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 <title>Mideast Peace Pulse</title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog</link>
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 <language>en</language>
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 <title>IPF Letter in The New York Times</title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/ipf-letter-new-york-times</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;To the Editor:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Re “&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/opinion/peace-without-partners.html&quot;&gt;Peace Without Partners&lt;/a&gt;,” by Ami Ayalon, Orni Petruschka and Gilead Sher (Op-Ed, April 24):&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;It is sobering yet productive that three distinguished Israelis are  generating ideas despite the unfortunate but realistic conclusion that  “a comprehensive peace agreement is unattainable right now.”&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Too many advocates of the two-state solution have given up altogether.  Others have moved to the left-wing fringe, mistakenly convinced that the  current deadlock can be overcome only through coercive pressure  tactics.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The writers have instead moved to the center, offering a measured,  pragmatic proposal that recognizes — but does not become paralyzed by —  the obstacles to a peace agreement.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The two-state solution remains the only viable way to resolve the  Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Keeping it alive in today’s political  environment will require ideas like these that pursue what is possible,  not what is ideal.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;DAVID A. HALPERIN&lt;br&gt; Exec. Director, Israel Policy Forum&lt;br&gt; New York, April 24, 2012&lt;/p&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/ipf-letter-new-york-times#comments</comments>
 <pubDate>Fri, 27 Apr 2012 09:09:39 -0400</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Israel Policy Forum</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">3438 at http://www.israelpolicyforum.org</guid>
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 <title>In Meeting, A Chance for A Regional Approach</title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/meeting-chance-regional-approach</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;Today, President Barack Obama meets with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after weeks of speculation about how the two countries will address the threat of Iran potentially obtaining nuclear weapons, and with little expectation for progress on Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. &amp;nbsp;However, the Iranian threat – coupled with the historic changes of governments across the Middle East – could actually serve as a strategic opportunity for these leaders to address Iran while advancing regional democratic efforts alongside Israeli-Palestinian peace.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;In the United States, the upcoming presidential elections will keep domestic legislation from moving forward. &amp;nbsp;But while domestic efforts are made fruitless by uncooperative political agendas, the Obama administration still can act with relatively greater liberty in the international arena.&amp;nbsp; And on the Iranian question, neither the Obama administration – nor Israel – can afford to ignore the issue until after the U.S. presidential election.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Actively addressing the threat means mobilizing an international community that has acknowledged the issue, but has been reluctant to act. &amp;nbsp;Still, the dangers of a nuclear Iran are now beginning to be understood, even by nations like Russia and China. &amp;nbsp;The creation of a regional nuclear arms race, and an emboldened Iran serving as an ideological pillar of fundamentalist Islam, would have lasting consequences on the nascent democratic movements that sprouted across the region just one year ago. Already Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have indicated their intention to acquire nuclear arms if Iran will obtains one.&amp;nbsp; Stalling to act could fatally endanger democratization in the region and tarnish the legacies of all leaders who enabled such developments, whether Arab, Israeli or American.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;If Iran succeeds in becoming a nuclear-armed regional power, it would be a colossal setback for the U.S., Israel and the Sunni world, whose ever-present and centuries-long feud with Shi’ah Islam cannot be understated.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Recent actions taken by the often-confrontational Arab League indicate a significant – and encouraging – change of mindset. &amp;nbsp;The Arab League’s unprecedentedly bold maneuvers in Libya, Yemen and Syria suggest that this body could be utilized in new and creative ways.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;While the Arab Peace Initiative has been all but forgotten, President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu should use their meeting to begin to develop a dialogue regarding ways to encourage this motivated Arab League to re-endorse the initiative as part of an incentive package of democratization assistance and strategic measures aimed at security assurances against an emboldened Iran.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Prime Minister Netanyahu primary concern is the threat from Iran. Israel’s ability to militarily prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon appears limited.&amp;nbsp; But Netanyahu’s personal conviction to address the threat leads us to believe that he would do everything he can to find a solution to eliminate it.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Meanwhile, for President Obama to garner the kind of international support necessary to institute the kind of measures that could impede Iran’s development of nuclear weapons – including from the Sunni Arab world – he must begin to deliver some form of progress on Arab-Israeli peace.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;This past summer Netanyahu turned down Obama’s proposal for a border agreement with the Palestinians. But with expectations reduced on the Palestinian question, now could be an opportune moment to privately reintroduce an improved – and more politically practical – border arrangement linked to the Arab Peace Initiative, calling for delayed implementation for as much as sixty months. This agreement would be largely based on the understandings achieved by former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas in the fall of 2008, as revealed by document leaks to Al Jazeera.&amp;nbsp; Such a formulation would enable Israelis and Palestinians time to deal with their own political realities while injecting life into a regionally-oriented effort.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The Obama Administration should encourage Congress to assist this effort by providing an unequivocal declaration of support for Israel and US Arab allies should Iran act with military force against either.&amp;nbsp; Perhaps most importantly, such a step would signal that the United States and Israel are approaching the region in a holistically strategic manner.&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Expectations are high for the meeting between Obama and Netanyahu when it comes to the Iranian question, but low when it comes to the Palestinian question.&amp;nbsp; But confronting the former effectively requires finding a mechanism to address the latter. This meeting presents an occasion for the American and Israeli leaders to develop a well-executed and coordinated international policy. The fear of the consequences of a nuclear Iran in the region should serve as a catalyst to mobilize the region, not to paralyze it. &amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;&amp;nbsp;-- David Avital is Board Member of the Israel Policy Forum (IPF). &lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp;-- David A. Halperin is the Program Director and Interim Executive Director of IPF&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/meeting-chance-regional-approach#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/issues/issues/us-diplomatic-leadership">US Diplomatic Leadership</category>
 <pubDate>Mon, 05 Mar 2012 11:41:31 -0500</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>The Pulse</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">3435 at http://www.israelpolicyforum.org</guid>
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 <title>The Right Balance on Iran </title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/right-balance-iran</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;Israel Policy Forum applauds President Barack Obama’s commitment to Israel’s security outlined in his address to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;President Obama stated that “Iran’s leaders should know that I do not have a policy of containment,” and that “I will take no options off the table, and I mean what I say. That includes all elements of American power. A political effort aimed at isolating Iran; a diplomatic effort to sustain our coalition and ensure that the Iranian program is monitored; an economic effort to impose crippling sanctions; and, yes, a military effort to be prepared for any contingency.”&amp;nbsp; In doing so, the President not only sent an important, tough message to Iran, but also a reassuring one to Israel.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;That reassurance is critical for the United States and Israel to build on the close security and military cooperation they share in addressing the unprecedented threat to Israel’s existence posed by an Iran with a nuclear weapon.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The Iranian threat is a complex one in which no options should be unavailable to US or Israeli policymakers.&amp;nbsp; In this regard, President Obama struck the right balance.&amp;nbsp; We at IPF agree that “we all prefer to resolve this issue diplomatically.” The use of force clearly must be a last resort.&amp;nbsp; However, an effective “carrot and stick” approach requires mobilizing the international community in a concerted diplomatic effort while maintaining the commitment to Israel - and the world community - to pursue a credible military option in a timely fashion should the diplomatic effort fail.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;It also requires close US-Israeli cooperation behind closed doors — not in the media with the kind of loose talk of war that has too-often characterized the discussion of this issue in recent weeks and months.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Neither Israelis nor Americans want war. But citizens of both countries expect their leaders to recognize the urgency of this issue and to address it with the kind of vigilance and prudence required to ensure their security.&amp;nbsp; We must support efforts to push for a concerted, international diplomatic effort. &amp;nbsp;We hope it will succeed.&amp;nbsp; But we must be fully prepared to support the taking of military actions should those efforts fail.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/right-balance-iran#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/issues/issues/us-diplomatic-leadership">US Diplomatic Leadership</category>
 <pubDate>Sun, 04 Mar 2012 16:22:24 -0500</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Israel Policy Forum</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">3432 at http://www.israelpolicyforum.org</guid>
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 <title>Alon Pinkas: On Iran and the Obama-Netanyahu Summit</title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/alon-pinkas-iran-and-obama-netanyahu-summit</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Steven L. Spiegel:&amp;nbsp; We want to talk today about the upcoming Netanyahu Obama meeting. Let’s start it off. It seems to me this is a big deal, especially given the situation in Iran and in American politics. What do you think planners are talking about?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Alon Pinkas:&lt;/strong&gt; Well, that’s a good question because this meeting has been labeled as a crucial meeting and some people went as far as to call it a showdown. That goes to the heart of whatever differences there seem to be on questions of policy and timing of policy toward Iran. Now I think that both gentleman, both leaders, President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu are walking into this meeting wishing it did not take place on the one hand, but on the other hand they understand that in terms of the timing his meeting has to take place because there seems to be one major rift. That is the U.S. seems to be unequivocally cautious and clearly against an Israeli strike, a military strike, against Iran at this point. On the other hand, Israel is exuding an aura – or at least emitting an aura or an impression – that a strike may be inevitable because sanction probably will not work and that Israel should go at it with or without the US. The meeting may very well take the shape and form of a President asking the Prime Minister “what exactly do you have on your mind?”, and the Prime Minister asking the President “what do you want me to say?, I am not clear on your policy.” This has all the ingredients of misunderstandings and a less than positive meeting, that’s one way it could go.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Let’s first talk about Netanyahu and then Obama. When Israel attacked Osirak, the Iraqi nuclear installation, and then in 2007, the Syrian installation, there was complete silence—it came out of the blue.&amp;nbsp; In fact, the Bush administration had leaked that Israelis had done it and Israelis were quiet. Now, the Israelis have talked and talked and talked. Therefore, if Netanyahu’s &amp;nbsp;policy is to get the world to increase sanctions, be tougher and get the US to do more on a covert level, the policy has been brilliant. But if the policy is to develop a background and basis for an attack, it has backfired, as all the talk has made most of the world even more opposed to an Israeli attack. What is going on here between Netanyahu and Obama?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;I agree with both premises that you presented, and will add another. That is that there is a good chance, we will never know for sure – until memoirs come out in 10-15 or 20 years or documents indeed come out in 40 years – but there is a chance that at some level Israel has threatened attacks so much and has exhausted the concept of deterrence so much that Israel will be forced to attack because the absence or the lack of an absence of refraining from an attack is not going to be a good thing, meaning that Israel never meant to attack but was kind of “wag the dog” into an attack, so to speak.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Now you take these three premises, and you are trying to simplify what looks to be an extraordinary complex situation, but you are not doing it in context– the much broader context – which is that Netanyahu and Obama do not have a good working relationship.&amp;nbsp; And this goes back essentially to their first meeting in May of 2009, and to the issue which is outside the domain of our conversation, but is nonetheless important to understand the issues in its context, it goes to the heart of the issue of expanding settlements and the level of mistrust and distrust that has developed between those two leaders, which makes negotiations/discussions/cooperation on Iran difficult because there is a sense on both sides that the other side doesn’t get it.&amp;nbsp; It seems President Obama does not trust Mr. Netanyahu, and Mr. Netanyahu thinks that President Obama is not tough enough, which leads me to your premises.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;If indeed Israel was pressuring the world in a way that says, “ya know guys if you don’t impose sanctions, we will have to attack, and an attack is something a) we don’t want to do and b) you don’t want us to go ahead with,” and that the world under the leadership of Obama imposes quite tough –not the toughest possible – but tough sanctions, and Israel should have quietly applauded it. Instead, the moment those sanctions were applied, especially the European Union sanctions, once they were announced the first reaction from Israel was ‘”hey guys this is not going to work, and this is an exercise in futility and the window of opportunity for a military strike is closing.”&amp;nbsp; And then Mr. Barak – the Defense Minister Ehud Barak – came up with a term that has permeated the discussion called “a zone of immunity,” meaning that the Iranians are capable of stashing or hiding enriched uranium and rods and centrifuges in a mountain site near the city of Qom, called Fordo.&amp;nbsp; In a way, that makes it impenetrable to Israeli munitions. So Barak’s point was by the time these sanctions could conceivably work, which would be the next fall, the fall of 2012, it’ll be too late to attack. Add to that the fact that by the fall of 2012 you have presidential elections in the US, and you can’t seriously discuss Israeli and American options while ignoring or dismissing the importance of those elections.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;So you look at these premises and you are saying this is extraordinarily complicated and it is doubtful whether one meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Obama is going to sort it out or clarify it, although I have to say that to the people reading or listening to our discussion what they will see the moment of the hours in the aftermath of that meeting, they’re going to read and going to see and get the impression that there was an extraordinarily warm meeting with broad understandings that Iran cannot be a nuclear power. Other than that, it is going to be all about disagreement.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;This is so complicated that one has to wonder really what’s going on. Because the Israelis it seems to me can’t hope to succeed with a strike without American backing afterward. Israel is not dealing with just one installation but a complex series of them buried deep underground, so that you would need follow up by the United States, either a blockade, backing certainly diplomatically, some kind of guarantees for Israel to prevent some forms of retaliation to deter or decrease the possibility for the Iranians to respond. If the US and Israel are at odds, than the whole idea of an attack is diminished isn’t it?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Yes. And it is diminished but not necessarily impossible or improbable, and let me explain or elaborate what I mean by that. One of the things that makes this scenario, this entire issue complex, is that we’re dealing with should Israel or should not Israel attack Iran?&amp;nbsp; Let’s assume that we resolve that Israel should attack, for lack of any better option, because Israel views and perceives Iran as an existential threat, and it is the responsibility of the prime minister and the defense minister. Then let’s take that to the next phase—what would the Iranian reaction be? Now, the Iranian reaction may suck, may involve – involuntarily – the US in this conflict in a way that Israel did not intend it to be. You do what you do, where the effectiveness could be 60 percent or 70 in terms of how much of the Iranian nuclear program you can destroy and incapacitate. Let’s say it is 50, 60, 70, even 80 percent. The Iranian reaction may involve the US. &amp;nbsp;So, an American president who did not want to go into a war with Iran, who just got America extricated from an unpopular war in Iraq, would not be willing to commit to another war unless there is a) wide legitimacy in the US and b) an international coalition. But maybe because of Israel’s action, becomes an involuntary accomplice to this war and involuntarily sucked into this war.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;So that’s one thing Israeli decision makers need to bear in mind. Second, obviously is what happens inside the Middle East. What the Iranian reaction is going to be like? How it will affect Iranian proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Hamas in Gaza? How this affects Iran’s most loyal ally in the Middle East, which is Syria. And, how this is going to play out in the energy market, i.e. oil prices, i.e. energy prices? Or to reduce it to a simple line: How much are you going to pay for a gallon of gas in 4 or 5 months? So this is extraordinarily complex.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;On the other hand, Steve, I have to say, that if you’re an Israeli prime minister, it’s not that complex, really.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;If you think that Iran is on the verge of becoming a nuclear power, if you think America is wrong by willing to allow the Iranians to become a threshold nuclear power, as long as they do not possess nuclear weapons, which in Israel is the conventional wisdom about the American policy; And if you think that Iran even being a nuclear threshold state constitutes an imminent, clear, present, existential danger to the State of Israel – it is your duty, it is your responsibility, it is incumbent upon you, to leave all considerations aside and do what you have to do, and let the chips fall where the chips fall.&amp;nbsp; That’s the easy way out, but it’s nonetheless a logic that guides some people in Israel.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Let’s talk about Obama. I think it’s very clear that the administration is opposed to this action, feels the sanctions have a much better chance to work, and don’t agree with this “zone of immunity” notion and are quite angry at Barak about it. And, indeed want to wait certainly until after the election as they feel that there are signs of unhappiness in Iran, the sanctions are working, and therefore there is a better chance that finally after all these years there is a non-military policy that has a good chance of working.&amp;nbsp; It is at just this very moment that the Israelis are creating this crisis correctly or incorrectly.&amp;nbsp; So, if you’re Obama, how do you feel about Netanyahu? &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;If you’re Obama you first and foremost try to appease him. You try to ameliorate his fears you tell him the US, as I, President Obama have said repeatedly the “US will not allow and will not tolerate a nuclear Iran. Time is still on our side and time is needed and required for the sanctions to work. And the sanctions are working.” And I would present to Mr. Netanyahu with proof that sanctions are working. To which Mr. Netanyahu is going to come up with a very valid point. He will say most probably that even if sanctions work they take their toll on the Iranian currency on the Iranian economy and the Iranian consumer and business. However, it will not deter this regime, the Ayatollah regime, from continuing to develop a nuclear program. And then Obama will say “No it will not. But Mr. Prime Minister I will force them to come to the negotiating table, where I can with the help of France and Germany and Britain can conceivably in the context of negotiations, even the Russians and Chinese – although that is less likely but conceivably it’s doable – I can convince them to subject their program to international supervision.”&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;To which Netanyahu will respond: “Mr. President, you know that this is nonsense. They are con-men; they are lying. Their art is deceit. There is no way around this. They will do whatever they can, and by pushing them to the corner, you are actually forcing them to expedite this program.”&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;At that point, this is where this discussion becomes a showdown and it goes to the beginning of our conversation where I said – guesstimated rather – that this is not going to be a pleasant discussion.&amp;nbsp; Although it’s not going to be personal, it’s substantive. The President will have to say to Mr. Netanyahu: “Look I have made my position clear. The US will not stand for a nuclear Iran. Iran is not a nuclear power yet. Time is still on our side. I cannot tell you, I cannot dictate to you, or prevent you from doing what you think is the right thing to do. No one is going to believe me that I knew nothing of it, but I am telling you that we are against this. And while we will not condemn you, we will not lend you our support, I am asking you to give this a little more time. “&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Now, the important point to understand here, is that the President feels, and this goes to domestic politics in Israel, the President feels – he may be right or he may be wrong – that Mr. Netanyahu is closer to his position than meets the eye while the more trigger-happy, excuse me for the expression, of the two is Mr. Barak, the defense minister. And there is a good chance that Mr. Netanyahu would welcome President Obama pressuring him into saying “let’s give it some more time.” But that of course is me speculating, I don’t know.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;It could end in a complete standstill. At which President Obama will tell is aides, and they may or may not leak this to the media at some point, that “I have made my positions clear but if the Israelis want to do what they feel they need to do than who am I to stop them?”&amp;nbsp; That’s also a possibility. It’s bad for the America’s ability to project power, if it cannot reign in its closest ally, than who can it reign in? But that’s life.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Yes, but at the same time Netanyahu’s arguments are not necessarily valid either. American intelligence believes that Iran has not even made a decision yet whether to go nuclear, but they have made the decision to have the capability to go nuclear.&amp;nbsp; The president can argue that the Israelis are only making it more likely that Iran will decide to go nuclear, and can also argue with considerable validity that Americans might not interfere with Israel. But without American backing afterward the consequences of an attack are more dire and the benefits are more diminished. So, they could go back and forth on this. On the American side, they have to have something to offer Netanyahu so that he can go home with something and is also reinforced in not attacking. You can’t only offer sticks, you have to offer a carrot. &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Now one thing might be that bunker-busting bombs, which are not necessarily as capable as people had thought, will be improved. And that with American-Israeli cooperation, at the proper time Israel would receive the enhanced bunker-busting bombs.