U.S. Engagement in Israel’s Talks with Syria

On July 14th Israel Policy Forum released a paper that advocates U.S. involvement in the indirect talks between Israel and Syria to help secure an agreement. To discuss the status of the negotiations Steven L. Spiegel, a National Scholar of IPF, moderated a conference call the following day between two of the paper's signatories, Ambassador Robert Pelletreau and Ambassador Edward Walker. The content of that discussion appears below in Q&A form.

Last week's "Club Med" conference in Paris featured a carefully choreographed appearance of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Syrian President Bashar Assad. Although the two leaders stood only inches away from each other, they did not officially "meet" or shake hands.

Who were the winners and losers of the Paris conference?

Ambassador Pelletreau: Assad was a clear winner at last week's conference. By coming to Paris and participating in the Bastille Day Parade, he is ending Syria's relative isolation. His participation showed that Europe, and France in particular, is moving beyond the Rafik Hariri assassination and looking for a new relationship with Syria. Furthermore, by not meeting or shaking hands with Prime Minister Olmert, who was clearly trolling the corridors for handshakes and eye contact, Assad showed that Syria is controlling the form and the pace of its current indirect negotiations with Israel.

Ambassador Walker: The real loser in this process was President Bush. The Bush administration's policy of not talking to Syria is bankrupt. The very fact that America's closest ally, Israel, is engaged in indirect negotiations with Syria, while the United States sits on the sidelines and allows French President Nicholas Sarkozy to pursue his efforts at reconciliation, undercuts the Bush position on Hariri and Iraq. It furthermore gives all the credit, and the due credit, to the Turks for their mediation efforts. But the final denouement is that a peace deal cannot be achieved without the United States. Syria made it clear in Paris that it is the United States that it is trying to entice into this discussion.

What has the U.S. position been in previous Israel-Syria talks?

Ambassador Pelletreau: The history of Israeli-Syrian negotiations has always included a central role for the United States. A notable example is Secretary Henry Kissinger's 1973-1975 shuttle diplomacy that resulted in the disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria, which has been well-observed by both parties. The United States, therefore, has a reputation for being able to overcome the distrust on both sides through its involvement.

What could the United States gain from an Israel-Syria agreement?

Ambassador Walker: The United States stands to gain a great deal from an Israel-Syria agreement. It has an interest in Syrian engagement in Iraq and a stabilization of their common border. There is an additional interest in where Hezbollah will wind up in the Lebanese and regional contexts, as well as in weakening Iran's ability to undercut U.S. efforts on the Israeli-Palestinian peace track. All of these issues center on Syria. If there is an agreement between Syria and Israel, the United States would come out as one of the winners, not to mention the Israelis and the Syrians, and the losers would possibly be Hezbollah and the Iranians. But unless the United States is engaged in that agreement, some of its interests may fall by the wayside.

However, the Bush administration has dug itself into a position on Syria where it would be embarrassing for them to say now, "Well, gee. The Israelis are talking to them. Maybe we should, too."

What is the current U.S. position on Israel-Syria talks?

Ambassador Pelletreau:  The Bush administration's attitude has been "you are either for us or against us." And Syria is either unwilling or unable to jump completely into the American camp. They have been promoting a certain amount of cross-border traffic into Iraq, and certainly, they have been unwilling to give up the various bundles of assets that they have accumulated to strengthen their bargaining position, and that includes their relationship with Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as with Iran.

Ambassador Walker: President Bush does not seem to think that there is a real chance for peace between Syria and Israel. He has put emphasis, in more recent years, on the Palestinian track and has sort of ignored any chance of a Syrian-Israeli peace. This after all, was the Israeli policy for a considerable period of time until just recently. So Bush has been following the path that has been outlined for him, to a certain extent, by Olmert.

How has Israeli diplomacy influenced the American position?

Ambassador Pelletreau: Olmert has not really made a significant push in Washington yet. If he did, and if the various friends of Israel could be mobilized in that effort, it would be much harder for the Bush administration to continue to stand apart.

Is Olmert able to pursue a peace agreement while he is so politically weak and with his term likely to end in the coming months?

Ambassador Pelletreau: Ehud Olmert realizes that he is on the ropes politically at home. The Likud Party has had a field day criticizing him for his attitudes in Paris. But Olmert is using every gesture he can in the international field to show that he is not paralyzed and that he is actively seeking to promote Israel's interests in broader peace.

How might Olmert's potential political challengers-Benyamin Netanyahu, Ehud Barak, Shaul Mofaz, and Tzipi Livni-continue, or discontinue, Israel-Syria talks?

Ambassador Pelletreau: They would all likely continue the process. Any new Israeli leader is likely to be willing to explore a serious opening with Syria. They would approach it, however, with less of an aura of desperation than Olmert is showing now.

Ambassador Walker: That's right, but it would depend, at least in part, on the strength and stability of the coalition behind that leader. There are internal factors that can work against any Israeli leader who talks with the Syrians. One is, of course, the fear among the broader settler movement that if settlements on the Golan are sacrificed it would be precedence for West Bank settlements. These political strains in Israel would make any new leader very cautious to start with.

Assad refused to shake Olmert's hand in Paris. Does he desire a peace agreement? Is he able to achieve it?

Ambassador Walker:  Assad has to think about his domestic situation as well. He can't move so fast in the process that he goes out in front of the United States and Israel, as well as in front of his own people. So it is not surprising that there wasn't a handshake. What would be surprising would be if Olmert really thought that there would be one.

The negotiations will not necessarily be easy. On the other hand, Assad has an interest in improving Syria's economy, which is in serious jeopardy. Oil production is declining even though the price of oil is high. That can cause enormous instability inside Syria and destabilize the regime whose primary objective seems to be staying in power. Assad is looking for a way to increase Syria's economic activity, to add jobs, and to build the wealth of the people. This may make him more open to negotiations. However, a critical component is the attitude of the United States toward negotiations.

How can Turkey influence this process?

Ambassador Walker: Turkey has long been interested in the Arab-Israel equation. It's logical for Turkey to engage on the Syria-Israel issue. First of all, they share a border with Syria. Syria, Israel, and Turkey share questions on water resources. Turkey is likely to reap benefits if indeed there is an agreement. It would reduce tensions and maybe even solve some of the border issues. Generally, it would provide a better atmosphere.

And then there's the next question for Turks, "If we can't join the Europeans, then maybe we'd better open more doors for ourselves and accentuate our relationship with the Arab world and with Israel." The Turks, therefore, see an opening and are making a calculated, and effective, diplomatic move.

How could Iran's ascendance affect the region? How should the next administration handle the talks in light of this?

Ambassador Walker: As a result of the Iraq conflict, there has been some shifting in the regional balance of power from West to East toward Iran. After the United States effectively eliminated Iran's competitors in the region, and made it the balancing factor in the region. That is not necessarily a sustainable position in the long run, depending on what the next president decides to do, but as long as there are two carriers in the Gulf, the United States is in pretty good shape. But does it really want to keep them there forever?

A more stable regional balance is a critical issue for all of the Middle East that could be helped if the next administration tried to develop a different kind of relationship with Iran.

Ambassador Pelletreau: It seems today that every single major issue we face in the Middle East is worse than it was seven and a half years ago. There is a real appeal among our traditional friends in the Middle East for a restoration of American leadership in the region, but it's going to take a lot of effort and a lot of time to regain lost ground.