What Next For Arafat?

All options lead to a dead end – except for the one already on the table.

The Israeli Cabinet's announcement of its intention to exile Yasir Arafat, followed by the United Nations Security Council debate on a resolution condemning Israel for doing so, has raised questions about Arafat's future.  In fact, Arafat's successful marginalization of Mahmoud Abbas - which led to his resignation as prime minister - suggests that Arafat continues to be the most significant Palestinian actor, and the biggest obstacle to the Palestinians internal effort to end violence.  This raises serious questions for Americans, Israelis and Palestinians, and suggests that the answer may be, "we can't live with him, can't live without him."

The following is a risk/reward analysis of seven options being considered by Israelis, Americans and even some Palestinians for Arafat's future.

1. Expulsion. Expelling Arafat would get him out of the region but would still enable him to influence events, both over the telephone from his place of exile or through his skillful use of the international media that would inevitably be close at hand.  Furthermore, an IDF effort to remove him could easily result in his Arafat's death.   There is, in fact, no safe way to simply remove Arafat from the scene.  Given the human shields that now surround the compound, the mission would be even messier.

2. Assassination. Assassinating Arafat, beyond the grave moral implications raised by such an act, would elevate him to near mythic status and might kill the peace process once and for all.  It would radicalize Palestinian politics, dealing a lethal blow to the moderates we are trying to strengthen and likely ensuring the end of the two state solution.  And, as was evidenced by the almost universal reaction to the suggestion of assassination, it would estrange Israel from most of the world.  Ze'ev Schiff writes in Wednesday's Ha'aretz that, "in any case, and it is important to emphasize this, there is a consensus among the security forces that removing or killing Arafat will broaden the bloody clashes, which could spread to Israeli Arabs."

3. Isolation. Another idea is to leave Arafat where he is, but cut off his cell phone and his visitors.  Even some who are deeply opposed to killing or expelling him believe this alternative has at least some merit as a temporary palliative: it might give Abu Ala a chance to get stronger (legally, Abu Mazen is still prime minister), and in this light it might allow for the unification of the security services under someone besides Arafat.   In the long run,  Abu Ala and company would probably be seriously constrained by Arafat's being closed in.  So, even if it were worth doing as a way of weakening Arafat momentarily, the strategy might backfire in the long term.

4. Talk to him. There are some voices who argue that since there is no way to get out of dealing with Arafat, the best alternative is to return to negotiations with him.  They also argue that only Arafat can deliver.  It is possible that, having triumphed over his adversaries, he now has an interest in serious negotiations as a means of strengthening his own position. His calculations would now be the exact reverse of Camp David, where he thought that cutting a deal would destroy him. The trouble with this argument is that even if it is correct today, Arafat has long proved that he cannot pursue a consistent negotiating policy over time.  Chances are he would reverse strategies again.  Besides, at this time, there is no way that the current American and Israeli governments would deal with him.

5. The US should oust Arafat. Some argue that Arafat should be ousted, but not by Israel.  Therefore, the US should join forces with its Arab and European partners to do the job itself.  The proponents of this position usually maintain that the administration should not use force as the Israelis would have to do, but should persuade Arafat that it is time to go.  This option sounds good in theory, but given Arafat's popularity in the street, likely opposition by the Arabs and the Europeans, and America's problems in Iraq, there is almost no chance of this happening. Most importantly, why would Arafat go?  Thanks in part to Israel's threats, he is more popular than ever.  What could the US and company possibly offer him to make it worth his while?  His whole life is tied up with being a symbol for the Palestinians, and he has plenty of money. He doesn't care if he's practically in jail already.  Why leave?

The proponents of this policy point out that over the years the US has successfully convinced leaders to depart:  Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, Raul Cedras of Haiti, and most recently Charles Taylor of Liberia.  But in each case these tyrants were less popular, were ruling illegitimately, had significant opposition, had much to lose by staying, and were not prepared to die. None of these points apply to Arafat.