&amp;nbsp; Obama has a history of giving Israel advanced weaponry without the kind of hesitation that his predecessors have employed.&amp;nbsp; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Another possible carrot – and I want to ask you how others might react to these – is to propose that a special working group of top aides be created on this issue alone— a special US-Israeli working group that would work in close coordination hereon-in on Iranian policy. This has disadvantages and advantages for both sides.&amp;nbsp; So that might be a step that if they could walk out of the office and announce this new working group that might assuage Israeli hawks in some manner, shape or form, and also prevent an attack this spring, as so many have rumored. What do you think of this notion of offering Israel something that embraces it and stops it at the same time? &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Well, you make a lot of valid points. Not sure I can answer them one by one, but I’ll try to make a narrative of it. President Obama is on solid ground when he says that security cooperation between Israel and the United States during his presidency and under his leadership has reached unprecedented heights in terms of quality and quantity.&amp;nbsp; This is not divulging state secrets; this is me quoting Defense Minister Ehud Barak. So, President Obama cannot and should not be blamed either by his political detractors or by hawks of wavering on Israel’s security.&amp;nbsp; Having said that, setting up a working group is always a good idea. However, I don’t know that its necessarily needed, because if you look at the traffic between Jerusalem and Washington on this issue in the last two months. Or, if you figuratively look at the frequent flyer mileage earned by American officials and Israeli officials flying back and forth just on that issue, we are talking about millions of miles. Meaning— a working group is always a good idea but people are going to read through it and think you are doing this to just win – or waste – time.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;You’re talking about carrots and sticks here. There is very little in terms of carrots that the president can offer. &amp;nbsp;And that touches on an issue that you alluded to at the outset but we didn’t expand on. That is I don’t remember a possible military attack in history that has been so much discussed. You can’t imagine that Pearl Harbor would be discussed in the Japanese press or that the invasion of Normandy in the British or American press at the level or the amount of details as the Israeli attack on Iran.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Neither Pearl Harbor nor Normandy would have succeeded with so much talk.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Of course not, no attack would have succeeded, even the invasion of Grenada would not have succeeded for that matter. However, we’re not looking at a strategic surprise but something that is more tactical. The more we talk about this, the less effective it will be and the more dangerous it could be, because you are essentially showing your cards.&amp;nbsp; And this is essentially a poker game. That is why when you say President Obama can and should present carrots to Prime Minister Netanyahu, not just sticks. You are essentially saying this needs to be kept inside the oval office. Because if it becomes public, what’s the point? Because if it becomes public, the President himself will be heavily criticized for it, and he is setting or establishing red-lines that he may not want, and setting timetables that he may not be able or willing to meet. And that seriously and severely constricts his maneuvering room, especially in an election year.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Which leads us to another point: Is Mr. Netanyahu enjoying – I don’t mean enjoying in the sense of joyous – but enjoying the benefit of Mr. Obama being put in a tough position on this? &amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Given their relationship, which I referred to earlier which is speculative, my answer would probably be, he’s not suffering from it.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The last big points in this discussion are the Republican presidential candidates and the upcoming election. Gingrich and Santorum have come out in support of an attack on the nuclear forces of Iran.&amp;nbsp; It appears if a Republican Administration were to come to power, it would be more sympathetic to a strike. The conventional wisdom is that Israel’s striking before the election would make it tougher for Obama to stop it than after, should he win reelection. &amp;nbsp;There is certainly a policy difference between the positions of Obama and the Republican candidates. &amp;nbsp;Does this encourage Israel to attack? Is it one more factor encouraging Israel to attack or discouraging Israel to attack at this moment?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Well, naturally this is what the Republican candidates are trying to do. They are trying to portray the president as hesitant and unsure and wavering on a foreign policy issue that concerns a major ally.&amp;nbsp; Having said that, there is nothing easier in the world than making promises as a candidate, and there is nothing more difficult than making that pledge a policy when you actually become a president. Everyone knows that – everyone who has been to the White House as a president knows that whatever the Republicans are saying now is unlikely to become policy once they are in the Oval Office come January, if they make it there. &amp;nbsp;I think, though, that the issue remains on the table that Obama is forcing Israel to refrain from an attack. It necessarily exposes him to criticism from the Republicans that he is supposedly weak on a major foreign policy issue. I think that is not the case. I think the Republicans should be more cautious before attacking him – I don’t want to get into American politics – but you cannot advocate an attack on Iran and lower gas prices at the same time and look in the mirror and think you are a serious guy, because you are not.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;It may be that thanks to the Republican race, Obama’s rising standing, that he may be able to take any criticism that he is against an immediate attack. &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;I don’t think he is going to come out against.&amp;nbsp; The people who have come out against didn’t speak on his behalf – the Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, the Chairman of the Joint Chief Staff Adm. Dempsey, the National Security Advisor Tom Donilon all spoke against, but it wasn’t the President himself. And you can expect at the AIPAC policy conference the president to be extraordinary tough on Iran and not to say he is against an attack but that sanctions are working and diplomacy should be exhausted.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;He will not be caught in an election year saying he is against an Israeli attack.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;What makes this thing so complex, unclear and murky, is that almost every argument has some truth in it. &amp;nbsp;It is true that the sanctions are working. It is true that the Iranian economy is suffering significantly. It is also true that the nuclear program has not halted or slowed down as a result of these sanctions.&amp;nbsp; What remains to be seen is whether or not President Obama is capable of mustering enough international support and enough domestic legitimacy to impose even further sanctions, which short of war could still affect the price of oil, but of course that is speculative.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/alon-pinkas-iran-and-obama-netanyahu-summit#comments</comments>
 <pubDate>Sun, 04 Mar 2012 14:37:21 -0500</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Israel Policy Forum</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">3433 at http://www.israelpolicyforum.org</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>Antony J. Blinken Speaks to IPF (VIDEO)</title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/antony-j-blinken-speaks-ipf-video</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;Antony J. Blinken currently serves as Deputy Assistant to the President and as National Security Advisor to the Vice President. He spoke on Monday, February 27th to an Israel Policy Forum audience in New York City.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;!--[if gte mso 9]&gt;&lt;xml&gt; &lt;o:OfficeDocumentSettings&gt; &lt;o:AllowPNG&gt;&lt;/o&gt; &lt;/o:OfficeDocumentSettings&gt; &lt;/xml&gt;&lt;![endif]--&gt;&lt;!--[if gte mso 9]&gt;&lt;xml&gt; &lt;w:WordDocument&gt; &lt;w:View&gt;Normal&lt;/w:View&gt; &lt;w:Zoom&gt;0&lt;/w:Zoom&gt; &lt;w:TrackMoves&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:TrackFormatting&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:PunctuationKerning&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:ValidateAgainstSchemas&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:SaveIfXMLInvalid&gt;false&lt;/w:SaveIfXMLInvalid&gt; &lt;w:IgnoreMixedContent&gt;false&lt;/w:IgnoreMixedContent&gt; &lt;w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText&gt;false&lt;/w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText&gt; &lt;w:DoNotPromoteQF&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LidThemeOther&gt;EN-US&lt;/w:LidThemeOther&gt; &lt;w:LidThemeAsian&gt;X-NONE&lt;/w:LidThemeAsian&gt; &lt;w:LidThemeComplexScript&gt;X-NONE&lt;/w:LidThemeComplexScript&gt; &lt;w:Compatibility&gt; 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	mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; 	mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; 	mso-style-noshow:yes; 	mso-style-priority:99; 	mso-style-parent:&quot;&quot;; 	mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; 	mso-para-margin-top:0in; 	mso-para-margin-right:0in; 	mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; 	mso-para-margin-left:0in; 	line-height:115%; 	mso-pagination:widow-orphan; 	font-size:11.0pt; 	font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; 	mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; 	mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; 	mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; 	mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; 	mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;; 	mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} --&gt; &lt;!--[endif] --&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;As Prepared for Delivery&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;Antony Blinken&lt;br&gt;Remarks to the Israel Policy Forum&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;New York City&lt;br&gt;Monday, February 27, 2012&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;Let me start by saying to everyone in this room:&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;thank you.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;Thank you for the work you do every day, through the Israel Policy Forum, to promote the unshakeable bond between the United States and the State of Israel.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;Founded nearly two decades ago with the blessing of a great hero—Yitzhak Rabin—IPF has made extraordinary contributions to peace and security by mobilizing leaders in both countries—inside and outside of government—to strengthen the U.S.-Israel relationship and address some of the defining policy challenges of our time.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;The work that you do strengthens America’s foreign policy.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;And it is critical to the security of Israel. Never has this cause been more important.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;And that’s what I would like to talk about today, from the perspective of the Obama-Biden administration.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;For more than 60 years since Israel&#039;s founding—during periods of war and peace, calm and crisis—U.S. administrations of all stripes have worked to safeguard Israel&#039;s security. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;But I would maintain that no administration – and no President – has done as much as President Obama with Israel… and for Israel’s security.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Last fall, President Obama&#039;s personal intervention helped avert catastrophe when a violent mob stormed the Israeli Embassy in Cairo. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Afterward, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said of the president: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&quot;I requested his assistance at a decisive—I would even say fateful—moment. He said he would do everything possible, and this is what he did. He activated all of the United States&#039; means and influence—which are certainly considerable. I believe we owe him a special debt of gratitude.&quot;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;That influence was but one vivid manifestation of our administration&#039;s iron-clad commitment to Israel&#039;s security, a commitment that has led to a level of cooperation that Mr. Netanyahu himself has rightly called &quot;unprecedented.&quot;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;That commitment starts with President Obama’s profound understanding of Israel’s predicament.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Here’s how the President put it this September, speaking to the countries of the world at the United Nations General Assembly:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;“Let us be honest with ourselves.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Israel is surrounded by neighbors that have waged repeated wars against it.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Israel’s citizens have been killed by rockets fired at their houses and suicide bombs on their buses.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Israel’s children come of age knowing that throughout the region, other children are taught to hate them.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Israel, a small country of less than eight million people, looks out at a world where leaders of much larger nations threaten to wipe it off the map.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;When it comes to Israel’s security and maintaining Israel&#039;s qualitative military edge, our actions speak loudest of all. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Since coming to office, we have launched the most comprehensive and meaningful strategic and operational consultations… across all levels of our governments… in the history of this relationship. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;These interactions, from our heads-of-state on down, are what averted tragedy in Cairo—and they only exist between the closest of allies. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;In October 2009, our nations&#039; armed forces conducted their largest ever joint military exercise, Juniper Cobra. It involved 1000 personnel on each side.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;It tested the inter-operability and effectiveness of our air defense systems.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;In 2010, nearly 200 senior-level Department of Defense officials visited Israel, and similar numbers of senior Israeli officials visited the U.S. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Last year, despite tough fiscal times, President Obama secured full funding for Israel in our 2011 budget, including more than $3 billion in military assistance—the most ever.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;For next year’s budget, we’ve requested an additional $25 million.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;And on top of last year’s historic commitment, we added $205 million to help produce Iron Dome. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;This short-range rocket defense system has been a godsend for besieged communities along Israel&#039;s border with Gaza, and it has now been installed in the north, along the Lebanon border, as well. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Already it has intercepted dozens of rockets and shells that might otherwise have struck homes, schools or hospitals. It is providing some peace of mind for people, like the residents of Sderot whom President Obama visited in 2008, living every day in the line of fire. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;To guard against more distant, but also more dangerous threats, we have worked with Israel on the Arrow weapons system, to intercept medium-range ballistic missiles. This is one of the most advanced missile defense systems in existence… and Israel is the only country in the world to field the complete system.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;We’ve also worked with Israel on David&#039;s Sling, a defense system for shorter-range missiles, like those possessed by Hezbollah. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;And we have collaborated on a powerful radar system linked to U.S. early warning satellites that could buy Israel valuable time in the event of a missile attack. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;We know that Israel sees the threat posed by Iran as existential. And make no mistake: An Iran armed with nuclear weapons would pose a direct and serious threat to the security of the U.S. as well.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;That is why President Obama is determined to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;We have backed up that commitment by building an unprecedented coalition to impose the most far-reaching sanctions Iran has ever faced. &lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;As a result, Iran finds itself increasingly isolated from the international community. &lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;It finds it harder than ever to acquire materials for its nuclear and weapons programs and to conduct transactions in dollars and euros. &lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;It is unable to access about 70 percent of its foreign currency reserves.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;It has struggled to buy refined petroleum and the goods it needs to modernize its oil and gas sector. &lt;br&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Already close to $60 billion in Iranian energy-related projects have been put on hold or shut down. &lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;World-leading companies are deciding to stop doing business there, including: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Shell;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Total; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;ENI; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Statoil; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Repsol; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Lukoil; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Kia; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Toyota; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Siemens;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;And the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms such as GE, Honeywell and Caterpillar, among many others. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;Most recently, the Administration worked with Congress to make sanctionable a host of transactions involving the Central Bank of Iran.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;And we are now working with partners to implement this new law in a way that maximizes the pressure on the Iranian regime.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;The regime is feeling the pressure. You don’t have to take my word for it.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Here’s what Iran’s President, Mr. Ahmadinejad, said about sanctions to Iran’s parliament late last year:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;“The West has imposed the most extensive and dastardly sanctions ever… Every day, all our banking and trade activities and our agreements are being monitored and blocked.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;This is the heaviest economic onslaught on a nation in history…”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;The purpose of this pressure is not punishment.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;It is to convince Iran that the price to be paid for pursuing a nuclear weapons capability is too high… and the time is now to make good on its commitments to the international community.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Standing up for Israel&#039;s security also means remaining ever vigilant against attempts to delegitimize Israel in the international arena. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;As President Obama has said, including in the speech he gave in Cairo, Israel&#039;s legitimacy is not a matter for debate. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;That is why we stood up strongly for Israel&#039;s right to defend itself after the Goldstone Report on the 2009 Gaza War was issued.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;That is why we refuse to attend events that endorse or commemorate the flawed 2001 World Conference Against Racism, which outrageously singled out Israel for criticism.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;And that is why we are working literally around the clock and around the world to try to prevent steps taken at the U.N. or its agencies from further isolating Israel or undermining efforts to reach a secure, negotiated peace with the Palestinians.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;As you know, in large part because of our commitment to Israel’s security, the President has made peace between the Israelis and Palestinians a priority from his earliest days in office. And the need for peace has never been more urgent.&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;Last May, the President presented a vision for a lasting peace involving two states for two people:&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;-- Israel as a Jewish state and the homeland of the Jewish people;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;-- And the state of Palestine as the homeland for the Palestinian people.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;The Quartet has been working with the parties since then… and Jordan recently hosted exploratory talks in Amman. There simply is no substitute for direct talks.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;Nothing happens in a vacuum.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;You know the recent steps toward reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah. &lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;Our policy on Hamas has not changed. Any Palestinian government must unambiguously and explicitly renounce violence… recognize Israel… and accept previous agreements and obligations between the parties.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Our administration is justifiably proud of this record. And we are confident that none of our predecessors has done more for Israel&#039;s security than we have. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;That does not mean we will always see eye to eye on everything. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Even the closest of allies disagree – just as Israelis do amongst themselves -- and when we do, we make our views clear. That is a sign of our mutual respect and of a relationship robust and mature enough to overcome our differences. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;What could actually harm U.S.-Israeli relations, and the security of the Jewish state, is subjecting either to the vagaries of partisan politics or turning them into election-year talking points. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;IPF is committed to the idea that debate need not descend into division—particularly when our shared interests are so profound.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;You are dedicated to the principal that, and I quote:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;“While debate and discussion are helpful, the current divisiveness in the American Jewish community and in Washington on the issues of the US-Israel relationship and our shared pursuit of peace, are not.”&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;I couldn’t agree more.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;This is not about stifling discussion, disagreement or dissent.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;It is about a simple proposition:&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;when it comes to discussing U.S. policy toward Israel in our political arena, by all means we should question each other’s judgments – but not each other’s motives. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;For generations, Israel has been a bastion of bipartisan consensus. The stakes are too high—for us, and for Israel—to let that change now.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNoSpacing&quot;&gt;Now, I’m anxious to hear your comments and questions.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Thanks for everything you do.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;And thanks for listening.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;div id=&quot;_mcePaste&quot; style=&quot;position: absolute; left: -10000px; top: 0px; width: 1px; height: 1px; overflow: hidden;&quot;&gt;&lt;!--[if gte mso 9]&gt;&lt;xml&gt; &lt;o:OfficeDocumentSettings&gt; &lt;o:AllowPNG&gt;&lt;/o&gt; &lt;/o:OfficeDocumentSettings&gt; &lt;/xml&gt;&lt;![endif]--&gt;&lt;!