Ambassador Indyk Tells All: Pretty Amazing Interview

Check out this interview from Yediot Achronoth.  And, unconstrained by official responsibility, he actually says what he thinks.  This interview will not make him more popular in Israel but it will confirm the view here that few, if any, in this country understand the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-American scenes better than Indyk.

Yedioth Ahronoth (an interview by by Nahum Barnea and Shimon Shiffer -
 
  Your book, we said, provides one major lesson with regard to US
administrations: Your [administrations] are very naïve, make many errors
and frequently fail.  Why should Netanyahu listen to you?
  “We are not the only ones who have failed,” Indyk said.  “You too
have erred and failed.  We failed, among other reasons, because
President Clinton did his best to meet the wishes of your prime
ministers.  There were other reasons: lack of leadership on Assad’s
part, errors made by Arafat and opportunities missed by Israel.  There
is a lot of failure to go around.  The first lesson is humility,
humility for everyone.  We should be more modest, less naïve, less
arrogant.
  “Netanyahu should listen to Obama because Obama is telling him, in
essence, that resolving the conflict is an American interest.  What is
happening at present is that the Israeli-Arab conflict serves as an
instrument in the hands of America’s enemies—Iran, Hizbullah and Hamas.
Time is not working in Israel’s favor or in favor of peace.”
  On existential questions, we said, there is a fundamental difference
between the United States and Israel, we said.  You Americans are in the
bleachers, and we are on the playing field.  As Golda Meir said, we
can’t afford to err twice.
  “There is no question that Israel is taking a tangible risk,” he
replied.  “But all these years, the US has been strengthening you
precisely for this purpose—so that you can take the risk of making
peace.  How exactly can the Palestinians destroy you?  The real
existential danger is that you will not succeed in parting from them.”
  Look what happened in Gaza, we said.  It is doubtful whether we can
afford to have a Hamastan in the West Bank.
  “That is a good argument for a debate, but not a recipe for policy,”
he said.  “You left Gaza unilaterally, without an agreement.  No one is
talking about a unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank.”
  You describe in your book what happened in 2000, we said, how Ehud
Barak and Shlomo Ben-Ami placed generous proposals on the table that
Arafat rejected one after another.  Could this have been managed
differently?

On Syria

  “Yes,” he said, “it could have been done differently.  The joint
strategy, ours and yours, was Syria first.  At the Shepherdstown
conference of January 2000, when we missed the chance to reach an
agreement with the Syrians, Arafat experienced a turnabout.  Until then,
he was afraid of being left behind.  After the failure with the Syrians,
Barak and Clinton—as President Bush rightfully said—courted Arafat
desperately.  Had there been an agreement with Syria, the equation would
have been different.
  “I write in the book that for seven years, Hafez Assad was interested
in the process, not the outcome, but before his death he underwent a
change: he wanted to reach a deal.  The fact is that over the years, he
refused to send a senior figure to direct negotiations with Israel.
Prior to his death, he sent his foreign minister Farouk Ashara to the
talks.
  “When Ashara came to Washington to negotiate with Barak, we dealt
with the question why he did not shake his hand and why he condemned
Israel in his speech, and ignored the most important thing he said: it
is a dispute over borders, not an existential conflict.  The Syrians
were prepared for a series of compromises.  People who read my book say
that Barak did not have the courage to complete an agreement with the
Syrians.  Barak is a courageous man, there is no argument about that.
The problem was the timing.  The moment to finalize an agreement with
Assad was between December 1999 and February 2000.  Had Barak risen to
the occasion at the right moment, it would have changed everything.”
  You were recently in Damascus, we said, as the guest of Foreign
Minister Walid Muallem.  With what insight did you return from there?
  “There is greater flexibility than in the past in Syria,” he said.
“Not on territory—it would be a mistake to think that they have changed
their position.  They will not cede a single centimeter of territory.
But if Israel recognizes Syria’s sovereignty over the entire Golan, they
will be willing to talk about what remains, including Israeli
communities under Syrian sovereignty.”
The three windows
  In the book, we said, you describe how you [i.e., the administration]
blatantly intervened in the Israeli elections of 1996 in favor of Peres
and against Netanyahu.  How did you dare?
  “Don’t get so excited,” Indyk said.  “We are not alone in this story.
Now you can understand what Clinton felt when Netanyahu tried to incite
members of Congress against him.  Clinton acted the same way as
Netanyahu.  Why criticize him and not Netanyahu?  There is a double
standard here.  Incidentally, the intervention of both of them only
caused damage to their interests.  The lesson is: don’t try to
intervene.

