by the Bush administration.

Likud governments are often underestimated: They brought a peace treaty with Egypt under Begin, the critical Madrid Conference under Shamir, and the successful Wye Conference under Netanyahu.  Sharon is the only Likud prime minister who does not have a diplomatic accomplishment on his record.  The key question of his second term is whether he can end the intifada and begin a process of resuscitating the Israeli people's tattered sense of well-being.   
 
At this point, the prognosis is, at best, only fair.  But there are enough variables out there that anything can happen (some of them even good).  One thing is certain: the pressure on the next government to do better than the last will start building the day it is sworn in.