--[if gte mso 9]&gt;&lt;xml&gt; &lt;w:WordDocument&gt; &lt;w:View&gt;Normal&lt;/w:View&gt; &lt;w:Zoom&gt;0&lt;/w:Zoom&gt; &lt;w:TrackMoves&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:TrackFormatting&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:PunctuationKerning&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:ValidateAgainstSchemas&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:SaveIfXMLInvalid&gt;false&lt;/w:SaveIfXMLInvalid&gt; 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Name=&quot;Medium List 1 Accent 1&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Revision&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;34&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; QFormat=&quot;true&quot; Name=&quot;List Paragraph&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;29&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; QFormat=&quot;true&quot; Name=&quot;Quote&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;30&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; QFormat=&quot;true&quot; Name=&quot;Intense Quote&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;66&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium List 2 Accent 1&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;67&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Grid 1 Accent 1&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;68&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Grid 2 Accent 1&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;69&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Grid 3 Accent 1&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;70&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Dark List Accent 1&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;71&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Colorful Shading Accent 1&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;72&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Colorful List Accent 1&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;73&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Colorful Grid Accent 1&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;60&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Light Shading Accent 2&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;61&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Light List Accent 2&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;62&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Light Grid Accent 2&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;63&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Shading 1 Accent 2&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;64&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Shading 2 Accent 2&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;65&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium List 1 Accent 2&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;66&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium List 2 Accent 2&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;67&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Grid 1 Accent 2&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;68&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Grid 2 Accent 2&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;69&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Grid 3 Accent 2&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;70&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Dark List Accent 2&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;71&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Colorful Shading Accent 2&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;72&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Colorful List Accent 2&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;73&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Colorful Grid Accent 2&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;60&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Light Shading Accent 3&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;61&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Light List Accent 3&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;62&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Light Grid Accent 3&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;63&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Shading 1 Accent 3&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;64&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Shading 2 Accent 3&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;65&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium List 1 Accent 3&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;66&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium List 2 Accent 3&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;67&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Grid 1 Accent 3&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;68&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Grid 2 Accent 3&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;69&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Grid 3 Accent 3&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;70&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Dark List Accent 3&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;71&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Colorful Shading Accent 3&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;72&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Colorful List Accent 3&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;73&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Colorful Grid Accent 3&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;60&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Light Shading Accent 4&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;61&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Light List Accent 4&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;62&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Light Grid Accent 4&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;63&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Shading 1 Accent 4&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;64&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Shading 2 Accent 4&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;65&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium List 1 Accent 4&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;66&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium List 2 Accent 4&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;67&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Grid 1 Accent 4&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;68&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Grid 2 Accent 4&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;69&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Grid 3 Accent 4&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;70&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Dark List Accent 4&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;71&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Colorful Shading Accent 4&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;72&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Colorful List Accent 4&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;73&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Colorful Grid Accent 4&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;60&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Light Shading Accent 5&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;61&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Light List Accent 5&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;62&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Light Grid Accent 5&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;63&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Shading 1 Accent 5&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;64&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Shading 2 Accent 5&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;65&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium List 1 Accent 5&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;66&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium List 2 Accent 5&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;67&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Grid 1 Accent 5&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;68&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Grid 2 Accent 5&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;69&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Grid 3 Accent 5&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;70&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Dark List Accent 5&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;71&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Colorful Shading Accent 5&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;72&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Colorful List Accent 5&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;73&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Colorful Grid Accent 5&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;60&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Light Shading Accent 6&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;61&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Light List Accent 6&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;62&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Light Grid Accent 6&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;63&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Shading 1 Accent 6&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;64&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Shading 2 Accent 6&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;65&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium List 1 Accent 6&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;66&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium List 2 Accent 6&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;67&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Grid 1 Accent 6&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;68&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Grid 2 Accent 6&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;69&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Medium Grid 3 Accent 6&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;70&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Dark List Accent 6&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;71&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Colorful Shading Accent 6&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;72&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Colorful List Accent 6&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;73&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; Name=&quot;Colorful Grid Accent 6&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;19&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; QFormat=&quot;true&quot; Name=&quot;Subtle Emphasis&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;21&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; QFormat=&quot;true&quot; Name=&quot;Intense Emphasis&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;31&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; QFormat=&quot;true&quot; Name=&quot;Subtle Reference&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;32&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; QFormat=&quot;true&quot; Name=&quot;Intense Reference&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;33&quot; SemiHidden=&quot;false&quot;    UnhideWhenUsed=&quot;false&quot; QFormat=&quot;true&quot; Name=&quot;Book Title&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;37&quot; Name=&quot;Bibliography&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;w:LsdException Locked=&quot;false&quot; Priority=&quot;39&quot; QFormat=&quot;true&quot; Name=&quot;TOC Heading&quot;&gt;&lt;/w&gt; &lt;/w:LatentStyles&gt; &lt;/xml&gt;&lt;![endif]--&gt;&lt;!--[if gte mso 10]&gt; &lt;mce:style&gt;&lt;!   /* Style Definitions */  table.MsoNormalTable 	{mso-style-name:&quot;Table Normal&quot;; 	mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; 	mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; 	mso-style-noshow:yes; 	mso-style-priority:99; 	mso-style-parent:&quot;&quot;; 	mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; 	mso-para-margin-top:0in; 	mso-para-margin-right:0in; 	mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; 	mso-para-margin-left:0in; 	line-height:115%; 	mso-pagination:widow-orphan; 	font-size:11.0pt; 	font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;; 	mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; 	mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; 	mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; 	mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; 	mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;; 	mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} --&gt; &lt;!--[endif] --&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt; text-align:center;line-height:normal&quot; align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;&lt;strong style=&quot;mso-bidi-font-weight:normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;text-decoration: underline;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;As Prepared for Delivery&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt; text-align:center;line-height:normal&quot; align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;&lt;strong style=&quot;mso-bidi-font-weight:normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt; text-align:center;line-height:normal&quot; align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;&lt;strong style=&quot;mso-bidi-font-weight:normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;Antony Blinken&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt; text-align:center;line-height:normal&quot; align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;&lt;strong style=&quot;mso-bidi-font-weight:normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;Remarks to the Israel Policy Forum&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt; text-align:center;line-height:normal&quot; align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;&lt;strong style=&quot;mso-bidi-font-weight:normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;New York City&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt; text-align:center;line-height:normal&quot; align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;&lt;strong style=&quot;mso-bidi-font-weight:normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;Monday, February 27, 2012&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;Let me start by saying to everyone in this room:&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;thank you.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;Thank you for the work you do every day, through the Israel Policy Forum, to promote the unshakeable bond between the United States and the State of Israel.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;Founded nearly two decades ago with the blessing of a great hero—Yitzhak Rabin—IPF has made extraordinary contributions to peace and security by mobilizing leaders in both countries—inside and outside of government—to strengthen the U.S.-Israel relationship and address some of the defining policy challenges of our time.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;The work that you do strengthens America’s foreign policy.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;And it is critical to the security of Israel. Never has this cause been more important.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;And that’s what I would like to talk about today, from the perspective of the Obama-Biden administration. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;For more than 60 years since Israel&#039;s founding—during periods of war and peace, calm and crisis—U.S. administrations of all stripes have worked to safeguard Israel&#039;s security. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;But I would maintain that no administration – and no President – has done as much as President Obama with Israel… and for Israel’s security.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Last fall, President Obama&#039;s personal intervention helped avert catastrophe when a violent mob stormed the Israeli Embassy in Cairo. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Afterward, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said of the president: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:0in;margin-left:.5in; margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black; mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&quot;I requested his assistance at a decisive—I would even say fateful—moment. He said he would do everything possible, and this is what he did. He activated all of the United States&#039; means and influence—which are certainly considerable. I believe we owe him a special debt of gratitude.&quot;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;That influence was but one vivid manifestation of our administration&#039;s iron-clad commitment to Israel&#039;s security, a commitment that has led to a level of cooperation that Mr. Netanyahu himself has rightly called &quot;unprecedented.&quot;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;That commitment starts with President Obama’s profound understanding of Israel’s predicament.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Here’s how the President put it this September, speaking to the countries of the world at the United Nations General Assembly:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:0in;margin-left:.5in; margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black; mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;“Let us be honest with ourselves.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Israel is surrounded by neighbors that have waged repeated wars against it.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Israel’s citizens have been killed by rockets fired at their houses and suicide bombs on their buses.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Israel’s children come of age knowing that throughout the region, other children are taught to hate them.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Israel, a small country of less than eight million people, looks out at a world where leaders of much larger nations threaten to wipe it off the map.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;When it comes to Israel’s security and maintaining Israel&#039;s qualitative military edge, our actions speak loudest of all. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Since coming to office, we have launched the most comprehensive and meaningful strategic and operational consultations… across all levels of our governments… in the history of this relationship. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;These interactions, from our heads-of-state on down, are what averted tragedy in Cairo—and they only exist between the closest of allies. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;In October 2009, our nations&#039; armed forces conducted their largest &lt;span style=&quot;text-decoration: underline;&quot;&gt;ever&lt;/span&gt; joint military exercise, Juniper Cobra. It involved 1000 personnel on each side.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;It tested the inter-operability and effectiveness of our air defense systems.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;In 2010, nearly 200 senior-level Department of Defense officials visited Israel, and similar numbers of senior Israeli officials visited the U.S. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Last year, despite tough fiscal times, President Obama secured full funding for Israel in our 2011 budget, including more than $3 billion in military assistance—the most ever.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;For next year’s budget, we’ve requested an additional $25 million.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;U5028819856467FE&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language: EN&quot;&gt;And on top of last year’s historic commitment, we added $205 million to help produce Iron Dome. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;This short-range rocket defense system has been a godsend for besieged communities along Israel&#039;s border with Gaza, and it has now been installed in the north, along the Lebanon border, as well. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Already it has intercepted dozens of rockets and shells that might otherwise have struck homes, schools or hospitals. It is providing some peace of mind for people, like the residents of Sderot whom President Obama visited in 2008, living every day in the line of fire. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;To guard against more distant, but also more dangerous threats, we have worked with Israel on the Arrow weapons system, to intercept medium-range ballistic missiles. This is one of the most advanced missile defense systems in existence… and Israel is the only country in the world to field the complete system.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;We’ve also worked with Israel on David&#039;s Sling, a defense system for shorter-range missiles, like those possessed by Hezbollah. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;And we have collaborated on a powerful radar system linked to U.S. early warning satellites that could buy Israel valuable time in the event of a missile attack. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;We know that Israel sees the threat posed by Iran as existential. And make no mistake: An Iran armed with nuclear weapons would pose a direct and serious threat to the security of the U.S. as well. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;U502881985646DBF&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language: EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;That is why President Obama is determined to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;We have backed up that commitment by building an unprecedented coalition to impose the most far-reaching sanctions Iran has ever faced. &lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;As a result, Iran finds itself increasingly isolated from the international community. &lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;It finds it harder than ever to acquire materials for its nuclear and weapons programs and to conduct transactions in dollars and euros. &lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;It is unable to access about 70 percent of its foreign currency reserves.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;It has struggled to buy refined petroleum and the goods it needs to modernize its oil and gas sector. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Already close to $60 billion in Iranian energy-related projects have been put on hold or shut down. &lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;World-leading companies are deciding to stop doing business there, including: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Shell;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Total; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;ENI; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Statoil; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Repsol; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Lukoil; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Kia; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Toyota; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Siemens;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;And the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms such as GE, Honeywell and Caterpillar, among many others. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;Most recently, the Administration worked with Congress to make sanctionable a host of transactions involving the Central Bank of Iran.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;And we are now working with partners to implement this new law in a way that maximizes the pressure on the Iranian regime.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;The regime &lt;span style=&quot;text-decoration: underline;&quot;&gt;is&lt;/span&gt; feeling the pressure. You don’t have to take my word for it.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Here’s what Iran’s President, Mr. Ahmadinejad, said about sanctions to Iran’s parliament late last year:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:0in;margin-left:.5in; margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black; mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;“The West has imposed the most extensive and dastardly sanctions ever… Every day, all our banking and trade activities and our agreements are being monitored and blocked.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;This is the heaviest economic onslaught on a nation in history…”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;The purpose of this pressure is not punishment.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;It is to convince Iran that the price to be paid for pursuing a nuclear weapons capability is too high… and the time is now to make good on its commitments to the international community.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Standing up for Israel&#039;s security also means remaining ever vigilant against attempts to delegitimize Israel in the international arena. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;As President Obama has said, including in the speech he gave in Cairo, Israel&#039;s legitimacy is not a matter for debate. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;That is why we stood up strongly for Israel&#039;s right to defend itself after the Goldstone Report on the 2009 Gaza War was issued.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;That is why we refuse to attend events that endorse or commemorate the flawed 2001 World Conference Against Racism, which outrageously singled out Israel for criticism.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;And that is why we are working literally around the clock and around the world to try to prevent steps taken at the U.N. or its agencies from further isolating Israel or undermining efforts to reach a secure, negotiated peace with the Palestinians.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;strong style=&quot;mso-bidi-font-weight:normal&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;As you know, in large part because of our commitment to Israel’s security, the President has made peace between the Israelis and Palestinians a priority from his earliest days in office. And the need for peace has never been more urgent.&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;Last May, the President presented a vision for a lasting peace involving two states for two people: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;-- Israel as a Jewish state and the homeland of the Jewish people;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;-- And the state of Palestine as the homeland for the Palestinian people.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;The Quartet has been working with the parties since then… and Jordan recently hosted exploratory talks in Amman. There simply is no substitute for direct talks.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoListParagraph&quot; style=&quot;margin-left:.25in;mso-add-space:auto&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;Nothing happens in a vacuum.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;You know the recent steps toward reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah. &lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;Our policy on Hamas has not changed. Any Palestinian government must unambiguously and explicitly renounce violence… recognize Israel… and accept previous agreements and obligations between the parties.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Our administration is justifiably proud of this record. And we are confident that none of our predecessors has done more for Israel&#039;s security than we have. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;That does not mean we will always see eye to eye on everything. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;Even the closest of allies disagree – just as Israelis do amongst themselves -- and when we do, we make our views clear. That is a sign of our mutual respect and of a relationship robust and mature enough to overcome our differences. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;What could actually harm U.S.-Israeli relations, and the security of the Jewish state, is subjecting either to the vagaries of partisan politics or turning them into election-year talking points. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;IPF is committed to the idea that debate need not descend into division—particularly when our shared interests are so profound. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;You are dedicated to the principal that, and I quote:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:0in; margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:0in; margin-left:.5in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;“While debate and discussion are helpful, the current divisiveness in the American Jewish community and in Washington on the issues of the US-Israel relationship and our shared pursuit of peace, are not.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;I couldn’t agree more.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;This is not about stifling discussion, disagreement or dissent.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;It is about a simple proposition:&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;when it comes to discussing U.S. policy toward Israel in our political arena, by all means we should question each other’s judgments – but not each other’s motives. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;background:white&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN&quot;&gt;For generations, Israel has been a bastion of bipartisan consensus. The stakes are too high—for us, and for Israel—to let that change now.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;Now, I’m anxious to hear your comments and questions.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Thanks for everything you do.&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;And thanks for listening. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;mso-spacerun:yes&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class=&quot;MsoNormal&quot; style=&quot;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height: normal&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;,&amp;quot;serif&amp;quot;&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/antony-j-blinken-speaks-ipf-video#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/issues/issues/us-diplomatic-leadership">US Diplomatic Leadership</category>