On the Washington Netanyahu knew in his first stint as PM versus now

  “On his current visit to Washington, Netanyahu arrived in a different
city to the one he knew in 1996.  At that time, the Republicans had a
majority in both houses of Congress.  Netanyahu is more a Republican
than a Likudnik: the Republicans consider him one of their own.  Today,
the Republicans are in a difficult situation, and Obama, as a skilled
politician, understands this.”
  If you were in the administration today, we said, how would you treat
Netanyahu?
  “I think,” he said, “that Bibi suffers from the fact that many people
in the Obama administration know him too well: they were there during
Clinton’s time.  They have not forgotten.  I don’t know whether this
affects Obama.  He is a person who makes up his mind on his own.
Therefore, Netanyahu has the ability to build a relationship of trust
with him.  The condition is for him to keep his word.  Consistency, that
was his great problem with us in his previous term.”
  If Netanyahu follows your advice, we said, he may not have a
government.  He has political constraints.
  “Of course he has political constraints,” he said.  “There is great
appreciation in the US of the fact that Israel is a democratic country.
Conversely, if you don’t want to do anything, why should we help you.
Especially if you’re the one asking.
  “Bibi can’t behave with Washington like the boy who killed his
parents and then asked for mercy because he was an orphan.  He can’t
say, I can’t make compromises because I have Lieberman in my coalition.”
  That sounds, we said, like an invitation to a confrontation between
the two governments.
  “On the contrary,” he said.  “The principle that should guide the
Obama administration is to work with the Israeli government, not against
it.  Israel holds over 50 percent of the problem and over 50 percent of
the solution, because it has the West Bank.  You cannot persuade Israel
to make concessions by increasing its risk.  Obama is not waving a club
over Netanyahu, but starting from Condoleezza Rice’s tenure, the opinion
has taken root here that establishing a Palestinian state is an American
interest.  From that moment, the question is not only what is good for
Israel, but what serves US interests.
  “The situation is different from what it was during the Clinton
period, because then the Palestinian Authority was associated with the
entire territory and Rabin had a mandate from the voter to offer peace.
In the meantime, skepticism has grown among most Israelis, and among
most Palestinians too.
  “There are now three windows of opportunity.  The first: the shared
fear of Iran.  It should be examined whether the common interest is
enough to resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict.  The second window that
should be examined is whether the peoples in the region are so exhausted
by suffering and wars that they are willing to go to a solution.  The
third window is Syria.  Their proposals should be examined seriously.”
You were the ones who asked
  In your opinion, should the Obama administration set a target date
for the end of its negotiations with Iran, we asked.
  “The Israelis,” he said, “are the ones who taught us that there are
no sacred dates.  Israel’s governments broke every possible deadline in
their talks with the Arab world.  The question is not the target date,
it is whether there is progress in the negotiations.
  “To a certain degree, the Israeli policy is sabotaging the campaign
against Iran.  From time to time you say that they have reached the
point of no return in the nuclear project, and then you move the point
forward.  The discussion should be about the basis for progress: For
example, can the Russians be convinced to join the sanctions.  If we can
succeed in preventing the sale of anti-aircraft missiles from Russia to
Iran, we will buy time.
  “In my opinion, there are three clocks that are ticking at a
different pace.  The Iranians only want to drag things out.  Conversely,
the clock of Israel and the Arab states is ticking quickly.  They feel
that if Iran crosses the threshold, it will be too late to block it.
The American clock is somewhere between these two clocks.
  “We have to see whether Syria can be added to the peace camp.  This
will signal to the Iranians that they are not taking over the region.
On the contrary: They are paying a price for their policy.  We have to
demonstrate progress on the Palestinian issue.  We have to soften the
hostility towards the United States in the Arab and Muslim world.”
  In your book, we said, you speak about an American nuclear umbrella
for the entire region.  Is this possible?
  “Yes,” he said, “we have to do this.  One of the dangers in this
period is that additional elements will introduce nuclear weapons into
the region.  An Israeli attack on Iran will postpone the completion of
the project for two or three years, no more.  Military action may
ultimately be the lesser evil, but at the moment it is correct to go to
talks with Iran.”
  Perhaps, we said, the solution for the US is to leave the Middle East
conflict alone.  This way, you will save yourselves from downfalls.
  “We have tried that,” Indyk said.  “After Clinton’s effort came the
years in which Bush kept his distance.  What was the result?  You killed
each other.  More Israelis were killed from hostile acts during Bush’s
period than in Clinton’s period.”
  That is unfair to say, we said.  The 2000 Intifada was born after
Clinton’s Camp David.
  “Not Clinton’s, but yours, he said.  “We worked for you.  Rabin and
Peres made Oslo behind our backs, and we took responsibility for the
process nonetheless.  You were the ones who asked.  The same is true for
Barak.  Clinton felt that Barak had used him for his own purposes,
misled him.  But it was not Clinton who forced Barak to make concessions
to the Palestinians.  The only time when Clinton pressured Barak was in
the talks with the Syrians in Shepherdstown.  Barak held his own.
  “Conversely, when Bush was elected president—I was ambassador in Tel
Aviv—Sharon did not send the IDF into the West Bank for about 15 months.