Assume for a moment that we could somehow persuade him to leave.  It's true that Marcos and Cedras went into semi-quiet exile; and the jury is still out on Taylor, though he still seems to be exercising some influence in Liberia.  But it's inconceivable that Arafat would go quietly.  All the problems attendant to the expulsion option above would return.  Proponents of this strategy often admit that coaxing Arafat out would create a major uproar in the Arab world, including among the Palestinians, because he would obviously be leaving under pressure.  But they argue that after the storm passed, the Palestinian prime minister would be able to consolidate much more power.  In other words, they claim, Arafat would be out, but Israel would not be doing the dirty work and it would not require the use of force.  Still, advocates of this position make a leap of faith that Arafat would become irrelevant and the Palestinian prime ministers would have greater freedom and flexibility.  Nothing in Palestinian history reinforces this point.  Rabin turned to Arafat originally in the Oslo deal because no Palestinian could make a move without him.  Little has changed now.

There is one scenario where ousting Arafat could make a difference: if Israel undertook major unilateral concessions, combined with a massive aid program to the Palestinians, so that the street saw quickly the positive fruits of Arafat's absence.  That could well work if Israel and the international community were prepared to take these risks, a huge assumption unto itself, but it returns us to the fundamental problem with this strategy: Arafat won't leave, even under international pressure.  Thus we're back to square one.

6. Beat Arafat at his own game. Arafat relies for his power on his symbolic connection with the people.  According to the polls, only one Palestinian leader comes close to rivaling him -- Marwan Barghouti, who is sitting in an Israeli jail.  Some argue that if the Israelis released him, he could move in and oust Arafat on his own.  The argument here for Barghouti is that while he did acquiesce in terrorist acts during the recent intifada, he was a known moderate beforehand and a strong supporter of peace.  From his jail cell he has been the a leading advocate for and architect of a ceasefire.  He is someone with whom Israel could deal.  Advocates of this strategy assume he would play along with this strategy, and work actively against Arafat--an assumption for which there is no evidence.  Releasing Barghouti would also be a controversial and potentially risky move for Sharon.

7. Back to the roadmap. The above six strategies for dealing with Arafat all have major flaws, bringing us back to the original roadmap strategy --easing Arafat "upstairs" into a symbolic post in favor of a political reform movement and a prime minister.  This policy did not work this summer, and Arafat essentially staged a counter-coup in forcing Abu Mazen to resign and in inhibiting Abu Allah from the start.

But in terms of dealing with Arafat, resurrecting the roadmap might work if a more courageous and effective prime minister than Abu Mazen emerged, if Israel had the confidence in him to make more concessions, and if the US demonstrated sustained interest.  For this strategy to operate effectively, the Palestinian security services would have to be unified under the prime minister, not Arafat.  The prime minister would need funds to train operatives and gain support, and the international community would have to provide the political-military backup, operatives, and forces if necessary to support such a government.  While the opponents argue that the roadmap has been tried and failed, the proponents submit that this strategy has yet to be tried because of a weak first prime minister, a skeptical Israel which offered almost no support, and an almost non-existent US policy.

The Bush administration can succeed in achieving both a ceasefire and the resumption of negotiations using the roadmap as its framework.  But it cannot do it long distance.  The President promised to be engaged, but wasn't.  The US envoy was supposed to be in charge of a team of monitors who would report what each party was doing and not doing.  None of that happened.  The bottom line then is that neither the Arafat problem nor the overall failure of diplomacy requires a new plan.  But they do require the United States to fully live up to its commitments.

The only alternatives to the above are options that most governments have hitherto rejected:  either a full Israeli reoccupation of Gaza and the West Bank, an Israeli security fence wherever Israel wants to put it, or an international trusteeship of some kind for Palestine.  Right now, the administration cannot afford to back off for fear of bad timing, or worry about upcoming elections, or be diverted elsewhere--especially Iraq.  If it doesn't salvage its own policy, the new circumstances will leave us even worse off than we are now.  And if anyone doubts that prediction, then they ought to think about the events of the last three months.