 <pubDate>Fri, 02 Mar 2012 15:58:18 -0500</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Israel Policy Forum</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">3431 at http://www.israelpolicyforum.org</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>Warren Bass On the International Community and the Middle East </title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/warren-bass-international-community-and-middle-east</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Steven Spiegel: Let’s talk about the Obama era at the United Nations. From what you saw, how would you describe America’s defense of Israel at the United Nations?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Warren Bass:&lt;/strong&gt; I would call it pretty vigorous and sustained. The Obama administration came into office believing, as it still does, that the UN is an important forum for bringing together the international community to find common solutions to common problems in the 21st century. That said, I think the administration has continued to be clear-eyed about the UN’s flaws, and one of those is its tendency to single out Israel in unfair ways. The net effect of that, I think, is that the administration has wound up on a day-in, day-out basis standing up for fair and equal treatment for Israel at the UN. This was guidance that came from the President and Secretary of State Clinton and Ambassador Rice on down to my rather modest level. It was very clear that the senior leadership of the administration was troubled by the way Israel was singled out at the UN and wanted it stopped. Ambassador Rice, I should say, has used some very strong language about this. She called the type of bashing Israel often comes in for at the UN “relentless, obsessive, and ugly”—which it is not terribly diplomatic language but, unfortunately, I think is quite accurate. &lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Do you think that the treatment of Israel today is worse, better, or the same as previous periods?&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;I think the all-time nadir for treatment of Israel at the UN was the infamous ‘Zionism is racism’ resolution. Branding the Jewish self-determination movement as a form of racism was a low that is unlikely to be topped, we hope. But I think there is still a significant problem in terms of the way Israel gets unfairly treated, and the President himself raised this in his speech at the UN General Assembly in 2010. He said that “efforts to chip away is Israel’s legitimacy would only be met by the unshakable opposition of the United States,” and I think you see that in the day-in and day-out of American policy, and on a range of issues.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Just to tick off some of the most prominent: there was the Palestinian bid last September for UN membership. While that is obviously still an extremely delicate situation, and it would be unwise to make bold predictions about how that will continue to turn out, they just didn’t have the votes required in the Security Council, and the landscape is not that different right now. Now, obviously, that remains tenuous, and things can change quickly.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;There was also an attempt by the Palestinians in February 2011 to insert the Security Council into the settlement issue. That triggered a veto from Ambassador Rice, which is still the first and only veto that the Obama administration has cast in the Security Council.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The United States also refused to participate in the ten-year commemoration of the 2001 Durban Conference because the administration felt that the Durban process, which is supposed to be an anti-racism process, has been marred all the way along by ugly displays of intolerance and anti-Semitism.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;There was a huge fight, as you know, over the release of the Human Rights Council’s Goldstone Report into the 2008-2009 war in Gaza. The United States under this administration said that the report was deeply flawed and stood up strongly for Israel’s right to defend itself. The United States voted against a barrage of Goldstone-related resolutions in both the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;This, I think, gives you some sense of the scope of it, but really, in my personal experience—and I should say that I don’t speak for the administration or for RAND and am speaking strictly as a private citizen today—this was something Ambassador Rice and the rest of her team were dealing with on a pretty daily basis, and the record, I think, is very hard to criticize from a fair-minded point of view.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;How do you explain the repeated successes? I must say I have been surprised by the ability to thwart the Palestinian effort the UN.&amp;nbsp; A lot of people suggested that the Palestinians would waltz in and do quite well and would do similarly well with the Goldstone Report. Without being partisan towards this administration or others, it is a record of wins. How do you explain that ability? Has the administration done something right, have the Israelis done something right, has the ardor for supporting anything the Palestinians come up with cooled? I am at a bit of a loss to put a marker on it. If it is the administration’s doing, what did they do right that other administrations didn’t do to have these successes?&lt;br&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Well, I think one of the elements behind some of these successes was just really good, ongoing, and sustained cooperation between the UN teams and the teams back in Washington and Jerusalem, for both the Obama administration and the Netanyahu administration, who worked really closely together. Just as one example, Gabriela Shalev, the first Israeli permanent representative that the administration dealt with, personally had a very warm relationship with my old boss, Ambassador Rice. They really worked well together, and part of that was the fact that Ambassador Shalev had a view of Israel at the UN pursuing a positive agenda that went beyond the conflict and sought to have Israel as a full participating member of the UN, with all of the rights and responsibilities of any member state. That was something we were enthusiastic to get behind, including trying to get the Israelis into the consultative bodies at the UN, which enable Israel to be a full member of the UN. The administration had good successes getting Israel into an important consultation group known as JUSCANZ, which helps coordinate positions before committee meetings and debates at UN bodies. JUSCANZ, by the way, is one of these absurd UN acronyms; it stands for Japan, United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and it sometimes has a few members beyond them.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Now, just to take the two examples that you mentioned very briefly, the Goldstone Report and the Palestinian bid for UN membership. On Goldstone, something fascinating and I think unexpected that happened over the course of that long and quite painful debate was that Justice Goldstone himself actually wrote an op-ed in the &lt;em&gt;Washington Post&lt;/em&gt; in which he recanted some of the core conclusions of his own report. I think that was not something anyone in the administration thought we were necessarily going to get. There were people across the administration, including in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and what is known as “L” at the State Department, the legal adviser’s office under the brilliant Harold Koh, all of whom came together with a very sustained and principled critique of the Goldstone Report. I think it was surprising—certainly to myself—to see Justice Goldstone recant some of his core conclusions.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;In terms of the Palestinians’ UN gambit, there was an underlying American position which I think some people had quite a bit of sympathy for, perhaps more so at the Security Council than in the General Assembly. The administration point of view was this conflict could only be resolved through the creation of an independent and viable Palestinian state, and that can only come through direct negotiations and a negotiated two-state solution with Israel and Palestine, a future state of Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security. And that just wasn’t going to happen through shortcuts at the UN. When the Palestinians did bring their application for UN membership forward in September, the Security Council went through its traditional process, which includes considering the application in a Security Council membership committee. There are a lot of lawyers and discussion and debate and analysis, and then that membership committee forwards a report to the Security Council. And that is basically where it stayed. I think that was not necessarily where the Palestinians thought it would go. I really don’t want to be in the prediction business on where this goes, but I think it is worth noting that in late January, Ambassador Rice said that while she didn’t want to make any rock-solid commitments about it, she thought that if the Palestinians were weighing their choices with respect to the Security Council, they would be doing so today in a fairly similar landscape to what they dealt with back in the fall.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;It is interesting that the administration has been so successful in blocking the Palestinians at the UN, but unsuccessful in its attempt to get genuine peace talks going, and even while moving to the Quartet in which the UN participates, they haven’t had that much success. How would you assess this effort—a great success at the UN and not so much success outside of the UN? What has the UN offered? The UN usually is seen as the great garbage can of Israeli initiatives, and yet it hasn’t worked out that way in recent years. &lt;br&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The administration, I think, has been fairly clear—along lines that I think will be fairly familiar to those who subscribe to some of the views of the Israel Policy Forum—that the only way for a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace is two states for two peoples. The question of actually getting there, I think, is very difficult. Often, Arab-Israeli peacemaking comes after moments of agony in the region or after unexpected breakthroughs—above all, Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, but also the incredible hopes of the handshake between Rabin and Arafat on the White House lawn in September 1993. I think it is very difficult to try to resolve excruciating issues at a time when the parties, to some degree, don’t feel that much impetus to move because the status quo is not that unbearable. But to my mind, the dilemmas are not going to change; only the body count is. I think the parties are much better off, particularly at this moment of change in the Middle East, moving forward and actually taking a deal along the lines that has been suggested by senior administration policymakers, including the president’s remarks in May, which lay out the overall administration view of the right way forward. Nobody else has really seemed to suggest a better way ahead than that, but it is very frustrating. There are a few small green shoots of hope that we have seen in recent weeks, notably when Jordan brought the parties together for several direct meetings in coordination with the Quartet. It didn’t get a huge amount of attention, but it was noteworthy just the same. These were the type of direct talks that people have been pushing and prodding and hoping for, though the question of whether it is possible to move forward is still being wrangled about. It does sound as if the Israelis came to the table with some sort of offering, and we will, I guess, get more clarity as to what exactly that was. Netanyahu has done something no Likud prime minister has ever done and come out in favor of a two-state solution in a speech a couple of years ago, which is something that is striking to hear from a Likud prime minister. But actually operationalizing that takes some guts and means running some risks. I think the United States will continue keep up its bipartisan commitment to be there, to let Palestinians see that negotiations can lead to real statehood, to let Israelis see that negotiations can led to more security rather than less, and to make clear that the United States will make the risks for peace less scary for leaders who are willing to run them in good faith. &lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Let’s move on to the rest of the Middle East. How would you describe the general success and also the experience of the United States in the last three years on this very active period in the Middle East with the Arab Spring and Iran and many other issues? &lt;br&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;I think there are a few stand-out moments that I saw or was tangentially involved with in my previous job. The first of those relates to Iran, where in June 2010, with leadership being driven quite directly by the President and Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Rice, the Security Council passed Resolution 1929—a really tough sanctions resolution, the toughest sanctions on the books today against any UN member state. Because it is a Security Council resolution, it is binding on all UN member states, including all Security Council members and including UN members that may differ from the U.S. on some aspects of Iran policy. Resolution 1929 was supported by Russia, China, by the full P5, the full five permanent members of the Security Council, and it not only dealt with Iran’s ability to acquire financing and materials and support necessary for a nuclear arms program, it also opened the door for further national sanctions from the United States, which were passed through the Congress, and from the EU, Canada, Japan, South Korea, and some Arab states, and others. You see this today, where there are hints that countries in Asia are not going to buy as much crude from Iran. It is really making a difference, I think. That was a major step forward.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Can you say the UN resolution actually accelerated the process of sanctioning Iran? That however strong it was, the sanctions that are currently being debated and implemented are much stronger, and in a sense, the toughest UN resolution ever opened the doors for even greater activity on that front?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt; I think that is exactly what you see today. As one straw in the wind, you not only have Iran today talking about cutting off all oil sales to the EU, which makes up about 19 percent of Iran’s oil sales, but you also had, on February 22&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;, Reuters reporting that China, India, and Japan are planning cuts of at least 10 percent in Iranian crude imports. Those three countries together buy about 45 percent of Iran’s crude exports, which is a serious sign that we are in a different type of era of sanctioning against Iran. Much of that is due to the president’s emphasis on working through the UN, bringing the world together on this, and bringing Iran to a moment of isolation the likes of which it has not experienced.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Let’s move on to the rest of the Middle East, the Arab Spring, the countries that have been affected and involved, and the surprisingly substantial role the UN has played here. So you must have many comments on that.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;I think the most striking of those was one of the great struggles of the Arab Awakening, Libya. You had the fairly quick departure of Ben Ali from Tunisia, the incredible revolution in Tahrir Square that toppled the Mubarak regime, and then Qaddafi’s determination to hunt his people down like rats, as he put it, rather than let them have the universal rights that they were standing up for. Last week marked the one-year anniversary of the revolution in Libya, and it is actually startling to think that it was just about a year ago that Qaddafi’s forces were at the gates of Benghazi, and the entire country of Libya was being menaced by one of the world’s longest-serving dictators—and now he is gone. Much of that did come through Security Council Resolution 1973, in which the United States outlined in great specificity inside the Council what it envisioned doing together with NATO and NATO’s Arab partners, both in terms of air strikes and in terms of actions on the ground. This was a resolution that didn’t simply authorize a no-fly zone, with planes hovering overhead that weren’t in a position to do what was necessary to protect civilians on the ground. It had the authority to make sure that civilians were protected on the ground and that there was not an Srebrenica-style massacre inside Benghazi. The Security Council gave that authority, and not a single Security Council country voted against it. I think it made a huge and life-saving difference, and one that I think is worth noting. I think the Arab Awakening would look quite different if Qaddafi had been able to hang on through truly brutal use of force.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What is the precedent of Libya? Obviously people think of Syria. What is happening next, what has the effect been? I have students asking me all the time, why isn’t the international community doing more about Syria?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt; I think there is a serious roadblock in terms of Security Council action on Syria in the form of Russia and China, who vetoed not one but two Security Council draft resolutions on Syria. The first one, back in October, was a strictly hortatory resolution; it didn’t have sanctions in it. The one Russia and China vetoed quite recently was a resolution that endorsed the transition plan that is being put forth by the Arab League. The guts of that vetoed Security Council resolution was then given to the UN General Assembly, which overwhelmingly got behind what the Arab League, Turkey, and others have been calling for, which is for Assad to step down. He has lost whatever scant legitimacy the Ba&#039;ath Party dictatorship ever had in Syria, and it’s past time to pave a way for a transition in which all Syrian voices can be heard. The Russians and Chinese have come up with a policy that is simultaneously brainless, ruthless, and heartless. Vladimir Putin may be the only major international leader who truly believes Bashar al-Assad has a real long-term future as the leader of Syria. I think over time this issue will continue to come back to the Security Council as the situation on the ground continues to deteriorate. I do hope that the Russians and the Chinese will at some point listen to the voices of the Syrian people—to the incredible bravery that it has taken the Syrian protestors to be back out on the streets week in, week out, knowing the degree of force that is going to be hurled against them by an utterly ruthless regime. It is really one of the most striking things that we have seen throughout the Arab Awakening, and Russia and China are just on the wrong side of it.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;How do you explain the difference in Russian and Chinese policy towards Libya vs. Syria? &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;I think the Russians and Chinese have tried to re-write the history of what they actually voted for in Resolution 1973, which is the Libya resolution in the Security Council. There has been a post-Libya dynamic which has unfortunately limited the Council’s ability to live up to its responsibilities during this ongoing emergency in Syria. I think that the Russians and the Chinese understood what was in Resolution 1973, understood how it was going to be implemented, and they continue to look for excuses in order to avoid involvement in Syria. I think it is regrettable, and I do think that, even from their point of view, it is untenable over time. I do think sooner or later, this is going to have to keep coming back, and I think the administration has signaled a willingness to work with the Russians and Chinese to deal with reasonable objections. The Russians have come back with wrecking amendments designed to blow resolutions up, and I do hope that, over time, they can be brought to a more reasonable posture that shows some awareness of what’s going on on the ground. If they don’t, I think people in the Arab world are noticing. They see what Russia and China are doing, and they can see very clearly who is on the side of Syrian protestors showing incredible moral courage, and they see who is on the side of a regime that is shooting them down with vicious brutality, and they see who is selling the weapons. This has not escaped the notice of the people of the Middle East, and I think the Russians and the Chinese may find this extremely shortsighted in the years ahead.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;You seem to suggest that a lot more would be done vis-à-vis Syria and ousting the regime by the international community if the Russians and Chinese had not vetoed. But the United States and other countries have lots of vehicles outside of the UN Security Council; as you have pointed out, they have gone to the General Assembly, which doesn’t have enforcement ability, but still there is now a moral authority action against the Assad regime. If I am correct in my inference, why would a veto at the UN Security Council make such a difference?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;I think that the vetoes at the Security Council were the Russians’ and Chinese’s way of telling us that they were still willing to shelter Assad from the international consensus of horror at what the Assad regime is doing. I think that part of the way of getting a message through to Assad does have to do with increasing the pressure and isolation on his regime, to try to induce him to change force, and pressure in Security Council sanctions would be very effective for laying the tables in these types of decisions. As we have seen on Iran, there are certainly things can be done individually elsewhere. Victoria Nuland and Jay Carney in their briefings at the State Department and the White House respectively on February 22nd made it clear that if Assad won’t yield to the pressure the international community is bringing, the U.S. and others may have to consider additional measures. For the time being, those spokesman are not speculating on what those measures could be, but they are also affirmatively not taking anything off the table.&lt;strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt; Some people have speculated that there is a real difference in the Russian and Chinese positions. The Russians are much more committed to the Assad regime, and with the Chinese, there is much more movement in bringing them away from the Russian position. Do you see any of that as a possibility?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;I do see it as a possibility. First of all, the Russian arms relationship is just a different order of magnitude. According to Reuters, Russia sold Damascus nearly one billion dollars worth of arms last year, and that includes missile systems. These are big-ticket items, and there are also Kremlin cronies who don’t want to see some of the related skimming off the top go away. Plus there is a certain view in the Kremlin that they have just been doing business with the Assad regime for so long that friends don’t abandon friends—it is just not what they do. I do think that China is in a somewhat different position, and I think one potential tealeaf on this is that post-Ben Ali Tunisia is hosting a ministerial conference on Syria at the end of the week. Tunisians has invited more than 70 countries. The Russians have said they are not going. The initiation explicitly calls this a meeting in support of the Syrian people and in support of the Arab League initiative for a political transition—the same Arab League initiative that Russia and China vetoed in that Security Council draft resolution. If China does accept Tunisia’s invitation to go to this “Friends of Syria” ministerial conference at the end of the week, that would be a really interesting sign. That is one that I will be watching with great interest.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;If we look at the entire sad saga of the Syrian uprising, the Israelis are absent; they have taken no stand, and that is probably a very wise policy. At the UN or elsewhere, have the Israelis done anything, or have they just watched and waited?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;My sense is that the Israelis have basically watched and waited. I think the Israelis understand that they have very little ability to influence what is going on inside Syria. That is an issue of Syrian people rising up against this narrow minority dictatorship. There are some interesting strategic opportunities for Israel in the uprising, but I think the Israelis basically recognize that they don’t have much ability to influence this and are best off letting this unfold without inserting themselves into the issue.&lt;strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt; There are some dangers for Israel as well. If the uprising results in instability—and you see some of that in Libya—the Israelis have found a certain comfort in the Assad’s control, and that is lost forever. I would imagine that Israelis are very nervous, but it has taken a degree of professionalism to hold back anyway.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt; Stern restraint is not always the hallmark of Israeli diplomacy, but on this particular issue, I think they have played it quite professionally.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial,sans-serif;&quot;&gt;Note: This phone conference took place on February 22, 2012.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/warren-bass-international-community-and-middle-east#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/taxonomy/term/30">israel</category>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/taxonomy/term/301">Netanyahu</category>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/taxonomy/term/187">Obama administration</category>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/taxonomy/term/294">United Nations</category>
