Mideast Peace Pulse

New Phone Number

Israel Policy Forum — Fri, 27 Jan 2012 11:07:54 -0500

Please note that IPF's phone number has changed. We can now be reached at 212-354-1812.

We will not stand for this

Israel Policy Forum — Sat, 21 Jan 2012 19:46:22 -0500

Israel Policy Forum is shocked and appalled by the column published in the Atlanta Jewish Times by its owner and publisher Andrew Adler calling for Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “to give the go-ahead for U.S.-based Mossad agents to take out a president deemed unfriendly to Israel in order for the current vice president to take his place, and forcefully dictate that the United States policy includes its helping the Jewish state obliterate its enemies."

Adler puts to shame Jewish values, reneges on American patriotism and discredits journalism. His statement of regret is clearly not sufficient. Adler told reporters that he was attempting “to get a reaction.” He is rightfully getting one from the Secret Service for threatening the life of our President. He should also get a strong, loud and adamant reaction from a united American Jewish community—We will not stand for this.

Enough is enough.

We are tired of extremists on the fringes of the political spectrum dragging the US-Israel relationship into the mud. Adler’s remarks are just the latest and most extreme example of how the discourse in the Jewish community has gone awry when it comes to issues concerning the future of the State of Israel. The US-Israel relationship is too important for the Jewish community to tolerate this any longer.

Israel Policy Forum will soon announce a new effort to bridge the gaps that divide our community and bring together the vast majority of American Jews – from across the political and denominational spectra – in support of a simple goal: reason.

It is a simple message, but one that has clearly been lost amidst the noise emanating from extremists like Adler.

Amb. Daniel C. Kurtzer on 'Reviving the Peace Process' (TRANSCRIPT)

Israel Policy Forum — Fri, 13 Jan 2012 10:13:37 -0500

Dr. Steven L. Spiegel: You think it's a mistake to wait around for the end of this administration’s first term – or this administration (however the election turns out) – and not do very much until next year. Can you explain why you think it is imperative that we act now?

Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer: Sure. First, hello to everyone and to IPF, a great organization. If the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Arab-Israeli peace process would do us a favor by hibernating for the next 10 or 11 months that might be ideal. We are going through our own political process, Israel may in fact go through an electoral process sometime this coming year and certainly there is ferment within the Palestinian community. The question remains whether or not Hamas and Fatah reconciliation will go forward. In an ideal world, if we were writing this up as a scenario we would say let’s put this all on hold, and everyone stays away happily and nothing changes for the worse, and we pick it up perhaps when everyone is stronger. But status quos are not status quos and people know that. They either get better – or more commonly – they actually get worse because they are left neglected. I fear that this status quo, over the next 10 or 11 months if there isn’t some very significant policy activity, will deteriorate into violence. This violence could either emanate from Gaza, unhappy groups that are not satisfied with what Hamas is doing, or from the West Bank or even from radical settlers who have designs to undermine the rule of law of Israel in the West Bank. For that reason alone it is important that the United States not pretend that they can put this issue on hold for a year.

You don’t think that the Israeli government on its own can handle these three problems, or any others that arise, and deal with the settlers of the West Bank and Gaza violence?

I would like to hope that they could, but they have not shown any determination to do so. Settlement activity according to Peace Now settlement numbers were up twenty percent last year. Having just come back from Israel with a group of Princeton University students, I can tell you that building is going apace. There is a lot of chatter about getting these West Bank settlers under control, but so far nothing has been done. And now we see the so-called “price-tag” attacks. When Israel decides to act against an outpost these folks act against Arabs or now against the IDF. There is no indication that the Israeli government has the will to do it, they certainly have the capability to clampdown, but I am not sure they have the will to do it, given the political configuration of the current coalition.

Now what about these arguments that are often made that while Netanyahu has been in the past a supporter of the settlers and continues verbally to do so, he has actually been much more controlled than previous prime ministers. After all, he has had this argument about supporting the Palestinians with an improved economic position and although he has a murky-at-best policy on the peace process, he has actually done more for the Palestinians than many previous prime ministers. Is there any accuracy to this?

First issue—I don’t buy it. When you mention “Peace Now” people say they are a biased organization. But I have found through very carful study that when they put out facts and figures they are correct. The facts that they put out to my knowledge have never been disputed by the Israeli government and I recall a time when I was the Ambassador and I wanted to show the then defense minister, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, some information about settlements and I couldn’t use classified material so I used peace now material and he looked at it and said “oh it is Peace Now” and I said tell me if it is wrong. I went back about two weeks later and he said “yes the information was correct.” If Peace Now is correct, which I think it is, Netanyahu has not been hesitant about conducting settlement activity. There was a ten-month pause in new housing starts during the second and third year of the Obama administration, but it never stopped settlement construction and you now have a resumption of the settlement building process. On the question of Netanyahu as a ground-up builder of Palestine, this is something Salam Fayyad has articulated as a goal in 2009 and everyone dismissed it as simply talk that the Palestinians will never get their act together. However, he has produced what he said he would produce. Has that benefited from a more benign Israeli government view, yes it has. However, it is also benefited from the fact that the security forces that we helped train, these so called Dayton Forces that are now conducting security in a professional manner in the West Bank have given the business community in the West Bank towns the confidence to go ahead and make investments. When I took my students to Ramallah just two weeks ago we were at the Mövenpick Hotel, which is better looking than almost any hotel in Israel. There is a lot of investment there. Yes, Israel gets a little credit for not stopping the investment, but I would not put up a statute of Netanyahu in the Ramallah town square and say he is responsible for the construction of Palestine.