When there was the terror attack in the Dolphinarium, Sharon said: Restraint is strength, and he held back.  Through Peres and Fuad he made it clear to Arafat that if he would stop the terror, Israel would restrain itself.  Sharon accepted the Mitchell report, which included a commitment to put a freeze on settlement activity.  He adopted the Tenet report, which tried to implement Mitchell.  Sharon went far in order to placate Bush.”

...

In your book, we said, criticism arises towards what you see as
excessive consideration by US administrations for internal Israeli
politics.
  “Democratic Israel is more understandable to the Americans,” he said.
“It is much more difficult for them to understand the Arab world.  They
tend to say, the Israelis are like us.  We speak the same language.
From the perspective of an American, Israeli politics are a very
difficult matter.  The political establishment is unwieldy.  It is
difficult to form a coalition, and difficult to maintain it.  There is
extortion and no stability.  It is very difficult to make long-term
plans.  All the prime ministers I knew refused to coordinate their moves
with the foreign ministers.  I am not telling you anything you don’t
already know.”
Netanyahu believed
  Why didn’t Rabin complete the agreement with Syria, we asked.
  “In October 1995,” he said, “a few weeks before the assassination,
Rabin was in Washington.  He said that he had to halt the negotiations
with the Syrians, because he stood before elections.  He doubted his
ability to achieve a majority for withdrawal from the Golan.  Rabin
didn’t believe, but Netanyahu believed.  His first intervention in
politics here was an attempt to prevent, by means of the Senate, the
stationing of US forces in the Golan—an important part of the agreement.
  “Netanyahu would come to me when I was ambassador, and question me
about what was happening with the Golan.  Why are you so concerned, I
asked.  Because if Rabin reaches an agreement on the Golan, he will win
by a large majority, he said.
  “That is why I say that Netanyahu will reach an agreement with Syria.
The left wing will be with him because of the agreement, and as a right
wing leader he will enjoy the support of the right wing.
  “Netanyahu negotiated with Assad.  Once again, behind our backs.  He
made more progress than Rabin and Peres.  Assad calculated—like his son
now—that Netanyahu could pass an agreement that the left wing would find
it difficult to pass.  That is the irony of the Middle East.”
  What can Obama learn from this, we asked.
  “When a US president puts his foot into the Middle East, he always
has a strategy that was carefully prepared—but prepared in Washington.
Every Middle Eastern leader will try to thwart his strategy, disrupt it,
slant it in his direction.  That is why we often fail, and that is why,
when one door closes, another one sometimes opens.  The conclusion is
that we have to be modest, flexible and understand the irony.”
  You first came to Israel as a Zionist, with the intention of making

aliya, we said.  Your stay in Israel during the Yom Kippur War made a change in you.

...

You can be paranoid and still be persecuted, we said.
 “It’s true,” Indyk said and sighed.  “Every generation an enemy
arises that tries to destroy the Jewish people.  Still, look how the
Jewish people has become stronger since the Holocaust.  Isn’t that
amazing?”