 <pubDate>Wed, 29 Feb 2012 13:27:44 -0500</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>AdamKorn</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">3430 at http://www.israelpolicyforum.org</guid>
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 <title>Nimrod Novik on Troubling Developments in Egypt</title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/nimrod-novik-troubling-developments-egypt</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: #000000;&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: #1f497d;&quot;&gt;Steven  Spiegel - What is happening in Egypt? What is the meaning of arresting  Americans and where is the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt; What is happening in Egypt is that the white  knight that was supposed to preserve stability is a dead man walking. &lt;br&gt; &lt;strong&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;span style=&quot;color: #1f497d;&quot;&gt;That is the military you mean?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; That is the military. The victory just twelve  months ago perceived the uprising as the outcome of the democratization  process in terms of a squash game: You politicians and civilians will be  free to play ball inside the walls, but we the military will determine  where the walls and the roof are, and we’ll make sure the ball does not  exceed those boundaries. So you want to do socio-economic, political  policy, that’s fine, but there are three clusters of interests that you  are not going to touch: They are national, organization and personal.  National, nobody will conduct policy that risks security friction with  Israel—you don’t want to be exposed. Second, nobody will conduct a  policy that risks U.S. military aid to Egypt. The Egyptian military  budget is all taken by salaries and constant domestic expenditures.  There is no money for procurement either spare-parts or new weapons,  that all comes from the American FMS (Foreign Military Sales). These are  the national interests that we will preserve. The organizational  interests are: nobody will touch the military budget, it will be outside  of civilian oversight. And nobody will touch the military’s substantial  economic interests. The Egyptian military is mega producing machine,  producing civilian goods of any type, from televisions and VCRs to  street lamps. This is the military income for the military organization  as such, and for retirees. The personal interests: Egyptian officers  will not be subject to prosecution by civilian courts. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif&quot;&gt;That  was the story 12 months ago, 10 months ago, 8 months ago, with time the  Egyptian military – the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces – grew  political incompetent and was outmaneuvered by the Muslim Brotherhood,  step-by-step on the sequence of political process, on the timing of  political process and on the substance of the political process. This  process of castrating the military by political maneuvering reached  obviously its peak with the election results, which gave the Muslim  Brotherhood the legitimacy of a majority, or at least a potential  plurality in parliament. And the next two points of contention are no  longer as threatening to domestic stability as they seem just five  months ago than is the composition of the 100 person committee that is  supposed to draft a new constitution. The army was going to determine  that, no longer so. And the timing of the presidential elections, the  army wanted it in 2013—as far as possible from the revolution so that  they can run some ex-uniform for president, and time would allow spirits  to subside, the people to be less hostile to someone who was previously  associated with the Mubarak administration—that is no longer the case,  the elections will be in June 2012. The army has loss one struggle after  another. If the large processes were not enough, it was even such  tragic incidents as the football match massacre in Port Said two weeks  ago, where seventy plus people were killed in a football match. This  allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to blame the military for what happened  there, not just for the incompetence for security on site, but for  having instigated it in order to demonstrate what happens when you go  civilian rather than listen to the military for law and order. So, we  have a situation that things are getting out of hand. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif&quot;&gt;The NGO story &lt;a href=&quot;http://images.myngp.com/LinkTracker.aspx?crypt=IVi0ax2%2b6UBSinc%2fCPYaKcEElO7dcU9C5ow%2fluNWEVrYhXPh5pPh625NbbEL%2b6l4Axq79rjrsP3vDvH40BnBmViQKZ90qzlr3nVBIY4NZwqY6MUHdWbY1yN7ZeQfTvMMRk0cXkXxkPvqWEtiKlzTbo1Q75CGZo8jhatjUJm42z2NS5o4GcNEh%2fHxAyqkK3fSyw9rt%2f4%2f8oY%3d&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;with the 19 Americans detained&lt;/a&gt; is another outgrowth of this story. It started off with the Muslim  Brothers trying to evade investigation of the sources of funding that  they used in the election. They got hundreds of millions of dollars from  the Gulf, which were illegal spent in the elections. So the way to go  was to blame the NGOs for doing the same. They had a minister, the  Minister of International Cooperation who was a holdover from the  Mubarak era, a female, who found this as an opportunity to cleanse  herself of the sin of being associated with the previous regime by  becoming more anti-American and more patriotic than anybody. &amp;nbsp;In this  situation where there is no responsible adult in the neighborhood,  patriotism is going wild, populism is going wild and even risking  relations with the United States, which they cannot afford—not just for  strategic reasons, but even for immediate economic reasons. Without a  U.S. supported position there is not going to be any money from the IMF,  from the World Bank and probably not from Europe either. So we see  Egypt losing any central force that preaches reason and we see forces  competing for populism for cheap headlines, and there is no adult in the  neighborhood to call it into order. &lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: #1f497d;&quot;&gt;Is the peace treaty still secure between Israel and Egypt? And what happens to these arrested Americans? &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;The peace treaty as a policy, the peace  treaty is secure. From everything I can tell, from everything I hear,  there is no intention to challenge the peace treaty. However, the peace  treaty can fall victim to something very different. As you know, the  security situation in the Sinai is beginning to look like an island of  Afghanistan. You have islands of al Qaeda; you have islands of Salafis,  the Bedouin community there is 550,000 strong having been neglected by  the central regime for decades making a living on smuggling everything  from weapons to women, and have been infiltrated by al Qaeda-like  ideologies. We are building a fence to secure our border and that fence  is going to deprive them of their livelihood, and I’m afraid that they  will go for more violent ways of earning money. On contract for Iran, on  contract for al Qaeda, on contract for elements in Gaza and with SA-16s  and SA-18s allegedly have been reached those ground to air missile and  reached the Bedouin trades from Libya over the past months. Just imagine  one scenario, an Israeli helicopter is shot down from over Israeli  airspace from a missile in Sinai. Do we send our air force into Egyptian  sovereignty, to take care of it? This is just one scenario, how the  peace treaty can fall victim to the failure of the Egyptians to secure  their sovereignty in the Sinai. &lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: #1f497d;&quot;&gt;And the Americans, do you see them getting out or not?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt; I can only tell you following President Obama’s  telephone call to Mohamed Tantawi that there was an effort to make it  happen. The fact that it hasn’t happened is probably the most striking  recent evidence of the extent to which the military has lost its  influence over policy. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: #1f497d;&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif&quot;&gt;That is a frightening ending. Tell me, do you therefore believe the Muslim Brotherhood is simply going to take over?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; No, the Muslim Brotherhood is taking over, there  is no doubt about that. I didn’t see that in such dark colors as some  others. I think the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood is mostly  intelligent people, who understand the difference between being in the  opposition to an repressive regime and being responsible for 85 million  Egyptians. Their foreign currency reserves went down from 36 billion to  10 billion and counting. They are going to have to take very harsh  economic measures when expectations are that the opposite would be the  case—the average Egyptians says we got rid of corruption we should have  prosperity. What is going to happen is not only subsidies on basic  foodstuffs will not be deepened, they will be removed. You are going to  have social unrest in Egypt for a long time to come as a result of harsh  economic realities. The Gulf is very stingy with resources until it  sees a stable Egyptian administration. Europe has its own difficulties  and it is not in the mood for coughing billions and billions for Egypt,  the U.S. likewise. And if that was not enough than what we just  discussed, the Egyptians misbehave. The Muslim Brothers will have a  tremendous challenge from the Salafis who will stay out of government in  order to try and strengthen their base the next time around with the  same electorate. So the real question is when the Muslim Brothers prove  unable to deliver for the Egyptian people, with unrealistic  expectations. Will the liberals use that time to get their act together?  I don’t know. If they do, they have a shot in the next Egyptian  government, the elections after this. If they don’t, Egypt may slide  further in the direction of more extreme religious elements like the  Salafis. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: #1f497d;&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;This  is a very stark image, and obviously we are hearing that Egypt is in  real trouble and this is an ominous sign for both the United States and  Israel. &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; We had thirty years of a good neighborhood; we have to get adjusted to a very difficult reality. &lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Note: This phone conference took place on February 8, 2012.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/nimrod-novik-troubling-developments-egypt#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/taxonomy/term/52">Egypt</category>
 <pubDate>Tue, 14 Feb 2012 16:09:26 -0500</pubDate>
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 <title>Nimrod Novik on Talks Between Hamas and Fatah, Israel and the Palestinians</title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/nimrod-novik-talks-between-hamas-and-fatah-israel-and-palestinians</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: #1f497d;&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial,sans-serif;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;Steven  Spiegel - Do you think there will be some kind of unity government? Are  these talks proceeding long enough to mean that there is a change?&lt;br&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial,sans-serif;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: #1f497d;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Nimrod Novik&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt; – There is  an opportunity for a unity government, which doesn’t mean there is an  opportunity for unity. To establish a joint government will not be a  precedent, we have had that before. Before it collapsed, but it did not  entail real unity between the two entities that if one wants to be  optimistic is a long way off. Unity between the two involves – and this  is probably the most difficult part of it all – what Abu Mazen (Mahmoud  Abbas) likes to call “one weapon, one authority.” For Hamas to accept  Fatah authority or P.A. authority over the forces in Gaza is not  something that at the moment is in the cards. Worse yet, even though  Khaled Mashaal did sign with Abu Mazen in Doha, the agreement is not the  first one that has been signed. You find opposition to the same  agreement not only if Fatah, but much more so in Hamas where people in  Gaza don’t see eye-to eye with those who are now leaving Damascus. &lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: #1f497d;&quot;&gt;When you say people in Gaza you mean, Hamas in Gaza?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt; Yes, Hamas officials in Gaza. The rift between  the two wings of Hamas has become far more pronounced since the Damascus  wing lost its base, and lost much of its power. The Gazans in turn felt  more emboldened that they were the ones who shoulder the  responsibility, who have faced Israel, so to speak, and who feel that  they must have a greater say in Hamas politics. When they see Khaled  Mashaal changing policy – like his declarations a few weeks ago that he  is putting on hold the armed struggle, or deciding Haniyeh, the senior  official from Gaza, will no longer be the Palestinian Prime Minister,  which he was when the previous unity government was formed – that is not  something they take lightly and they seem to feel that they are in a  position to challenge Damascus, the outsiders so to speak, the ‘Diaspora  Hamas,’ on these issues. It is not just that Hamas and Fatah are  finding it very difficult to bridge differences— it is within each that  you have problems that are not likely to allow real unity to emerge  anytime soon. &lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: #1f497d;&quot;&gt;There is a lot of  talk about Hamas changing its stripes. Is Hamas trying to change its  stripes? There is lots of discussion in the press, the media and  certainly in the blogosphere. First of all, is it true? And if someone  is trying to change their stripes it sounds like the old Damascus crowd,  which was seen as the most radical that is actually is trying to become  more moderate than the Gaza Hamas. Is that accurate?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt; If we take public statements at face value than  that is the situation. If we scratch the surface, I think we will find  other explanations for what we hear. Yes, it was Haniyeh who led the  more moderate wing for a long time until the last weeks or couple  months, when he suddenly became far more belligerent in his statements. I  think this is a tactical move concerning intra-Hamas politics rather  than a change of strategy of Hamas. I think the strategy of Hamas has  been evolving even before the so called “Arab Spring,” even before they  found themselves in a very tough spot when Iran demanded that they stand  with Assad and their identity and they chose not to follow that all the  way, having to evacuate from Damascus. They have been evolving way  before that, gradually changing their position, not going all the way to  accepting the three conditions of the international community, Quartet,  Israel etc. But sliding in that direction, by ending that armed  struggle, again in various phases and by accepting Palestinian state on  the borders of 1967 within a long term, interim agreement. Long term for  them, they were talking 20 to 40 years. We have seen evidence of that  for a long time. Today it is even more so, given that they find that the  mother organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, now faces the  responsibility of having to run Egypt, with 85 million people who need  to be fed every day. Suddenly, it is changing its tone on the likelihood  of peace with Israel. They realize the Muslim Brotherhood is in no mood  for Hamas to get them into trouble with Israel, so on the one hand  their mother organization is on the rise throughout the Arab World, and  on the other this carries with it some burden of responsibilities.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: #1f497d;&quot;&gt;How do you explain Haniyeh turning to be more hawkish? &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt; I believe Haniyeh was looking for a way to  distinguish himself from the Khaled Mashaal crowd and thought that  perhaps that as Mashaal had lost favor in Iran, he might be the one that  would get the dollar loaded suitcases from Tehran. &amp;nbsp;So he is trying to  out-maneuver and switch roles with Khaled Mashaal as a tactical way to  survive politically. &lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: #1f497d;&quot;&gt;I&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: #1f497d;&quot;&gt; am wondering who is in favor of this unity? Is it unity with Haniyeh or is unity with the Damascus crowd? &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;It is like asking who is in favor of a  permanent status agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians. The  negotiations that took place in Amman—What you had was that those  engaged in those negotiations had no illusion that this would lead to a  deal. However, they had reasons that forced them to sit at the table and  pretend to be doing the real thing. While they were planning the blame  game from the outset, each was looking at which one would walk away from  the table, being blamed by the witnesses for having caused a failure.  You had the Palestinian street in both Gaza and the West Bank affected  by the so-called “Arab Spring” and blaming their miserable situation for  intra-Palestinian rivalries. They think they will not be able to stand  up to the Israeli occupation and roll it back as long as the two are  divided. They want to see unity and therefore are thinking of an  election at any time, being it in 2012 or beyond. The two sides need to  show the public it is not them who are to blame for the absence of  unity, so they keep propelling this illusion of unity, they keep taking  steps that don’t go as far as violating the red lines that make one or  the other, subservient to the other.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial,sans-serif;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: #1f497d;&quot;&gt;Salam Fayyad is going to lose his job in this whole arrangement, isn’t he?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial,sans-serif;&quot;&gt;Salam  Fayyad is prepared to lose his job. He may emerge as a deputy prime  minister. He may be the minister of finance, nobody knows. He may resent  it all and just walk away. I don’t think anyone knows exactly how it  will play out.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;span style=&quot;color: #1f497d;&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;You are the  long-time president of the ECF, the Economic Cooperation Foundation; it  is a lot more than economics, it gets involved in many activities  especially with the Palestinians. What is all of this going to lead to?  Will it lead to the end of American aid, lead to Israelis holding back  tax-revenue, what is going to happen here? I understand that the  Palestinian public may believe the best way to elections and to confront  the Israelis is to have a unity government, but in the international  context it may be the best way for them to take a major step backwards.  What do you think?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; I rarely dare to predict about the past, let  alone the future. Let me make a comment about it without trying to  predict what will happen, just to try and perhaps shed some light, on  what are Abu Mazen’s motivations when he goes that way. Abu Mazen found  himself corned, by the fact that the peace process was yielding him no  dividends; the Gilad Shalit deal was the crowing jewel of that reality  from his perspective. Here Hamas is being rewarded for kidnapping an  Israeli solider, by getting the release of over 1,000 prisoners. His  security cooperation with Israel, which is exemplarily, is not being  rewarded by anything. He started to create options for himself and to  open up options. One option was that he started to internationalize, go  to the UN, go to UNESCO, he didn’t anticipate the harsh reaction,  certainly from Congress or Washington and Congress in particular. He was  stunned by some of the results, but he felt that he had no alternative  if he wanted to show his constituency that he was doing something. It  will not produce a Palestinian state, but it may produce some national  pride, recognition, whatever. Then came this finding that Khaled Mashaal  was an opportunity to open up another option. Now if I am Abu Mazen I  am faced with three options: “I can go international, I can go bilateral  with the Israelis if they are serious, or I can go with Hamas and do  domestic unity.” In striking the deal with Mashaal he was very careful,  trying to square several circles. The least of which is not to create a  Hamas-Fatah government with which the international community will not  deal. But to create a government of technocrats, that is acceptable to  Hamas and Fatah. If that was not enough he agreed to stand at the head  of the government so the international community has someone that they  know and trust. The conventional wisdom here in the region is 2012 will  not see a serious peace process and the question of those who are still  engaged is how do we create an alternative to the peace process that  keeps options open for the morning after when the U.S. is back from  lunch, when the Israeli elections are over perhaps, that options are not  foreclosed, that the bilateral relations between Israel and the  Palestinians do not slide into an eruption of violence again. How can we  identify some measures that can be enough for Abu Mazen to stay at the  table and not too costly for Netanyahu to refuse to go for it? Everyone  is working on it right now. I am sure you are all familiar on two of  these, two clusters of such measures. One was the Quartet decision to  bring the parties to the table to talk about border security first.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;span style=&quot;color: #1f497d;&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;That is the Jordan talks?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; That is the basis for the talks, thus far. They  produced some progress (I will talk about these in a second), but in my  judgment the biggest mistake was they chose the wrong issue, as long as  that issue was in isolation. As long there was no ‘safety-net,’ for that  issue. As long as that issue is not accompanied by smaller measures  that can be implemented concurrent with the continuation of the  negotiations. Borders and security first to me perceive as the political  horizon, something to keep on talking about, keep on making progress if  you do, if you don’t you don’t you keep on talking. While at the same  time you implement certain measures on the ground, that help the  Palestinians stay at the table, that improves life in the territories  that contributes to state building from the bottom up, that everybody  claims to be supporting, that Salam Fayyad claims, that Netanyahu is on  the record supporting. But that was missing; the only thing that was the  agenda was that in three months you guys should put a map on the table.  