Two Societies Disengage

Volume 3.26

Focus on Disengagement and Democracy

Disengagement Update:

• Prime Minister Sharon signed an order closing the areas to be evacuated in the Gaza Strip and Northern Samaria to non-resident Israelis until the end of disengagement.
• Prime Minister Sharon will submit the Philadelphia Road deployment arrangements with Egypt for the authorization of the Knesset.
• Following coordination between Israel and the PA, Palestinian forces will form a buffer zone between Gush Katif and Khan Yunis during disengagement, in order to prevent mortar and rocket fire on Israeli targets.
• A meeting between President of Israel Moshe Katzav and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is scheduled to take place before disengagement.
  
  Security
  
  Following the suicide bombing in Netanya, Israel criticized Abbas' lack of action against terrorists and Defense Minister Mofaz pledged that Israel would implement a "'root canal' plan against Islamic Jihad and act where the Palestinian Authority fails to do so."
• The IDF has formulated a document that can be defined as the army's "code of ethics" for the disengagement. Among other things, the code stipulates that security forces be allowed to open fire on evacuation opponents who endanger the lives of the soldiers and police only when "all else has failed."
  
  Anti-Disengagement Opposition
  
  A fake bomb planted by anti-disengagement activists paralyzed the Jerusalem central bus station, infuriating hundreds of commuters.
• Anti-disengagement forces are launching a major offensive against the plan beginning with a national three-day march from Netivot to Gush Katif, scheduled to start July 18th to coincide with the Knesset vote on postponing the disengagement.
• In his first appearance before the Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, Chief of Staff Dan Halutz reiterated that the IDF would not tolerate any form of insurgence and added that 30 incidents within IDF ranks have been registered until now.
  
  Palestinian Democracy
  
  Palestinian Authority officials on Saturday welcomed an aid package of up to $3 billion promised by the participants of the G-8 summit, but urged that the money be disbursed quickly to help rebuild the Gaza Strip after Israeli withdrawal.
  
  The Palestinian Legislative Council summoned a special session with Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei, accusing him and his cabinet of failing to end lawlessness and anarchy.
• Mazen Sunokrot, Minister for Economic Affairs in the PA announced that agreement had been reached between Israel, the PA and Europe on deploying European observers along future crossing points between Gaza, Israel and Egypt following disengagement.

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Two Societies Disengage

During Arafat's prime in the mid 1990s, the Palestinian leader used to complain bitterly about collusion between so-called Palestinian and Israeli extremists, by whom he was presumably referring to Hamas/Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the settlers.  Collusion was a strong term, but granting Arafat a generous interpretation, he may have meant that no one could proceed very far without Hamas or the settlers upsetting the apple cart.  (The less generous interpretation would be Arafat's insidious effort to shift the blame for Palestinian terrorism onto individual Israelis.)

At any rate, as they wait nervously for disengagement, many Israelis and Palestinians see this summer as "the calm before the storm" and Arafat's ramblings come clearly to mind.  Disengagement has created a crisis with groups (however different they may be), which have befuddled their societies for more than a generation.  The outcome of their respective confrontations with the settlers and the Islamic fundamentalists will determine the future of Palestinian-Israeli relations for years to come.

The Israeli drama is more distinct, more time bound, and more immediately intense than its Palestinian equivalent. Barring a horrendous catastrophe, there is no way the settlers can prevent disengagement from Gaza. But they can affect the nature of disengagement, its cost, its political context, and its history. And that's what the strategy of most of the settlers, beyond the extreme diehards, seems to be all about. If they can make the disengagement experience deeply painful to most Israelis, the idea of going through it again, at least any time soon, will be loathsome to Israeli society  If they can create enough internal trauma and angst, the settlers have a serious prospect of achieving a "never again" atmosphere for unilateral disengagement in the West Bank and of affecting the political costs of negotiating with the Palestinians, since withdrawals and ouster of settlers would necessarily be involved. The assumption by the settlers is that no Israeli leader would want to go through this, or even want to suggest the possibility of going through this, again, especially on a wider scale in the West Bank.

Of course, the strategy could backfire.  The Israeli public could be so repulsed by settler behavior that they would find it ever easier to crack down on settlers (unless Palestinians make that impossible by some of their own acts).   For the moment, however, the settlers have at least temporarily achieved their aim since more and more mainstream Israelis speak about the pain of their citizens being uprooted from their homes. (There is an ironic element to this argument, given that the entire Palestinian national psyche is based on the tragedy of people being uprooted from their homes.)

In any case, the benign relationship between Israeli society and its settler community will never again be the same after this summer. The moment of truth in Israelis' confronting their settler demon has arrived. Either the settlers will have broken their almost mystical ties with the majority of the Israeli population and they will no longer be seen as the true Zionist pioneers of the 21st Century, but rather as a group of extremists and fundamentalists, or the Israeli majority will feel deep guilt accompanied by a sense of obligation to avoid such painful uprooting again.

If the latter happens, it is likely to be extremely difficult for the Israeli government to decide on future withdrawal.  External elements would have to do that for them.  Israelis might well be relieved at that prospect if they found the task too emotionally draining. In that case, the settlers' strategy will have backfired in a different way by making Israelis more receptive to outside intervention.

If the Israeli drama playing out over Gaza has severe consequences, the Palestinian stakes are even higher) Abu Mazen is trying to co-opt Hamas, whose actions have brought the Palestinians to the brink of political, diplomatic, and social ruin, into a conventional player in the Palestinian political system.  He is seeking to gain Hamas complicity in its political undoing or, more likely, his own.  And all the while, the newly proposed national unity arrangement is supposed to be the basis of controlling Gaza so the Israelis will reengage and withdraw from additional territory either unilaterally or after negotiations - reinforcing Israeli willingness to confront the settlers. The problem is that the PA is not strong enough to confront Hamas or to withstand its political clout if it tries to share power with it. While the alternative outcomes of the confrontation with the settlers seem clear, if stark, it is difficult to envision a successful result through the bog of Palestinian maneuvering.

Disengagement is a good plan, but if it fails it would not be the first time in the period since 9/11 that good plans were foiled by poor implementation. For the present, both sides are preoccupied with their respective high dramas with the settlers and Hamas.  It is a great shame that each is distracted at home at the very moment when they should be turning their attention to each other more intensely to coordinate ways to deal with the advent of new technical, trade, security, political and human problems that will be created by the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza..

The Israelis and Palestinians must focus on the dynamics of implementing disengagement instead of concentrating on domestic politics and passion.  Regrettably, it seems that everything is being left to chance and the good offices of James Wolfensohn and General William Ward. Let's face it. The Israelis and Palestinians need help and they are not receiving enough of it. If they don't get it shortly, the debate over who lost disengagement may be coming soon to your favorite cable channel, website, or blog.

Written by IPF National Scholar Steven Spiegel and IPF Staff in Washington DC and Jerusalem.