Time to Get Serious

At first glance, it appears that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s recent visit to Israel has proved the skeptics – those who doubted that either Israeli or Palestinian leaders were prepared to make any bold moves, and that the United States was not truly committed to the process – right.  Traveling to Jerusalem to oversee talks between Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian President Abbas over a “political horizon”, Rice left the region with very little, if anything, of substance. 

Neither side seems any closer to being in a position to reopen the negotiating process, let alone make progress toward the two-state solution to which both Olmert and Abbas are committed.  The only tangible accomplishment was a commitment from both sides to meet again.

The main reason the summit failed to produce anything concrete was the confusion and uncertainty that surrounded the new Palestinian unity government that was formed between Hamas and Fatah nearly two weeks ago.  The effective consolidation of Hamas’s position in the government complicated US and international efforts to kick-start negotiations.

The unity agreement – hammered out in Mecca between Abbas and Hamas leader Khaled Meshal – was, from the Palestinian’s perspective, a much-needed compromise that put a stop to the internal Palestinian fighting that threatened to spiral out of control.  Nearly a hundred people had been killed in the violence, and Palestinians – fearing social disintegration and civil war – welcomed the agreement.  It wasn’t perfect, but it stopped the fighting.

Israel and the international community, on the other hand, were less enthused by the factional rapprochement.  The agreement blurred the distinction between Hamas and Fatah, throwing the reliability and intentions of the Palestinian Authority into question. 
 
Israel and the Quartet saw no reason to alter their relationship with the Palestinian government because, under the terms of the new agreement, Hamas had not recognized Israel, nor forsworn terrorism, nor had it pledged to adhere to previously signed agreements (providing only a vague promise to “respect” them). Furthermore, as it was the moderate Abbas who put this government together, prior strategy for dealing with the Palestinian government – which consisted of aid to Abbas in an attempt to strengthen Fatah and ultimately discredit Hamas – had to be reconsidered. 

That’s why, as Washington Post reporter Glen Kessler reported, nearly one third of Monday’s meeting was devoted to a discussion of the unity government and Abbas’s explanation as to why he decided to see it through.  All in all, the United States and Israel decided to continue to deal with Abbas, while maintaining the isolation of the rest of the government.  That was the extent of political progress.

Still, this decision leaves unanswered the original question that was raised when Hamas won the elections one year ago: is the unity government a means through which Hamas will change, or will it radicalize the Palestinian Authority government?  Are there pragmatic elements in the Islamic movement that will embrace the two-state solution, or will the revolutionaries never cease to fight against Israel? 

Each interpretation presents different policy options.  If Hamas cannot or will not change and the unity government only encourages further recalcitrance, then a government collapse – possibly spurred by increased sanctions and financial pressure – is the best outcome.  If, however, there is the possibility of reforming the government and working with the Islamists, the situation becomes more complicated.

This is the framework in which some analysts, like Israeli General Yossi Alpher, are considering the next steps.  In a radio interview earlier this week, Alpher argued that the three Quartet conditions – particularly the one that demands that Hamas recognize Israel – should be reconsidered.  He pointed out that Israel negotiated with Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and the PLO before any of them recognized Israel.  Recognition was one of the major points of the negotiations.  Implicit in this suggestion is the idea that Hamas, under the right circumstances and with the right mix of carrots and sticks, can be a viable player in the peace process.

The Palestinians affairs correspondent for Haaretz Danny Rubinstein made a similar argument.   Referring to the unity government, he pointed out that Hamas has evolved politically, even though “for many Israelis, it was not particularly dramatic.”  But for the Hamas leadership, the agreement at Mecca “can be seen as a change in direction.”  He points out that in the past year they have more or less adhered to the ceasefire, participated in elections to the parliament, offered Israel a long-term hudna, and now pledged to “respect” previously signed agreements between the PLO and Israel.  From Hamas’s point of view, this represents serious moderation.

Still, the United States’ guarded approach to Hamas is appropriate, and there is little reason to even consider changing policy until Hamas changes its behavior on the ground.  The release of the captive Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, together with an effort to stop the Kassam rocket fire on Sderot and a halt to the smuggling of weapons into Gaza would be a good signal that Hamas may be reassessing its positions.  The recent report of a failed Islamic Jihad suicide bombing attempt underscores the need for efforts to change the security situation on the ground.

Until then the United States and Israel should only deal with Abbas.  But, unlike Monday’s summit, the effort needs to be more robust and substantive if it is going to have the positive effect that the Secretary desires.

There is no reason to abandon the strategy of developing a “political horizon” to reinvigorate the two-state solution.  Discussions between Abbas and Olmert about what a final-status agreement will look like – an agreement that Abbas can bring directly to his people and bypass the Hamas government – is still a laudable and realistic goal.  It will strengthen Abbas’s hand while demonstrating the United States’ seriousness about resolving the conflict. 

But an American commitment to the negotiations is necessary for their success. That means additional time spent working with both sides alone and together.  And it also means trying to make mini-deals and put together packages of deals that will improve the situation on the ground, and set the stage for other deals later.  Possible agreements could include extending the ceasefire to the West Bank, facilitating the shipment of Palestinian goods, renewal of the Gaza-West Bank safe passage agreement, strengthening the prevention of smuggling on the Gaza-Egyptian border, the loosening of roadblocks if a generalized ceasefire takes off, and even the consideration of an international force for Gaza.
 
Monday’s meeting was an achievement in that both sides sat down and began talking after years of violence and unilateralism.  Little was achieved, but the stage for the next meeting has been set. 

That next meeting needs to happen.  Secretary Rice encouragingly told reporters that she is committed to this process and will use the two years the Bush administration has left in office to pursue it.  This initial foray into diplomacy was a positive step.  But now it’s time to get serious.