Now the moment you pronounce that you also announce the date of the  funeral of this process, because there is no way in the world that in  2012 Prime Minister Netanyahu can put a map on the table. For if he puts  a map, that is real for the peace process he doesn’t have a coalition.  If he has a map that accommodates his coalition, he doesn’t have a peace  process. That reality should have been clear to everybody. It shouldn’t  be supported by clutches to walk on, I don’t know how many of you have  seen the very good article Dennis Ross in the Washington Post, when he  suggested the menu of steps Israel should do. The menu was very good; it  was something the administration has been trying to do for 2.5 years  without much success. But again he too presented it in isolation from  the rest of the context of the situation. Again, Prime Minister  Netanyahu is not in a charitable mood of making unilateral gestures.  Somebody should have taken Dennis Ross’ menu of gestures of Israel to  the Palestinians, add to them a menu of Palestinian commitments to, and  make that into a safety-net for talking about borders and security.  First, to allow those negotiations to continue for the rest of the year  and perhaps into 2013, until the environment is different for a peace  process. This was not done. I know the people who are working on it as  we speak, trying to remedy, to create a context that would allow those  negotiations in Amman to proceed. &lt;br&gt; &lt;span style=&quot;color: #1f497d;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Which people are working on it, can you tell us?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; Tony Blair is working on it, our Prime  Minister’s office is working on it, the Mahmoud Abbas team is working on  it, the Egyptian team which is entrusted in supporting the peace  process is working on it, and Washington is certainly in the picture. &lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; Let me talk about the negotiations in Amman.  They drew too much attention, Netanyahu representative in Amman, Molcho,  while unable to present a map for the reasons I suggested earlier, did  present principles in which a map could be based. In those principles,  he went farther than Netanyahu ever did until that point. Now, he did  not go as far as Ehud Olmert or perhaps as far as Ehud Barak would like,  but he went farther than Netanyahu ever did in primarily two areas:  One, in defining Israel’s future borders in terms that are associated  with the fence, which is everything outside of the fence will not  belong, will not be Israeli sovereignty. That is not enough, but for a  beginning of a Netanyahu negotiating team it is interesting. Second, he  is no longer asking for sovereignty along the Jordan River, he didn’t  even ask for Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley. He spoke of an  Israeli military security presence along the Jordan River, which is a  far narrower definition, and the terms did not preclude the possibility  that the Israeli security presence along the Jordan River would be  within an international force. &lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: #1f497d;&quot;&gt;I&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: #1f497d;&quot;&gt;n  other words we have some positive indications, but basically what you  are saying is to expect more of the same in Gaza, in the West Bank and  in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Is that fair?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; Yes, it is. &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Note: This phone conference took place on February 8, 2012.&lt;br&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/nimrod-novik-talks-between-hamas-and-fatah-israel-and-palestinians#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/taxonomy/term/81">Fatah</category>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/taxonomy/term/43">Hamas</category>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/taxonomy/term/30">israel</category>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/taxonomy/term/239">unity Palestinian Hamas Fayyad</category>
 <pubDate>Mon, 13 Feb 2012 21:24:29 -0500</pubDate>
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 <title>New Phone Number</title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/new-phone-number-0</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;Please note that IPF&#039;s phone number has changed. We can now be reached at 212-354-1812.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/new-phone-number-0#comments</comments>
 <pubDate>Fri, 27 Jan 2012 11:07:54 -0500</pubDate>
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 <title>We will not stand for this</title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/we-will-not-stand</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;Israel Policy Forum is shocked and appalled by the column published in the Atlanta Jewish Times by its owner and publisher Andrew Adler &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.jta.org/news/article/2012/01/20/3091282/atlanta-jewish-times-apologizes-for-obama-assassination-scenario&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;calling&lt;/a&gt; for Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “to give the go-ahead for U.S.-based Mossad agents to take out a president deemed unfriendly to Israel in order for the current vice president to take his place, and forcefully dictate that the United States policy includes its helping the Jewish state obliterate its enemies.&quot; &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Adler puts to shame Jewish values, reneges on American patriotism and discredits journalism. His statement of regret is clearly not sufficient.&amp;nbsp; Adler &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/20/newspaper-owner-sorry-obama-hit-column?newsfeed=true&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;told reporters &lt;/a&gt;that he was attempting “to get a reaction.”&amp;nbsp; He is rightfully &lt;a href=&quot;http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/21/us/jewish-president-threat/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;getting one&lt;/a&gt; from the Secret Service for threatening the life of our President.&amp;nbsp; He should also get a strong, loud and adamant reaction from a united American Jewish community—We will not stand for this. &amp;nbsp;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Enough is enough.&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;We are tired of extremists on the fringes of the political spectrum dragging the US-Israel relationship into the mud. Adler’s remarks are just the latest and most extreme example of how the discourse in the Jewish community has gone awry when it comes to issues concerning the future of the State of Israel.&amp;nbsp; The US-Israel relationship is too important for the Jewish community to tolerate this any longer.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Israel Policy Forum will soon announce a new effort to bridge the gaps that divide our community and bring together the vast majority of American Jews – from across the political and denominational spectra – in support of a simple goal: reason.&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;It is a simple message, but one that has clearly been lost amidst the noise emanating from extremists like Adler.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/we-will-not-stand#comments</comments>
 <pubDate>Sat, 21 Jan 2012 19:46:22 -0500</pubDate>
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 <title>Amb. Daniel C. Kurtzer on &#039;Reviving the Peace Process&#039; (TRANSCRIPT)</title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/amb-daniel-c-kurtzer-reviving-peace-process-transcript</link>
 <description>&lt;p style=&quot;margin: 0.1pt 0in;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: rgb(23, 54, 93);&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;Dr.  Steven L. Spiegel: You think it&#039;s a mistake to wait around for the end  of this administration’s first term – or this administration (however  the election turns out) – and not do very much until next year. Can you  explain why you think it is imperative that we act &lt;em&gt;now&lt;/em&gt;? &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: rgb(23, 54, 93);&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt; Sure. First, hello to everyone and to IPF, a great organization. If the  Arab-Israeli conflict and the Arab-Israeli peace process would do us a  favor by hibernating for the next 10 or 11 months that might be ideal.  We are going through our own political process, Israel may in fact go  through an electoral process sometime this coming year and certainly  there is ferment within the Palestinian community. The question remains  whether or not Hamas and Fatah reconciliation will go forward. In an  ideal world, if we were writing this up as a scenario we would say let’s  put this all on hold, and everyone stays away happily and nothing  changes for the worse, and we pick it up perhaps when everyone is  stronger. But status quos are not status quos and people know that. They  either get better – or more commonly – they actually get worse because  they are left neglected. I fear that this status quo, over the next 10  or 11 months if there isn’t some very significant policy activity, will  deteriorate into violence. This violence could either emanate from Gaza,  unhappy groups that are not satisfied with what Hamas is doing, or from  the West Bank or even from radical settlers who have designs to  undermine the rule of law of Israel in the West Bank. For that reason  alone it is important that the United States not pretend that they can  put this issue on hold for a year.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin: 0.1pt 0in;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: rgb(23, 54, 93);&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;You  don’t think that the Israeli government on its own can handle these  three problems, or any others that arise, and deal with the settlers of  the West Bank and Gaza violence? &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; I would like to hope that they could, but they have not shown any determination to do so. Settlement activity according to &lt;em&gt;Peace Now&lt;/em&gt; settlement numbers &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4173945,00.html&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;were up twenty percent last year.&lt;/a&gt; Having just come back from Israel with a group of Princeton University  students, I can tell you that building is going apace. There is a lot of  chatter about getting these West Bank settlers under control, but so  far nothing has been done. And now we see the so-called “price-tag”  attacks. When Israel decides to act against an outpost these folks act  against Arabs or now against the IDF. There is no indication that the  Israeli government has the will to do it, they certainly have the  capability to clampdown, but I am not sure they have the will to do it,  given the political configuration of the current coalition.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin: 0.1pt 0in;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: rgb(23, 54, 93);&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;Now  what about these arguments that are often made that while Netanyahu has  been in the past a supporter of the settlers and continues verbally to  do so, he has actually been much more controlled than previous prime  ministers. After all, he has had this argument about supporting the  Palestinians with an improved economic position and although he has a  murky-at-best policy on the peace process, he has actually done more for  the Palestinians than many previous prime ministers. Is there any  accuracy to this? &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; First  issue—I don’t buy it. When you mention “Peace Now” people say they are a  biased organization. But I have found through very carful study that  when they put out facts and figures they are correct. The facts that  they put out to my knowledge have never been disputed by the Israeli  government and I recall a time when I was the Ambassador and I wanted to  show the then defense minister, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, some information  about settlements and I couldn’t use classified material so I used peace  now material and he looked at it and said “oh it is Peace Now” and I  said tell me if it is wrong. I went back about two weeks later and he  said “yes the information was correct.” If Peace Now is correct, which I  think it is, Netanyahu has not been hesitant about conducting  settlement activity. There was a ten-month pause in new housing starts  during the second and third year of the Obama administration, but it  never stopped settlement construction and you now have a resumption of  the settlement building process. On the question of Netanyahu as a  ground-up builder of Palestine, this is something Salam Fayyad has  articulated as a goal in 2009 and everyone dismissed it as simply talk  that the Palestinians will never get their act together. However, he has  produced what he said he would produce. Has that benefited from a more  benign Israeli government view, yes it has. However, it is also  benefited from the fact that the security forces that we helped train,  these so called Dayton Forces that are now conducting security in a  professional manner in the West Bank have given the business community  in the West Bank towns the confidence to go ahead and make investments.  When I took my students to Ramallah just two weeks ago we were at the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;Mövenpick&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; Hotel, which is better looking than almost any hotel in Israel. There  is a lot of investment there. Yes, Israel gets a little credit for not  stopping the investment, but I would not put up a statute of Netanyahu  in the Ramallah town square and say he is responsible for the  construction of Palestine.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin: 0.1pt 0in;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: rgb(23, 54, 93);&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;You have a four-point program in your &lt;em&gt;National Interest&lt;/em&gt; piece. Could you tell us about your four-point program?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; I have  been arguing this for a couple of years. I started the argument almost  three years ago when I testified in front of the Senate Foreign  Relations Committee. My problem with the approach that we have followed  over the last few years is that we have chosen tactics rather than  strategy. Therefore, what I would like to see us do is plan an  across-the-board strategy. Element number one is to come up with “Obama  Parameters.” We know from the Clinton Parameters that he tried to  capture approximately where the parties might start to negotiate. In  other words, it wasn’t the outcome plan, but it was a going-in idea  where you start negotiations. And we now know from the negotiations that  have taken place over the last decade about where the tolerance points  are for the two sides to start negotiations. President Obama could put  them out – not as a plan for the outcome of negotiations – but rather  where the parties should start and he should tell the parties when he  puts them out. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin: 0.1pt 0in;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: rgb(23, 54, 93);&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;Can you give a specific example of how the “Obama Parameters” might differ from the Clinton Parameters?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; For  example, on the question of Jerusalem, one of the most sensitive and  emotional issues. If you remember, Clinton talked about dividing the Old  City into different areas of sovereignty. Since 2001, when those  parameters came out, there have been a lot of studies done by  non-governmental institutions, including one I am associated with done  by a number of Canadians, which is called the Jerusalem Old City  Initiative. We also have what Olmert negotiated in 2007-2008 with Abbas,  which rather than a division of sovereignty in the Old City it was a  question of differing sovereignty and coming up with an agreed plan for  governing Jerusalem. This would divide the area outside the Old City,  but not divide the Old City itself, which is only one square kilometer.  This might be one of the places where, instead of coming out with a  sovereignty parameter of Jerusalem, the Obama administration might  suggest these different creative ways of dealing with a question like  Jerusalem.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin: 0.1pt 0in;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: rgb(23, 54, 93);&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;Let’s go on to a second element.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; The  second element to the strategy is to make good on what Abbas has been  talking about: this includes Palestinian institution and security  strategy. They have done a good job, and with no question they are much  better off now than they were a couple of years ago. However, they can  do better. Especially in areas where progress has not yet been made. For  example, this includes both the education system and incitement. There  needs to be reform of Palestinian textbooks, public discourse and media  so that you answer the argument on whether or not there is an education  for peace underway or an education for continued conflict. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt; &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p style=&quot;margin: 0.1pt 0in;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;The  third element is a throwback to the “Roadmap.” The Roadmap in 2003/2004  called for a series of actions by each side in parallel that would be  mutually reinforcing. The Roadmap today is dormant, but has good ideas  in it. In the context of negotiations rather than in the absence of  negotiations we might be able to get some movement in Roadmap  obligations. Obama tried a settlement freeze, but he tried it in the  abstract and in the absence of negotiations. However, I think he would  have a better chance if the parties were negotiating on the basis of  parameters. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt; &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p style=&quot;margin: 0.1pt 0in;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;The  fourth element of the strategy is to pick up on the Arab Peace  Initiative. The Arabs changed their policy—they are now focused on what  happens to the 1967 problem. Which is the problem of the occupied  territories, they are no longer calling Israel’s existence into  question. Also, nobody is using the Arab Peace Initiative. One way to  use it is to revive some multilateral engagement between Israel and the  Arabs even in advance of a negotiated outcome on the bilateral issues.  Questions of health, water and environment still need to be dealt with  and these questions transcend boundaries. If we could show that process  starting again it would lend a great deal of support and a safety net  for the larger process.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin: 0.1pt 0in;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: rgb(23, 54, 93);&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;This  is a highly admirable approach, but is it a viable one? In the United  States the idea of supporting Palestinian institutions is not  controversial. But the president tried to do something like a parameter  on borders and got assailed last May. What has changed that would make  this approach work? &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; It is  not what has changed; it is what needs to change. Up until May of 2011  the president was putting forward tactics, and tactics don’t work in  this process. In May, he began to put forward something that approached a  larger strategy, but he walked away from it at the first sign of  Israeli and Arab pushback. What needs to change is a willingness of the  United States to stand behind what it stands for. Is this something that  is important to the United States? I didn’t determine that, the  President of the United States said when he entered office that this is  important to the United States. This is a ‘national interest of our  country.’ He took the trouble on the first full day of his  administration to appoint George Mitchell as his envoy. If it is  important, and that importance has not diminished over the last three  years, than we ought to act as though it is important and it means you  put forward a good idea. And the President’s idea in May was a good  idea—and then you work it. You don’t take ‘no’ for an answer and you  pushback when one or both of the parties push at you. And you modify as  you need to modify. However, you don’t just walk away as we did.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin: 0.1pt 0in;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: rgb(23, 54, 93);&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;No  Republican presidential candidate will hesitate to criticize the  President for the slightest thing that he does to promote the peace  process. How does the President pursue this during an election year and  can he be convinced that it would help him and not hurt him?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; It  strikes me that the Republicans in this campaign have given him a  tremendous amount of latitude to operate because the ideas they put  forward are so beyond the moon. One candidate said the ‘Palestinians  were an invented nation’ and another candidate said they will do  ‘whatever the Israeli Prime Minister wants them to do.’ That is not what  an American president needs to do. The president needs the ability to  say to the American people “I will do what needs to be done that will  help the Israelis make the peace that is in their strategic interest.  However, that may require some engagement beyond simply saying ‘yes’ to  what the Israeli prime minister is telling me that he wants to hear.” It  requires a little bit of boldness and leadership.&lt;span&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;But  these other guys who are running for office are just saying whatever  makes sense to their donors. The current candidates have no  responsibility for what they are saying, while the president does have  responsibility. And he is on record as saying this is important so he  should act like this is important. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin: 0.1pt 0in;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: rgb(23, 54, 93);&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;Let’s  turn to the two parties. How do you get the two parties to observe the  Roadmap when they haven’t in the past? On the Palestinian side you have a  lot of disunity and a leader who has proven himself to be very cautious  even when Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in September 2008 made a  far-reaching proposal. How do you get the Palestinians to take the steps  the Roadmap requires? Also, how do you get Netanyahu to move when his  government is particularly right-wing and he has been reluctant to take  any serious initiative that might cause any controversy within his  coalition? &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; The answer on the Roadmap is—I don’t know.&lt;span&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Because  we have never tried to implement it in the context of a larger  strategy, even when it came out in 2003. I was Ambassador to Israel at  the time and it was in a very limited context and it fell apart under  the burden of continued terrorism. I don’t know if we will be able to  succeed with it. If you want a chance for success it has to be  integrated into this larger strategy. I don’t have a ready answer for  that, but we have never tried it in the context of a larger strategy.  Neither of the two parties has been tested fully on a strategic  approach. It was not hard for Netanyahu to pushback on settlements  because settlements as an issue didn’t make a lot of sense to people not  to just Netanyahu. I don’t think it was the way to go because you are  not going to get an Israeli government to do that when it sees nothing  else happening. When Obama made that demand he couldn’t even get the  King of Saudi Arabia to allow El Al flights to overfly the kingdom. He  couldn’t even get a minor confidence building measure out of an Arab  state. In the abstract, a settlements freeze makes no sense and  therefore Netanyahu has found it easy to dodge anything the President  has thrown at him. I don’t know how easy it would be for to him to deal  with a full strategic American approach that would be marketable in  Israel. Dan Shapiro is a very strong Ambassador to Israel and the  President needs to talk directly to the Israeli people. Same with Abbas.  If you take his words at face value, he feels that Obama put him ‘up in  a tree.’ What are you going to do when the President of the United  States actually has a serious strategy? Are you still going to act  small-minded and narrow-minded saying “I can’t go forward without my  precondition”? If he does, this just doesn’t happen. It doesn’t mean  that this doesn’t go forward.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin: 0.1pt 0in;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; &lt;span style=&quot;color: rgb(23, 54, 93);&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Has President Obama done anything right with the peace process? &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; He was  100 percent right in defining this issue as important to the United  States. The United States should want peace in the Middle East because  the absence of it costs us a great deal. The President was exactly right  in defining it in appointing a very senior negotiator and by May 2011  he came to the realization that it was not going to be confidence  building measures that move this thing forward it is going to be a  reasonable approach to negotiations. I think the May 19 &lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; speech last year was both fair and reasonable. I think the President has  done some things that were quite positive. My problem with the  President is it took him some time to move from a tactics approach to a  slightly more strategic approach.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin: 0.1pt 0in;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; &lt;span style=&quot;color: rgb(23, 54, 93);&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What  kind of administration is most likely to produce a successful policy?  David Hale doesn’t have the visibility that George Mitchell had. How do  you think the President should organize your four points?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; Well, it  is better to have an envoy without a policy than a policy without an  envoy. I think if the president makes the decision to pursue a strategy I  have argued or if he has his own strategy, he needs to give the sense  of an integrated and comprehensive plan. After that, it would be  difficult to organize for diplomacy. The Middle East peace process has  become the problem of the Secretary of State and the President. If that  is the case than one way to organize this is to – in a sense – say to  the Secretary of State this is now one of your options. You organize the  department and when the issues start to grow than it gets pushed up  anyway. You need the Secretary of State or the President to extract the  real issues from the leaders. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin: 0.1pt 0in;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: rgb(23, 54, 93);&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;Let’s the say the United States can’t or won’t do it. Is there any other entity or government that could pursue your strategy? &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; Not that  I see, no. Israel hates when the United States puts some pressure on  it, but doesn’t trust anyone else to put pressure on it. Since Israel is  at least half the issue here you are not going to get the European  Union or the United Nations or some combination of the Quartet to do  this kind of thing. An Arab leader such as King Abdullah II of Jordan  could actually play a significant role in future negotiations,  especially if one or two more Arab leaders got together to make some  kind of compelling argument to the people of Israel that changes the  situation. This has happened in the past such as with Begin and Sadat.  It is not likely, but still possible. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin: 0.1pt 0in;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: rgb(23, 54, 93);&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;Could this happen in the aftermath of the Arab Spring? &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; If you  look back and ask what prompted the Arab Initiative to come forward in  2002, it was a significant concern on the part of Saudi Arabia and most  other Arabs. The Arab-Israeli conflict had become a heavy weight around  the neck of the Arab systems in the face of Iran. There is no question  that this was the concern. These countries could not deal with Iranian  power projection because of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The national  interests that propelled the Arab states in 2002 to adopt the Arab Peace  Initiative have not changed and they don’t change as a result of the  Arab Spring. It remains to be seen if the Islamist leaders will see it  in this light – whether they will govern as leaders or as Islamists. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt; &lt;p style=&quot;margin: 0.1pt 0in;&quot;&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;color: rgb(23, 54, 93);&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;Does the Iranian problem make it worse or better? &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;span style=&quot;font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;&quot;&gt; It makes  it more imperative to do it faster. The Middle East dynamic changes  overnight if the President takes the front seat and it also make it  easier with the Russians and Chinese. It just makes it easier do  diplomacy even with the Security Council. Our Arab diplomacy was  facilitated in the 1990s as a result of the Arab Peace Process. If you  want a large strategic reason to do this it is Iran. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/amb-daniel-c-kurtzer-reviving-peace-process-transcript#comments</comments>
