Understanding the Implications of the Final Winograd Report

The final Winograd report issued on Wednesday will likely close a chapter in the long discussions, recriminations, and critiques that followed the Second Lebanon War. The big winner was Ehud Olmert, who is likely to keep his position now until elections are next held, presumably in early 2010, barring unforeseen circumstances. 

While not fully exonerating him, the report did Olmert a favor: by blaming everyone, it blamed no one.  "We found grave faults and failings both in the political and military echelons in the lack of thinking and strategic planning," the report read, "and we found grave faults and failings in everything concerning the defense of the civilian population."

The report also took Olmert off the hook by suggesting that the decision to expand the war in its crucial last days was correct, because it gained Israel political assets in terms of the final UN resolution. The security cabinet's decision on August 9th to approve the IDF's recommendation for a ground offensive, Winograd said, was a "practically essential decision," that " provided Israel with necessary diplomatic flexibility."

Sure, the report criticized the decision making system and the preparedness of the IDF, but it also criticized the actions of the two previous Prime Ministers, Sharon and Barak.  With blame spread so widely, it is all the easier for Olmert to escape the political guillotine. 

It is no surprise that Kadima reacted to the report by rallying behind its leader; taking Olmert off the hook does the same for his party.  As for the Labor party, its chief, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, will almost surely remain in the Cabinet given the likely possibility that if elections were held today Binyamin Netanyahu would be the winner. 

Likud can try to hang Olmert with the report, but the problem with that strategy is that most Knesset members do not want imminent elections.  And the report did not really provide the basis for an ouster of the Prime Minister, instead asserting that "there was no failure in the decision itself. . .," and that ". . .both the prime minister and the defense minister operated out of a strong and honest assessment and understanding of what, to them, was seen as necessary for Israel's interests."

The Winograd Committee did critique the preparations, training, and strategy of the IDF, finding that "there was no proper discussion or decision on the war's objective for several weeks," and "there was also a serious delay in preparing for a wide-scale ground operation."  Because of this failure the ground operation that was launched in the last 60 hours of the war and resulted in the deaths of  33 soldiers, "did not achieve any military objectives. . .  reduce the Katyusha fire . . .  or achieve significant accomplishments."

But by now, the criticism that a major military opportunity was lost is widely accepted, and the major military figures responsible for the mistakes in 2006 are mostly gone. Indeed, the IDF has been hard at work in the long term process of correcting the errors of the past and a new team has taken over.
 
Unexpected problems are always possible in politics, especially Israeli politics, but Olmert now has Shas with him-so long as he does not discuss Jerusalem with the Palestinians-which ensures him a majority of Knesset seats for the foreseeable future. If negotiations with the Palestinians should be successful, and a comprehensive agreement was in hand, Olmert would almost surely have to go to elections anyway to gain public approval.

Thus, in a strange way Olmert may now have more reason to move forward on the peace front with the Palestinians, and even potentially with Syria.  Assuming this assessment is correct, with Winograd largely settled he will be able to return to his original focus on the peace process itself. The talk-even reality-of a weak Israeli leader unable to make decisions should now be less critical. This could, and even should, raise prospects for movement in the peace process.

Of course, it takes two to negotiate and Olmert's apparent survival does not guarantee the strengthening of Mahmoud Abbas.  He will require more bolstering than ever from the international community on the economic, political, and security fronts.  Hamas is not going to disappear just because Olmert survived the Winograd report.  And the failures of the international community to move the process forward since 2000 shows no signs of abating despite Annapolis and the President's trip. If Olmert survives, as it is almost certain he will now, the Israeli right will be even more ardent in opposing his every move toward accommodation even on relatively minor matters such as the dismantling of illegal outposts and the freezing of construction on settlements.  Dealing with core issues such as borders, refugees, and Jerusalem will be as daunting as ever.

Beyond these issues, we do not really know whether Olmert is a cautious survivor or a potential political hero who was constrained by the aftermath of the Hezbollah war, which broke out only three months after his electoral victory.  Now, however, there will be fewer excuses for the Prime Minister on political grounds.  If Israel is going to move forward after the Second Lebanon War, the time has arrived.  And we will know soon enough whether Ehud Olmert is not only a survivor, but a man of courage and foresight.  Few politicians get a second chance; Ehud Olmert has been given one.  Let's see what he can do with it.