Udi Segal and Alon Pinkas: Israel’s Election and the Peace Process

On February 11, Steven L. Spiegel moderated an Israel Policy Forum discussion about the implications of Israel's election with Udi Segal, diplomatic correspondent for Israel's Channel 2 News, and Alon Pinkas, Israel's former consul general in New York and head of the Rabin Center's Institute for Israel-U.S. Relations. The following is a summary of their remarks.

The election results

Alon Pinkas:

Israel's election was like a Seinfeld episode, i.e., about nothing. The public didn't even know why elections were being held, except that they seem to come up every two years or so.

Some Israeli pundits call it the "Al Gorization" of Tzipi Livni-she got more votes, yet the coalition will most likely be formed by Benyamin Netanyahu.

Udi Segal:

People here thought that we were in an American presidential race. That Tzipi Livni is Obama and that Benyamin Netanyahu is McCain, or vice-versa. But we have a different political system-one where the majority of the elected parties chooses a prime minister.

What the right-wing's electoral victory means for the peace process

Udi Segal:

In this election, Israelis said no to the two-state solution, as they had understood it. The shift to the right is, at least in part, because Israelis have come to believe over the last few years that there is no real chance to have a meaningful peace process. By choosing the right-wing, they are saying no to the negotiations Ehud Olmert began. The majority of those that were elected to the new Knesset are against the two-state solution.

Who is to blame? In part, Hamas' launching of rockets for more than eight years. In part, Mahmoud Abbas, who received a proposal from Ehud Olmert of 99.5 percent of the land in the West Bank and said, "Well, I don't know. I'll think it over. I don't think this is something I can do."

There is the possibility of working toward peace, but only with a centrist coalition, one that has a "Kadima center." If Netanyahu forms a right-wing coalition, the Obama administration should assume that nothing can be done to accomplish peace.

What difference would a broad or narrow government coalition make

Alon Pinkas:

There would be a significant difference in what a narrow right-wing coalition and a broad coalition could accomplish on the peace process, with the Palestinians as well as with Syria. Although Netanyahu has repeatedly declared his intention to form a broad national unity government, he is showing all the political signs that he first and foremost intends to solidify a right-wing bloc that will consist of the Likud, Yisrael Beitenu (Avigdor Lieberman's party), the ultra-religious Shas Party, and two other extreme right-wing parties. That would be sufficient to form, what we call in political jargon, a narrow right-wing coalition.

Udi Segal:

Netanyahu believes that in the next couple of weeks Kadima will come to realize that they don't have a chance to form a government. Once that happens, they will start signaling that they will join a Likud government, and the chance for a broad coalition would become more likely.

Would Netanyahu work toward peace as prime minister?

Udi Segal:

With Netanyahu as prime minister, the only chance for progress with the Palestinians is to go back to the idea of an arrangement that doesn't address final status issues.

Annapolis launched two processes: one was top-down talks between Ehud Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas on a solution toward a Palestinian state; the other was bottom-up and predominantly worked on the forming of a new security force. Netanyahu would likely promote the second-bottom-up-part of the process.

Alon Pinkas:

I have a different, heretical, view. If he forms a broad coalition government, then Netanyahu has the best chance to get along with the Obama administration because both administrations need success. Neither can afford to fail: the Americans in the Middle East and Netanyahu domestically as a recycled, second-tenure prime minister.

However, Netanyahu is now saying, "Let's depart from the final status agreement-the ambitious, comprehensive Camp David-style arrangement-and go back to economic development-based interim agreements. It is doubtful that that is going to be endorsed enthusiastically at the State Department or the White House. That said, the Obama administration wants to succeed and might allow Netanyahu some time and some latitude, while he is tested.

There is agreement in the United States that there needs to be a major effort in terms of economic infrastructure and major economic development in the West Bank. Is that a substitute to a political process? No. Is that going to get Netanyahu off the hook in terms of the two-state solution? Absolutely not. But if Netanyahu convinces the Americans that this could work and everyone can benefit, his plan could actually take off.

Would American pressure help advance the peace process?

Alon Pinkas:

The idea of American pressure is unwelcome in Israel. However, the word pressure is amenable to many different definitions and levels of intensity. What if, for example, four months down the road, Obama entertains the King of Saudi Arabia at the White House or goes to Riyadh and then says that he has thoroughly read a new Saudi peace plan, thinks that it is a positive move in the right direction, and would love to hear Israel's reaction to it. That amounts to pressure. Pressure doesn't mean, "This is the White House number. Call us when there's a problem," as James Baker did in '91 and '92.

Udi Segal:

America doesn't need to put any pressure on Israel because pressure exists inherently in the relationship between Washington and Jerusalem. Israel needs things from the United States, particularly on the Iranian issue. That in itself is pressure on a Netanyahu coalition-or any coalition.

What would Netanyahu's position be on Iran?

Alon Pinkas:

Netanyahu sees Iran as the major national security threat and challenge facing Israel, and he knows that if he is prime minister he needs to engage the Obama administration in a very delicate way. He cannot be perceived as pushing America into any kind of action that has opposition inside Washington, let alone throughout the United States.

Everyone asks, "What will happen when President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu first meet?" Well, the first meeting is going to be wonderful. They're going to pat each other on the shoulder and talk about a whole range of things and swear on their mothers' graves that they're both going to cooperate.

What's important is actually the second meeting. If, by that time, Obama is not convinced that Netanyahu's coalition has serious intentions on the Palestinian-or even, for that matter, the Syrian issue-then that will have a major impact on the type of dialogue Israel and the United States will have on Iran.