Abbas’ Proposal for an Undeclared Settlement Freeze: Transparent Ploy or Plea for Help?

INSS Insight No. 151, December 20, 2009

In an interview with Haaretz on December 15, Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas repeated his longstanding position that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations can only resume after Israel implements a complete freeze on settlement construction throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. But in a new wrinkle that might have been intended as a sign of flexibility, he added that negotiations could begin immediately, even if the freeze is not publicly declared.

At first glance, this is not a serious proposition. Abbas knows perfectly well that a surreptitious settlement freeze is a practical impossibility. Given the inevitable reaction of the settlers – already manifested in their ongoing opposition to the partial and temporary freeze declared by the Israel government – as well as the intrusive presence of the international and Israeli media, there is absolutely no chance that any attempt to impose such a freeze would remain unpublicized and, consequently, no chance that an “undeclared” freeze would be one iota less problematic for the Israeli government than a declared freeze.

The most plausible explanation for his rather curious addendum is therefore that Abbas is not really interested in a re-launch of negotiations – though this is the ardent wish of the United States and the rest of the international community, which continue to fund his government and security forces – but that he would like to show ostensible flexibility in order to shift the onus for the absence of renewed talks onto the Israeli side. The premise behind this explanation is that renewed negotiations would either produce some movement, exposing him to accusations of weakness and capitulation just at a time when Hamas has defiantly reaffirmed its total commitment to the path of uncompromising resistance, or would simply reconfirm the futility of negotiations, which would also validate Hamas’ approach. According to this calculus, which has apparently been embraced by the Israeli government, Abbas actually fears more negotiations but can exploit the international preoccupation with settlements to portray Israeli recalcitrance on this issue as the real obstacle to their resumption.

There is, however, another possible interpretation to the interview: that while an undeclared freeze is logically absurd, Abbas is nevertheless looking for some way to climb back down from the “precondition” limb onto which he was pushed by the original American demand earlier this year for a complete settlement freeze. That demand was ill-advised in two respects. First of all, it was unrealistic: there was not the slightest chance that this Israeli government would comply absent American pressure of such a brutal and unrelenting character as to be politically inconceivable. Second, and even more destructively, it painted Abbas into a corner by forcing him to demand no less than what the Obama administration was demanding but leaving him unable to adjust because his public opinion – unlike Obama’s – could not acknowledge Israeli political imperatives and subsequently accommodate any understanding with Israel's prime minister Netanyahu on partial compliance.

The hypothesis that Abbas views this as an uncomfortable dilemma from which he would like to escape is strengthened by the fact that he communicated his message directly to Israelis via an Israeli journalist, which is a rather unusual step for him, and the premise behind it is that Abbas genuinely does want renewed negotiations. According to this interpretation, Abbas sees the status quo as tolerable because of improving economic conditions in the West Bank, the growing effectiveness of his security forces, and agile maneuvering around the incumbency issue (he has not retreated from his commitment not to present his candidacy in the next presidential election but has secured PLO authorization to extend his term of office until postponed elections can be held, and has succeeded in putting the blame for the delay on Hamas). Nevertheless, this situation is not seen as sustainable indefinitely, because continuing paralysis on the political track erodes the viability and legitimacy of the strategic alternative he poses to Hamas’ approach and leaves day-to-day stability hostage to some unpredictable and uncontrollable event.

Israeli decision makers who oppose a complete settlement freeze either out of genuine conviction or calculation that the domestic political and social costs would far outweigh the possible diplomatic benefits can certainly find grounds to embrace the first interpretation of Abbas’ interview and dismiss his proposal as simply a ploy to ward off calls for negotiations without preconditions. But those who share the concern about the sustainability of the current situation of “no war, no peace, no talks” attributed to him in the second interpretation will find cause at least to explore whether or not there is anything to it. After all, pressure to restart negotiations, especially from the Obama administration, will almost certainly revive in early 2010. In addition, the ability of the Palestinian Authority to continue functioning properly – which many in the Israeli security establishment consider to be a major Israeli interest – could come under new threat from terrorist attacks, fallout from the global economic recession, or even the strengthening of Hamas’ standing following any deal on Gilad Shalit.

This does not mean that even those Israelis who view renewed negotiations as a matter of some urgency can accede to Abbas’ demand as currently formulated. They may, however, find in his message a signal of some desire to look together for a face-saving way around the current impasse, perhaps in the form of undeclared implementation of longstanding commitments on the so-called “unauthorized” settlements or an internationally-monitored commitment to halt immediately all construction activity in any areas to be transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction according to a negotiated agreement on borders, no matter how long implementation of that agreement would actually take.

Such ideas may prove to be sterile. After all, possibilities to square the circle are, in the nature of things, notoriously elusive. But one other useful element would be an Obama administration acknowledgment, even undeclared, of the need to avoid depositing any more circles on the road in the future.

This column is re-published with the permission of the Institute for National Security Studies.