You have a four-point program in your National Interest piece. Could you tell us about your four-point program?

I have been arguing this for a couple of years. I started the argument almost three years ago when I testified in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. My problem with the approach that we have followed over the last few years is that we have chosen tactics rather than strategy. Therefore, what I would like to see us do is plan an across-the-board strategy. Element number one is to come up with “Obama Parameters.” We know from the Clinton Parameters that he tried to capture approximately where the parties might start to negotiate. In other words, it wasn’t the outcome plan, but it was a going-in idea where you start negotiations. And we now know from the negotiations that have taken place over the last decade about where the tolerance points are for the two sides to start negotiations. President Obama could put them out – not as a plan for the outcome of negotiations – but rather where the parties should start and he should tell the parties when he puts them out.

Can you give a specific example of how the “Obama Parameters” might differ from the Clinton Parameters?

For example, on the question of Jerusalem, one of the most sensitive and emotional issues. If you remember, Clinton talked about dividing the Old City into different areas of sovereignty. Since 2001, when those parameters came out, there have been a lot of studies done by non-governmental institutions, including one I am associated with done by a number of Canadians, which is called the Jerusalem Old City Initiative. We also have what Olmert negotiated in 2007-2008 with Abbas, which rather than a division of sovereignty in the Old City it was a question of differing sovereignty and coming up with an agreed plan for governing Jerusalem. This would divide the area outside the Old City, but not divide the Old City itself, which is only one square kilometer. This might be one of the places where, instead of coming out with a sovereignty parameter of Jerusalem, the Obama administration might suggest these different creative ways of dealing with a question like Jerusalem.

Let’s go on to a second element.

The second element to the strategy is to make good on what Abbas has been talking about: this includes Palestinian institution and security strategy. They have done a good job, and with no question they are much better off now than they were a couple of years ago. However, they can do better. Especially in areas where progress has not yet been made. For example, this includes both the education system and incitement. There needs to be reform of Palestinian textbooks, public discourse and media so that you answer the argument on whether or not there is an education for peace underway or an education for continued conflict.

The third element is a throwback to the “Roadmap.” The Roadmap in 2003/2004 called for a series of actions by each side in parallel that would be mutually reinforcing. The Roadmap today is dormant, but has good ideas in it. In the context of negotiations rather than in the absence of negotiations we might be able to get some movement in Roadmap obligations. Obama tried a settlement freeze, but he tried it in the abstract and in the absence of negotiations. However, I think he would have a better chance if the parties were negotiating on the basis of parameters.

The fourth element of the strategy is to pick up on the Arab Peace Initiative. The Arabs changed their policy—they are now focused on what happens to the 1967 problem. Which is the problem of the occupied territories, they are no longer calling Israel’s existence into question. Also, nobody is using the Arab Peace Initiative. One way to use it is to revive some multilateral engagement between Israel and the Arabs even in advance of a negotiated outcome on the bilateral issues. Questions of health, water and environment still need to be dealt with and these questions transcend boundaries. If we could show that process starting again it would lend a great deal of support and a safety net for the larger process.

This is a highly admirable approach, but is it a viable one? In the United States the idea of supporting Palestinian institutions is not controversial. But the president tried to do something like a parameter on borders and got assailed last May. What has changed that would make this approach work?

It is not what has changed; it is what needs to change. Up until May of 2011 the president was putting forward tactics, and tactics don’t work in this process. In May, he began to put forward something that approached a larger strategy, but he walked away from it at the first sign of Israeli and Arab pushback. What needs to change is a willingness of the United States to stand behind what it stands for. Is this something that is important to the United States? I didn’t determine that, the President of the United States said when he entered office that this is important to the United States. This is a ‘national interest of our country.’ He took the trouble on the first full day of his administration to appoint George Mitchell as his envoy. If it is important, and that importance has not diminished over the last three years, than we ought to act as though it is important and it means you put forward a good idea. And the President’s idea in May was a good idea—and then you work it. You don’t take ‘no’ for an answer and you pushback when one or both of the parties push at you. And you modify as you need to modify. However, you don’t just walk away as we did.

No Republican presidential candidate will hesitate to criticize the President for the slightest thing that he does to promote the peace process. How does the President pursue this during an election year and can he be convinced that it would help him and not hurt him?

