Coming Tensions between Washington and Jerusalem

There are mounting demands that the Obama administration aggressively pursue Israel-Arab peace, even as it seeks a diplomatic solution to tensions with Iran.

Depending on the circumstance, both of these objectives could entail significant tension between Jerusalem and Washington.

The administration is being urged to take what I believe is an overly optimistic view of the possibilities of significant progress with the Palestinians, although, insh'allah, perhaps peace is just an arm-twist away.

I think the view that in return for the Golan Heights and a freer hand in Lebanon, Syria will cut ties with Iran and the terrorist organizations Hezbullah and Hamas are, while worthy, equally unrealistic.

Finally, I think the odds are long that either a new diplomatic engagement or tougher sanctions will put a stop to Iran's accelerating plans to acquire a nuclear weapon.

Like the cries for the "liberation" of the public discourse from the alleged stranglehold imposed by hawkish pro- Israel elements, recommendations that Washington resume the role of "honest broker" assume that the local players are incapable of leading themselves to a resolution and that therefore, they need the intervention of the United States. The problem with the Bush administration's approach was not only that it allegedly watched from the sidelines but that even when engaged it reflected and protected the Israeli view and rarely, if ever, publicly applied pressure to Jerusalem for concessions.

The second criticism was also applied to the Clinton administration's approach - President Clinton, we are told in several memoirs of the Camp David Summit in the summer of 2000, was Israel's lawyer and salesman.

Clearly, if the Obama administration ratchets up pressure on settlement expansion, there will be increased friction between the two capitals.  Even if the incoming Netanyahu government dismantles settler "outposts", fulfilling a promise made years ago, that only applies to the settlements that were never approved by the Israeli government in the first place and which are, therefore, illegal under Israeli law.  Until now, with only a few exceptions, successive governments have lacked the requisite moxie to disperse them.  The deal that brought Labor into the Netanyahu coalition will require the government to "restrict...or dismantle...settlement construction...according to law."  There is less here than meets the eye.  Such a formula does not address the consensus Israeli view that construction continue in the settlements on the Israeli side of the security fence, territory Israel intends to keep.

The fact that Netanyahu has preferred cobbling together a coalition that would not prematurely force this issue is a good sign that he aims to avoid increased friction with the Obama administration.

There is quite narrow space in which to maneuver with respect to the Palestine issue.  That does not mean efforts to strengthen the Palestinian Authority should be abandoned.  If anything, they should be stepped up.  But while further investment is necessary, the Palestine file will not yield any great diplomatic rewards in the near future.

Reviving Syria-Israel talks is unlikely to create much space between Israel and America - in certain respects, like Syria's interests in Lebanon, Israel has in the past been more forthcoming than America.

The most likely source of discord is the Iranian scenario.  The point of departure for the administration is that risking a third front is both unwise and unnecessary and that, if push comes to shove, America will learn to live with a nuclear Iran as it learned to live with a nuclear China.  According to this scenario, taking into account Israel's three-pronged nuclear deterrent, Iran will act as a nation state and not a revolutionary chiliastic movement.

The Israeli view (and there is an unusually broad consensus about this) is that it will be impossible to learn to live with a nuclear armed Iran and that Iran is at least as likely to fulfill the rhetoric of President Ahmadinejad and even of the "moderate" Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.   Rafsanjani once told a mass gathering at Friday prayers in Tehran in 2001 that a nuclear armed Iran would not fear Israeli deterrence and that that it was "not irrational to contemplate an eventuality" wherein Iran would initiate a nuclear war against the Jewish state.  "If one day, the Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like those that Israel possesses now, then the imperialists' strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything," Rafsanjani said, while an Israeli nuclear counter-attack "will only harm the Islamic world."

How can Israelis live indefinitely under such a threat?  Imagine the atmosphere here at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis - could we have endured it for decades?

I cannot imagine any Israeli government dismissing these statements as merely bluster.  Both internal politics and sober analysis will block an Israeli decision to roll over and accept a nuclear Iran.  Any Israeli politician who stands for election having succumbed to an American desire to avoid this conflict will be at best completely marginalized.

The debate in Israel is not whether an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would be justified, but whether it would inflict significant enough damage to risk the ensuing hostilities, which will surely drag the United States into a further conflict. There is also debate over determining the point of no return after which any attack would risk a Iranian nuclear response or be too costly.  The upcoming sale of a sophisticated Russian ground to air defense system could be such a moment.  In any event, that moment will likely arrive before the Obama diplomatic initiative has played out.  And that would lead to the worst of both worlds: a clash between allies at a time of war.