 <pubDate>Fri, 13 Jan 2012 10:13:37 -0500</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Israel Policy Forum</dc:creator>
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 <title>Israel &amp; 2012 (VIDEO)</title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/israel-2012-video</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;On January 11, 2012, IPF convened a discussion in New York City on &quot;Israel &amp;amp; 2012.&quot;  Jane Eisner, editor-in-chief of the Forward newspaper moderated the conversation with former Israeli Consul General Alon Pinkas, former State Department Advisor Aaron David Miller and former National Security Council Senior Director Michael Doran.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://vimeo.com/34969888&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Click here to view Part 2 of the discussion.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/israel-2012-video#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/issues/issues/us-diplomatic-leadership">US Diplomatic Leadership</category>
 <pubDate>Thu, 12 Jan 2012 19:41:34 -0500</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Israel Policy Forum</dc:creator>
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 <title>Israel &amp; 2012 (VIDEO) Part 2</title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/israel-2012-video-part-2</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;On January 11, 2012, IPF convened a discussion in New York City on  &quot;Israel &amp;amp; 2012.&quot;  Jane Eisner, editor-in-chief of the Forward  newspaper moderated the conversation with former Israeli Consul General  Alon Pinkas, former State Department Advisor Aaron David Miller and  former National Security Council Senior Director Michael Doran.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/israel-2012-video-part-2#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/issues/issues/two-state-solution">A Two State Solution</category>
 <pubDate>Thu, 12 Jan 2012 19:35:30 -0500</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Israel Policy Forum</dc:creator>
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 <title>Israel &amp; 2012 (VIDEO) Part 3</title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/israel-2012-video-part-3</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;On January 11, 2012, IPF convened a discussion in New York City on  &quot;Israel &amp;amp; 2012.&quot; Jane Eisner, editor-in-chief of the Forward  newspaper moderated the conversation with former Israeli Consul General  Alon Pinkas, former State Department Advisor Aaron David Miller and  former National Security Council Senior Director Michael Doran.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/israel-2012-video-part-3#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/issues/issues/us-diplomatic-leadership">US Diplomatic Leadership</category>
 <pubDate>Thu, 12 Jan 2012 19:20:25 -0500</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Israel Policy Forum</dc:creator>
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 <title>Hamas&#039; Dilemma </title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/hamas-dilemma</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;Hussein Ibish spoke with Steve Spiegel about how regional dynamics are impacting Palestinian reconciliation efforts amid reports that Hamas is considering joining the PLO. To listen to the audio, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/interview/hussein-ibish-hamas-dilemma&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;click here.&lt;/a&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; Below is a full transcript.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;SUMMARY POINTS&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Hamas is being forced to adjust its longstanding ties to Syria and Iran as the region is increasingly aligning along sectarian lines.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Fatah is also under pressure as Muslim Brotherhood movements are gaining influence throughout the Arab world.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;There is significant tension within Hamas between the external leadership and internal leadership.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Reports of an Interim Leadership Framework leading to Hamas and others joining the PLO is likely an effort to show the Palestinian public that efforts toward unity are being made—but it would be very difficult for Hamas politically to become a part of PLO and maintain its posture as a resistance movement. &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Mahmoud Abbas’ meeting with Palestinian prisoners released in the Gilad Shalit deal is also intended to bolster domestic political support. Abu Maze and others within the PA and Fatah have come to the conclusion that there is nothing they can do or say that will make headway with this Israeli government. &amp;nbsp;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Hamas’ hopes that the Muslim Brotherhood will not only influence but rule politics in the Arab world are far-fetched.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;The United States remains the only viable broker for a peace agreement that can produce what the Palestinians need—and independent state and an end to the occupation.&amp;nbsp; This is a fundamental reality.&amp;nbsp; The Palestinians cannot afford a long-term crisis with the United States. &amp;nbsp;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What is going on among the Palestinians between Hamas and Fatah? Is this a major change?&amp;nbsp; What is happening? &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Hamas has been forced to seriously readjust its regional role because it can no longer remain part of the Syrian-Iranian alliance of which it has been a core member for almost two decades.&lt;strong&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/strong&gt;Its relationship with what is now essential seen, by most of the other Arab Sunni Islamists – and Sunni governments – in the Arab World, as a Shiite alliance led by Iran of entirely non-Sunni actors, mostly Shiites. Certainly this is a non-Sunni alliance and maybe in so many ways an anti-Sunni alliance. Now, Hamas ideologically is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood of Palestine, and it just couldn’t continue under these circumstances to rely on the old narrative of a culture of resistance versus a culture of accommodation. That narrative, which allowed it to uniquely be aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood movement on the one hand, and this sort of Shiite or quasi-Shiite Iranian alliance on the other, has broken down.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The region is realigning in my view very strongly along sectarian lines. This is most clear in Syria, where only non-Sunni actors now support the Assad regime, and almost all Sunni actors –including Turkey and the Arab Islamists and Arab governments – are opposed to the Assad regime. This put Hamas in an impossible situation vis a vis the headquarters of its politburo, its external political leadership – Khaled Meshaal and his colleagues – they really cannot stay in Syria in the long-run and they cannot rely on Iran as a principle patron or source of much of anything. &amp;nbsp;So, they are literally and figuratively on the move.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;There’s also pressure on Fatah.&amp;nbsp; There is real concern about the role of the new Egyptian government – as the Muslim Brotherhood gains a great deal of influence there … &amp;nbsp;you can see the Muslim Brotherhood gaining ground not just through the elections but generally in Egypt and analogous in parties Tunisia and other places, so there is also a lot of pressure on Fatah.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The Palestinian demand in terms of the Arab Spring was not for regime change but for unity. This is something that the groups have been working on for awhile.&amp;nbsp; What they did earlier this year was agree to make an agreement. But what they found is that they couldn’t agree on a national unity government of technocrats or anything like that. Now they are talking about holding elections in May, and they claim they have formed committees to oversee those elections.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;There is new information that Hamas – and possibly Islamic Jihad and others – may try to join the PLO.&amp;nbsp; Now this is very complex.&amp;nbsp; And there even might be what is being called and “Interim Leadership Framework” of the PLO that could be a kind of a supra organizational committee including PLO leaders, Fatah leaders, Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders, and maybe even others, which would probably be more for show than anything else. But again, responding to that call for unity.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;One final word on the question of unity: I think everyone agrees that Palestinian unity is important. Certainly all the Palestinians do. And, I think even the Israelis do. I mean everyone has complained about the division within the Palestinian national movement.&amp;nbsp; The question is not whether the Palestinians should re-unify – whether that’s necessary or important for peace or for any constructive purpose – the question is: on whose terms is that re-unification going to come?&amp;nbsp; That very much remains to be seen.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;So I can’t answer the question as to whether this is cosmetic or the beginning of a serious transformation. Insofar as Hamas has to realign itself with other actors: Turkey, Qatar, maybe Jordan, Egypt, etc., it is going to be dealing with a group of countries relying in fact on support of a group of countries with very different relationships to the regional status quo, to the United States, to Israel, than Syria and Iran did.&amp;nbsp; It’s going to have to make some pretty big changes. The less they have to make changes, I think, the happier they’ll be.&amp;nbsp; Different parts of the organization are more ready for change than others. But, they might have no choice but to make some very painful adjustments and you can see at least the cosmetics of that happening. Now how far it goes? Again, I think, in the end, the regional re-alignment will be the most influential factor in determining where all of the different Palestinian movements end up going.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Jordan, Egypt – even Qatar – are government that have contacts with Israel.&amp;nbsp; How does Hamas become associates with these governments without making changes on their policy vis a vis Israel? Particularly when these countries want close relations with the United States? &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;I think the answer is they can’t.&amp;nbsp; The question is, in a sense, do you decide to fully re-align and really embrace a transformed role within the region, sort of give up on your hardcore anti-status quo positions, and really reconsider attitudes not only to US but to Israel as well, which would make it possible perhaps for Hamas to join the PLO. &amp;nbsp;If Hamas joined the PLO under the current circumstances that exist now, it would almost certainly mean agreeing to the PLO’s existing positions: the letter of mutual recognition that Chairman Arafat sent to Prime Minister Rabin in ‘93 recognizing the State of Israel, or at least not opposing that.&amp;nbsp; I mean they wouldn’t necessarily have to issue a statement enforcing it, but they would be joining an organization for which that is a central pillar of its policy, and in effect committing to the Quartet conditions that they have resisted for so long.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Now in a certain sense strategically in terms of having the kind of support: the headquarters, the material and financial support that they need, this is an easy choice to make, and is probably something that they would really want to do. On the other hand, there is a heavy political price to be doing that.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Because insofar as Hamas has been presenting itself as the alternative natural leadership – the rival – potential national movement of the Palestinian people to the PLO and Fatah. They’ve had to do it by outbidding the nationalists on the struggle with Israel: on saying they will never recognize Israel, which they continue to maintain; that they think only in terms of a long term truce and not a peace agreement with Israel; that they continue at least in rhetoric if not in practice the use of armed struggle etc, etc, and have refused to accede to the Quartet conditions.&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;How could they do that so easily?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;There is a big problem for them in doing it. &amp;nbsp;In terms of recognizing Israel, they could get away with recognizing that the aim is a two-state solution.&amp;nbsp; I don’t think they would actually have to issue a statement recognizing Israel. I think they would have to accept the principle of a two-state solution—basically what Netanyahu has done. Netanyahu has not recognized a Palestinian state but he’s recognized at his Bar Ilan University speech and many other occasions in the last couple of years the goal of a two-state solution. I think that would be sufficient. Certainly they would have to renounce violence, particularly terrorism and absolutely crucially the legitimacy of existing PLO agreements, particularly as members of the PLO they couldn’t really reject outstanding treaty commitments undertaken by the PLO.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;But here’s the political problem: Insofar as they have been trying to challenge the PLO as the national leadership for the Palestinians, they’ve had to do it from a position of outbidding them on a national strategy for independence, liberation, etc. They can’t really hope to get a majority of Palestinian support based on Muslim social conservatism. That’s just not going to work for them among the Palestinians. So it’s almost asking them to give up their brand.&amp;nbsp; Then Palestinians would basically be confronted with two organizations: one Islamist social conservative, reactionary and with a bunch o social attitudes that I think are not shared by a majority of Palestinians; and the other a socially conservative but nationalist group– fighting for the same goals: a two-state solution through non-violent means and a state along Israel.&amp;nbsp; I think they’d risk losing their brand.&amp;nbsp; I don’t know how they recoup that if they went along with all of this. At the same time, how much of that brand of resistance they can keep if their main sponsors are countries like Qatar, turkey, Jordan and Egypt is very hard to understand.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;So I think their in a tricky spot. And I also think there are many different fissures within the Hamas movement, it breaks down along multiple axes of course personal, political regional, etc. The biggest is the division between the external and internal leadership.&amp;nbsp; The external leadership has known for many months that it’s got to leave Syria it can’t maintain its relationship with Iran anymore, it has to look for a new home, new sponsors and a new profile—they have no choice. For them it’s not a matter of calculating costs. It’s a matter of existential necessity. The leadership in Gaza, I think, insofar as they are loyal to the external leadership would maybe go along with this because they see the primacy of that leadership.&amp;nbsp; But the people who see themselves as independent Hamas leaders in Gaza, I think stand to lose a great deal. They are sitting pretty in Gaza. They don’t have the same kind of emergency crisis of even knowing where to physically be that the external leaders do. I think you can see a lot of tension between internal and external forces. Particularly the internal hardliner in Gaza Mahmoud Zahar, whose been subject to what ware called ‘severe disciplinary measures’ – I don’t know exactly what those are – but for criticizing the recognition by the external leadership of the authority of the PLO to negotiate with Israel and worse still the authority of the external leadership of the political bureau.&amp;nbsp; He basically said here in May the leadership is here in Gaza and the people outside are just a part of that. So he kind of inverted what most people in Hamas see as the hierarchy.&amp;nbsp; And that was considered unacceptable but I think it was a reflection of the tension of this kind of movement where the external leaders see an urgent necessity to adjust themselves to the political reality and the internal leaders only pay the price. It is almost like a tab is being run up by the external leaders on the credit card of the internal leaders, so to speak.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Meanwhile, what Israelis are paying attention to is Mahmoud Abbas meeting with former prisoners released in the Shalit deal, which is having a devastating impact on Israeli opinion. How do you explain this – why do this? &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;I think Abu Mazen, like Hamas – and not just Abu Mazen, a lot of Fatah’s leadership, the Fatah Executive and Central Committees – have been feeling also the pressure of national legitimacy. A lot of what they have done in the past year has been efforts to shore up their base, their national legitimacy, and their broad public appeal. And I think they came to the conclusion - seen most dramatically expressed in the UN bid – that the point of these exercises was domestic political support.&amp;nbsp; I think you have seen this in a ratcheting up of rhetoric. There have been a number of efforts by Abu Mazen to reach out to the Israeli public particularly in the few weeks after his UN speech. He gave interviews to Israeli media where he was very forthcoming saying some remarkable things, including that the rejection of the Partition agreement (in 1947) was a mistake. Everyone knows that his own village –Safed – would have been in the Jewish state. So for him to say that in particular given that he was alive at the time – this is a big and important thing for him to say. But it didn’t have any effect. I think the Fatah leadership came to the conclusion that there is nothing they can really do or say that will make serious headway with this Israeli government.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;They’ve come to the conclusion they have nothing to work with. So while they don’t want the tax revenues to be withheld, which are 70-75 percent of their budget, and they don’t want a break in relations.&amp;nbsp; I think they don’t mind doing things that are politically popular among the Palestinians, but maybe not particularly good for relations with the Israelis.&amp;nbsp; It’s very significant though that Salaam Fayyad is still the prime minister and that this has been a major issue between Fatah and Hamas – Hamas being a group that cannot stand Salaam Fayyad – that security cooperation continues, that the state and institution building program on the ground continues. And, that nothing in the core deep structure of the status quo that has been built over the last couple of years by the Fayyad government of the PA has been dismantled or broken down. There have been hiccups like the finance minister withholding tax revenues, some of the US aid being withheld because of a procedural hold put in place by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, and some other things. But these are hiccups. The deep structural cooperation is still there. But at the political level there’s a sense that the Arab Spring has put huge pressure both because of regional changes and the reactions of the Palestinian public on both of these groups to move quickly to deal with what is a crisis of legitimacy for Fatah, and not only a crisis of legitimacy for Hamas, but also a crisis of identity, of branding and of who they are.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;It is a much deeper crisis for Hamas which is why I think you see a great deal of movement on their side in terms of how they’re appearing to adjust themselves or preparing people for potentially big adjustments.&amp;nbsp; But again, I think they will try to keep it to a minimum because how they maintain their political strength after that becomes s hard to imagine.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;If they did do that. They would be pitting all their hopes on the notion that Muslim Brotherhood parties would come to power not only in Egypt but in many Arab states, and the Arab world would at least be 30-50 percent Muslim Brotherhood ruled, not just sharing power but really ruled by Muslim Brotherhood parties. Then they could present themselves as part of that world, and that could be another kind of brand.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;But that doesn’t look like it’s happening, frankly.&amp;nbsp; I don’t agree with those people who think the Islamists are taking over everywhere.&amp;nbsp; It doesn’t look that way at all. I think if that’s what they are betting on they are making a losing bet.&amp;nbsp; Sure, Islamists parties are going to do well in any early elections, but in Egypt the presidency is still in the armed forces, the Islamists have a big chunk of a body that has very little authority. In Tunisia, they did well but are in a coalition with a bunch of secular organizations.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;This hope that the Muslim Brotherhood will simply sweep into uncontested leadership in the Arab world is I think a very, very far fetched one. So Hamas will have to be very careful about placing all of their bets on that.&amp;nbsp; Though it is significant that Hamas did do something that is has never done before which is join the umbrella ‘international Muslim Brotherhood-parties’ group. Everyone knows they are an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine but they never joined the international Brotherhood movement, and they did do so in the past few weeks.&amp;nbsp; And that’s significant and it’s all part of a movement to re-brand. But I think it’s a very delicate operation for them filled with risks.&amp;nbsp; I don’t think they quite know how they are going to handle it, which is why so much of this might prove to be cosmetic and for public consumption.&amp;nbsp; I will remind you it’s been about a year since Hamas and Fatah were supposed to form a unity government, release each other’s political prisoners – which they haven’t been able to do, find a new prime minister – which they haven’t done, have new elections, which they re talking about but haven’t done. They have formed in any number of committees doing different things but not one item has happened, not even the release of political prisoners, let alone the removal of Fayyad or elections or anything.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;If Hamas doesn’t break with its past, Palestinians will lose funding—even from some Europeans. How would they deal with that?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Obviously, it would be highly ill-advised to say the least for the PA to enter into an agreement with Hamas that would result in a loss of all US aid and a lot of international aid from Europe and expect aid form Arab states and Turkey will cover that. And, to deal with a crisis in relations with the US that would result in something more than money. The EU combined is the biggest donor to the Palestinians but the US is the single largest donor. If you also exclude tax revenues from Israel, you are talking about a potential complete economic breakdown and it is hard to see if that could be sustained.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;It’s hard to see how the PA would deal with that and survive. You can only not pay your security officials and others for so many weeks before they stop showing up to work—it’s as simple as that.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;But in addition to that there is a reality that the United States is the only real, viable broker for a peace agreement, and in the end the Palestinians cannot get what they need – an independent state and an end to the occupation – without an agreement with Israel.&lt;strong&gt; I&lt;/strong&gt; don’t think anybody doubts that at a certain level a third party is needed.&amp;nbsp; Sometimes third parties can complicate things, but at a minimum, you need the US for bridging proposals, for guarantees, and to create a mechanism to hold the parties to account for actually doing what they have promised they would do, something that is desperately needed now. And, to reassure the Israelis, because the United States is the only country that Israel trusts. Now there are a lot of people who say that the United States is not an appropriate third party, although we need a third party. What they need to understand is there is no alternative. It is not as if the United States is hoarding this selfishly or beating back lots of competitors. I can only think of France as any other country of any note at all that has expressed an interest in doing this. And France alone cannot do it.&amp;nbsp; The EU isn’t interested. The UN as a multilateral organization isn’t interested in it.&amp;nbsp; Nobody else. Its not isn’t a question of the US being indispensably positioned to do it, it’s also the question that there isn’t a rival for doing it. The Palestinians cannot in their long-term interests afford a huge and extended breakdown or crisis with the United States. But ultimately they need cooperation with the United States, not just financially and technically, but ultimately politically if they are to get what they need. No matter how frustrated they are this is a very fundamental reality.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/hamas-dilemma#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/issues/issues/two-state-solution">A Two State Solution</category>
 <pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2011 16:14:44 -0500</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>The Pulse</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">3411 at http://www.israelpolicyforum.org</guid>
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 <title>The Iranian Nuclear Threat: Views from Israel &amp; the US </title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/iranian-nuclear-threat-views-israel-us</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;On Tuesday, November 29th, IPF convened a debate and discussion on the Iranian nuclear threat with Tel Aviv University Professor David Menashri, Atlantic Council Senior fellow Barbara Slavin, and Philadelphia Inquirer columnist Trudy Rubin.&amp;nbsp;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.c-span.org/Events/A-Look-at-Iranian-Nuclear-Threat/10737425910/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Click here to watch the program on CSPAN. &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/iranian-nuclear-threat-views-israel-us#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/taxonomy/term/12">Iran</category>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/issues/issues/toward-new-iran-policy">Toward a New Iran Policy</category>
 <pubDate>Thu, 01 Dec 2011 17:12:40 -0500</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Israel Policy Forum</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">3408 at http://www.israelpolicyforum.org</guid>
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 <title>Rob Danin on the Role of the Quartet</title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/rob-danin-role-quartet</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Rob Danin&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations&lt;br&gt; Former Head of the Office of Quartet Representative and worked closely with Tony Blair in Jerusalem&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Here are some key excerpts from the phone conference to listen to the full call click &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/interview/talk-rob-danin-shalit-quartet-regional-environment&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;strong&gt;The Quartet&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; The Quartet had met Washington in the summer and had failed to come up with a statement. They were trying to produce a statement that was a little more ambitious, not just a boilerplate statement of the usual sort of things, but try to provide a bath way forward. [This was] an effort to give something to both sides so that they could claim victory and move into negotiations.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; To get the parties into the negotiations the Palestinians would the 1967-armistace line (the green lined) affirmed as the basis for negotiations . . . and Israel would get very robust assurances that its security needs would be addressed in a final status issue. President Obama called in the two sides to start with borders and move forward. [However], the Quartet was unable to embrace the Obama Plan. The State Department announced that a meeting would be held in Jerusalem on Wednesday, October 26&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; with the Quartet. Tony Blair will be there and they will meet on getting the negotiations back on track.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;I have never seen the Quartet more actively engaged since it started in 2002, The United States, Russia, the United Nations and the European Union and I think one thing that has made it possible is the enhanced role of the Quartet [on the other hand] the White House has been too active. This has created an opportunity for the international community to play a larger role. The task ahead is quite difficult, having to do with Palestinian politics, Israeli politics and Global politics. The Quartet is actively involved and will be meeting. The release of Gilad Shalit opens up so very interesting opportunities, when it comes to Gaza.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Israel as a Jewish State&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; Question: A lot of people were disappointed when the Quartet was not able to come to some agreement [this past summer]. Why couldn’t they agree?&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; Answer: Two core issues, one was the notion of the 1967 and its role negotiations and the second had to do with the characterization of Israel as a Jewish state. These were two issues that were very problematic. The inability to embrace a formula on those two elements had been articulated by President Obama in May and had thwarted the Quartet from agreeing on a statement.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;In September they did over come that, but did not agree on the issue of the Jewish state. United Nations Resolution 181, which had called for the partition of Palestine into two separate states, one Jewish, one Arab in November 29&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 1947, it laid the basis for Israel’s creation 27 times. The Arab world has refused to call ‘Israel,’ Israel and has called it the Jews or the Jewish state. Now we have come 180 degrees and now the Palestinian’s are struggling to referring Israel as a Jewish state and prefer to call it Israel.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;Within the international context there are some now within Europe and Russia in particular who have a very hard time with ‘A Jewish State.’ It is very poorly understood by the international community, Israel has not helped to define it very well either. Who is a Jew, which makes the definition of Jewish state become ambiguous. Within the Quartet, you have not divisions, but reflections of different views within the Quartet, part of the role of the Quartet is to come to a unified view. Ultimately it was these issues that became so problematic.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; The Palestinian demand of having the 1967 line as a basis for negotiations was met by the Quartet. The Palestinian’s missed an opportunity to declare victory, the two issues became linked, you could only have the 1967 line with Jewish state and since Jewish state become so radioactive it was all taken out in order to create the pathway to negotiations with a reference to the Obama language that does have Jewish and does have 67 lines and has all of these issues addressed. Getting the parties back on the path of dialogue is important.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;strong&gt;The United States as a Moderator&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; Palestinian politics have shifted a great deal largely due to two basic reasons, the Palestinian analysis of the institutional framework and right now the Palestinians are disenchanted with the United States, they feel they will pay a price politically by entering into negotiations. Palestinian’s are very focused on timelines, which is why the Quartet inserted them. Israel is concerned that the Palestinian’s want to pre-negotiate all the outcomes of the negotiations. The Palestinian’s believe they will lose credibility by entering into negotiations.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt;The Arab spring has unsettled many of the Palestinian leaders including Mahmoud Abbas who was very close to Hosni Mubarak. The Palestinian people want unity and the Palestinian leadership on Fatah and the Hamas side want to be seen to be trying to reach unity, but nobody wants to pay the real price. For Hamas the price is giving up sole control over Gaza and for Fatah it means letting Hams into the West Bank. Both of those a priced too high for both sides. In the period ahead we are going to see more efforts at Palestinian unity, but I don’t think they are going to lead to very much.”&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Gilad Shalit &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; Question: Where does Gilad Shalit fit into the context of the Quartet activities?&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; Answer: I think Hamas and Israel are gearing themselves up for the next round. Hamas has issued orders to capture more soldiers. Hamas is feeling more embolden and strengthened this pulls Abbas away from Israel and towards a tougher position. Palestinian request for statehood is still in the Security Council and will come out of the Security Council at some point and the Palestinian authority is going to be more hardnosed about this and will likely take it to the general assembly. Palestinian will have enough votes to become a non-state member of the General Assembly.&lt;br&gt; &lt;br&gt; Note: This phone conference took place on October 18, 2011.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/rob-danin-role-quartet#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/issues/issues/two-state-solution">A Two State Solution</category>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/taxonomy/term/188">Gilad Shalit</category>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/taxonomy/term/491">Quartet</category>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/taxonomy/term/294">United Nations</category>
 <pubDate>Tue, 25 Oct 2011 21:59:21 -0400</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>The Pulse</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">3404 at http://www.israelpolicyforum.org</guid>
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 <title>Remembering Tom Kully</title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/remembering-tom-kully</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img style=&quot;vertical-align: middle;&quot; src=&quot;http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/files/Tom_and_Steve.jpg&quot; alt=&quot;&quot; width=&quot;498&quot; height=&quot;330&quot;&gt;I&lt;br&gt;&lt;em&gt;Tom Kully (left) with Steven Spiegel at an IPF event in New York City in 2006. &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I met Tom Kully on a cold, wintry Friday night in Jerusalem over a  decade ago.&amp;nbsp; A small group was gathering at the Citadel to walk over to a  nearby home for dinner.&amp;nbsp; By the time we reached our destination, I felt  as if Tom and I were old friends.&amp;nbsp; I had met someone who &amp;nbsp;understood  the subtleties of the Arab-Israeli dispute and American policy toward  the Middle East better than most specialists I knew.&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;He was  inquisitive and curious, always asking questions, probing to find a  better answer than had already been given.&amp;nbsp; His alternative ideas &amp;nbsp;were  always challenging and thought-provoking.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;And he was such a wonderful listener; Tom would listen so carefully  that he could see through any weaknesses or contradictions. I  appreciated that Tom wasn’t shy about saying if he thought you were  wrong.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Tom and I became close friends: we met in Chicago, Los Angeles, New  York, and Washington DC, often at Israel Policy Forum functions, but  just as often privately.&amp;nbsp; We discussed the latest political and  strategic developments affecting the US, Israel, and the Middle East.&amp;nbsp;  Often, Tom, as a vociferous reader, had read the article I was going to  read, something that had just come out, pointing to the latest political  developments with great insight and acumen.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Before he became too ill to travel extensively, I invited Tom to  attend an international conference I was running.&amp;nbsp; I was amazed at how  enthusiastic he was to &amp;nbsp;meet other participants from countries  throughout the Middle East, Europe, and North America.&amp;nbsp; Tom was a  natural at such gatherings: his thirst for knowledge, information, the  perspectives of others was contagious and stimulating.&amp;nbsp; Many of the  regular participants commented about how he had enhanced discussions and  contributed to the positive atmosphere of the conference.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Of course, we would often mention the irony that the initials of his  illness and the organization that had introduced us were the same:  IPF.&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; And I saw the same qualities in Tom as he fought his disease as I  had seen in him when he was trying to find ways to bring peace to the  Middle East.&amp;nbsp; His determination and fortitude &amp;nbsp;permeated everything that  he involved himself in, and were a model for all those of us who were  privileged to see him in action. &amp;nbsp;Tom persevered until he was so cruelly  taken from us.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;We will all miss him.&amp;nbsp; &amp;nbsp;I know that I will miss his penetrating,  probing mind and the camaraderie he offered me.&amp;nbsp; Perhaps even more, &amp;nbsp;I  will miss his kindness, his concern, and the generosity of spirit and  the philanthropic attitude that he embodied.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Tom’s memory will live on in the Israel Policy Forum, and we all extend our deepest condolences to his family.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/remembering-tom-kully#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/issues/issues/two-state-solution">A Two State Solution</category>
 <pubDate>Mon, 17 Oct 2011 17:06:36 -0400</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Steven L. Spiegel</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">3400 at http://www.israelpolicyforum.org</guid>
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 <title>&quot;Securocrats&quot; and the Two State Solution </title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/securocrats-and-two-state-solution</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;In his &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.forward.com/articles/142822/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;column at the Forward&lt;/a&gt; titled &quot;A Palestinian State Even Securocrats Can Accept,&quot; JJ Goldberg writes about IPF&#039;s symposium Monday night in New York, and specifically former Mossad Director Efraim Halevy&#039;s message, which he describes as &quot;If the strategic map of the Middle East looks like a lemon, make lemonade&quot;:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;I don’t think I’d be going out on a limb to suggest that Israel is  having a bit of a rough patch lately, what with its Cairo embassy in  ruins, terrorism flaring in the south and new troubles brewing at the  United Nations. I could drone on about the dangers, but I don’t need to.  I happen to have a handy list, itemized the other day at the Harvard  Club by former National Security Council anti-terrorism chief Richard  Clarke.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In Clarke’s view, Israel faces seven main threats right  now: the rupture with Islamist-led Turkey; chaos in Egypt; the  “Hezbollah government” in Lebanon; extreme instability in Libya; the  looming declaration of Palestinian statehood at the United Nations; the  “ascent” of soon-to-be-nuclear Iran, and “the diminution of American  power and influence.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Clarke was addressing a day-long symposium on Israeli  security sponsored by the liberal-leaning Israel Policy Forum. By the  time he was done, everyone in the room — a collection of dark-suited  business types, American and Israeli military and intelligence officials  and assorted wonks — seemed ready to run home and crawl under their  beds for a year.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The gloom was promptly lifted, however, by a positively  chipper presentation from the next and final speaker: Efraim Halevy,  former director of Israel’s Mossad intelligence service, a man not  usually known for spreading sunshine.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Halevy’s basic message: If the strategic map of the  Middle East looks like a lemon, make lemonade. Or, as he put it: “In a  situation where the most probable outcome is the least desirable and the  most desirable is the least probable, you go halfway. Sometimes a half a  cup of coffee is better than a full cup of coffee” — that is, when a  full cup isn’t available.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;There are several layers of meaning to this little maxim.  At the most overt level, he was talking about the possibility of  Israeli-Palestinian peace. For Israel today, he said, “the best possible  solution is a complete peace between Israel and Palestine. But I think  it’s the least probable.” The most probable solution, he said, is “no  solution — more of the same,” muddling along toward “either a one-state  solution, with all that entails, or chaos.” That’s the “least  desirable,” but “the most probable.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;So what’s he offering in his half-cup of coffee? He  didn’t spell it out at the Harvard Club, but he’s done so in Israel  several times recently. He believes Israel should offer to recognize a  Palestinian state within provisional borders, and then enter  state-to-state negotiations over the issues in dispute: borders, water  rights, demilitarization, refugees, Jerusalem.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt; &lt;div style=&quot;overflow: hidden; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; text-align: left; text-decoration: none; border: medium none;&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.forward.com/articles/142822/#ixzz1Y2soyIeh&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Click here to read the entire column&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;a style=&quot;color: rgb(0, 51, 153);&quot; href=&quot;http://www.forward.com/articles/142822/#ixzz1Y2soyIeh&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/securocrats-and-two-state-solution#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/issues/issues/two-state-solution">A Two State Solution</category>
 <pubDate>Thu, 15 Sep 2011 13:48:58 -0400</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>The Pulse</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">3396 at http://www.israelpolicyforum.org</guid>
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 <title>Efraim Halevy: Obama showed &quot;leadership of historic dimensions&quot; to save Israelis in Cairo embassy</title>
 <link>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/efraim-halevy-obama-showed-leadership-historic-dimensions-save-israelis-cairo-embassy</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;Last night at Israel Policy Forum&#039;s symposium in New York on &quot;Security and the New Middle East,&quot; former Director of the Mossad Efraim Halevy spoke directly about President Obama&#039;s efforts to &quot;extricate&quot; the six Israelis trapped inside the Israeli embassy in Cairo last Friday night:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;“We’ve been talking these days about Turkey and about Egypt. And I would like to say something about the event which took place last Friday evening or through the night in Cairo, which &lt;strong&gt;I think to a large extent was a seminal event, not only in the history of the Middle East but also in the history of the relations between Israel and Egypt, and between Israel and the United States of America.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;During that night, as you know, our embassy was surrounded and was on the verge of being stormed. &amp;nbsp;And the Prime Minister went to the special command center in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and from there he actually ran and commanded this operation of trying to extricate our staff from the embassy. And, at the end, there were six people left, six people of the security detail of the embassy. &amp;nbsp;They were there inside the last room, which had been the ultimate room in the embassy. And, they had one steel door, which was between them and the mob.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;And the Prime Minister took many very, very important decisions that night. Successful decisions, very responsible decisions. &amp;nbsp;And for that he has been lauded, and rightly so I think by the public in Israel and by the population at large for his cool and his measured way of handling this crisis.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But one of the decisions he had to take in the end, he wanted to take, was to find ways of extricating his people, our people, out of that embassy.&lt;strong&gt; And he turned to one man, to the President of the United States, and he spoke to him. And the president of the United States, without having much time to consult with Congress, and with the media, and with the analysts and with all of the other people who have to be consulted on major and grave decisions. He took a decision to take up the telephone and get on the line with the powers that be in Egypt, and get them to order the release of these six people, and the detail of the Egyptian commando forces entered and saved them.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I think that this decision by President Obama was a unique decision in many ways. Because I don’t have to tell you, and this was just said time and time and over again this afternoon/this evening, that the United States is not in a position the way it was many years ago in the Middle East, it has its problems, it has its considerations, and rightly so. &lt;strong&gt;But I believe the leadership that the President of the United States showed on that night was a leadership of historic dimensions. It was he who took the ultimate decision that night which prevented what could have been a sad outcome—instead of six men coming home, the arrival in Israel of six body bags.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;And I want to say to you very openly and very clearly that had there been six body bags, there would have been a much different Israel today than we have been used to seeing over recent years. This would not have been one more incident, one more operation, one event. And the man who brought this about was one man and that was President Barack Hussein Obama.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;And I believe it is our duty as Israelis, as citizens of the free world, to say, not simply thank you President Obama, but also we respect you for the way and the manner in which you took this decision.”&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;</description>
 <comments>http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/efraim-halevy-obama-showed-leadership-historic-dimensions-save-israelis-cairo-embassy#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/taxonomy/term/384">Cairo</category>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/taxonomy/term/52">Egypt</category>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/taxonomy/term/551">Embassy</category>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/taxonomy/term/30">israel</category>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/taxonomy/term/403">President Barack Obama</category>
 <category domain="http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/issues/issues/us-diplomatic-leadership">US Diplomatic Leadership</category>
 <pubDate>Tue, 13 Sep 2011 20:14:39 -0400</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>Israel Policy Forum</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">3392 at http://www.israelpolicyforum.org</guid>
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