It strikes me that the Republicans in this campaign have given him a tremendous amount of latitude to operate because the ideas they put forward are so beyond the moon. One candidate said the ‘Palestinians were an invented nation’ and another candidate said they will do ‘whatever the Israeli Prime Minister wants them to do.’ That is not what an American president needs to do. The president needs the ability to say to the American people “I will do what needs to be done that will help the Israelis make the peace that is in their strategic interest. However, that may require some engagement beyond simply saying ‘yes’ to what the Israeli prime minister is telling me that he wants to hear.” It requires a little bit of boldness and leadership. But these other guys who are running for office are just saying whatever makes sense to their donors. The current candidates have no responsibility for what they are saying, while the president does have responsibility. And he is on record as saying this is important so he should act like this is important.

Let’s turn to the two parties. How do you get the two parties to observe the Roadmap when they haven’t in the past? On the Palestinian side you have a lot of disunity and a leader who has proven himself to be very cautious even when Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in September 2008 made a far-reaching proposal. How do you get the Palestinians to take the steps the Roadmap requires? Also, how do you get Netanyahu to move when his government is particularly right-wing and he has been reluctant to take any serious initiative that might cause any controversy within his coalition?

The answer on the Roadmap is—I don’t know. Because we have never tried to implement it in the context of a larger strategy, even when it came out in 2003. I was Ambassador to Israel at the time and it was in a very limited context and it fell apart under the burden of continued terrorism. I don’t know if we will be able to succeed with it. If you want a chance for success it has to be integrated into this larger strategy. I don’t have a ready answer for that, but we have never tried it in the context of a larger strategy. Neither of the two parties has been tested fully on a strategic approach. It was not hard for Netanyahu to pushback on settlements because settlements as an issue didn’t make a lot of sense to people not to just Netanyahu. I don’t think it was the way to go because you are not going to get an Israeli government to do that when it sees nothing else happening. When Obama made that demand he couldn’t even get the King of Saudi Arabia to allow El Al flights to overfly the kingdom. He couldn’t even get a minor confidence building measure out of an Arab state. In the abstract, a settlements freeze makes no sense and therefore Netanyahu has found it easy to dodge anything the President has thrown at him. I don’t know how easy it would be for to him to deal with a full strategic American approach that would be marketable in Israel. Dan Shapiro is a very strong Ambassador to Israel and the President needs to talk directly to the Israeli people. Same with Abbas. If you take his words at face value, he feels that Obama put him ‘up in a tree.’ What are you going to do when the President of the United States actually has a serious strategy? Are you still going to act small-minded and narrow-minded saying “I can’t go forward without my precondition”? If he does, this just doesn’t happen. It doesn’t mean that this doesn’t go forward.

Has President Obama done anything right with the peace process?

He was 100 percent right in defining this issue as important to the United States. The United States should want peace in the Middle East because the absence of it costs us a great deal. The President was exactly right in defining it in appointing a very senior negotiator and by May 2011 he came to the realization that it was not going to be confidence building measures that move this thing forward it is going to be a reasonable approach to negotiations. I think the May 19 ^th speech last year was both fair and reasonable. I think the President has done some things that were quite positive. My problem with the President is it took him some time to move from a tactics approach to a slightly more strategic approach.

What kind of administration is most likely to produce a successful policy? David Hale doesn’t have the visibility that George Mitchell had. How do you think the President should organize your four points?

Well, it is better to have an envoy without a policy than a policy without an envoy. I think if the president makes the decision to pursue a strategy I have argued or if he has his own strategy, he needs to give the sense of an integrated and comprehensive plan. After that, it would be difficult to organize for diplomacy. The Middle East peace process has become the problem of the Secretary of State and the President. If that is the case than one way to organize this is to – in a sense – say to the Secretary of State this is now one of your options. You organize the department and when the issues start to grow than it gets pushed up anyway. You need the Secretary of State or the President to extract the real issues from the leaders.

Let’s the say the United States can’t or won’t do it. Is there any other entity or government that could pursue your strategy?

Not that I see, no. Israel hates when the United States puts some pressure on it, but doesn’t trust anyone else to put pressure on it. Since Israel is at least half the issue here you are not going to get the European Union or the United Nations or some combination of the Quartet to do this kind of thing. An Arab leader such as King Abdullah II of Jordan could actually play a significant role in future negotiations, especially if one or two more Arab leaders got together to make some kind of compelling argument to the people of Israel that changes the situation. This has happened in the past such as with Begin and Sadat. It is not likely, but still possible.

Could this happen in the aftermath of the Arab Spring?

If you look back and ask what prompted the Arab Initiative to come forward in 2002, it was a significant concern on the part of Saudi Arabia and most other Arabs. The Arab-Israeli conflict had become a heavy weight around the neck of the Arab systems in the face of Iran. There is no question that this was the concern. These countries could not deal with Iranian power projection because of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The national interests that propelled the Arab states in 2002 to adopt the Arab Peace Initiative have not changed and they don’t change as a result of the Arab Spring. It remains to be seen if the Islamist leaders will see it in this light – whether they will govern as leaders or as Islamists.

Does the Iranian problem make it worse or better?

It makes it more imperative to do it faster. The Middle East dynamic changes overnight if the President takes the front seat and it also make it easier with the Russians and Chinese. It just makes it easier do diplomacy even with the Security Council. Our Arab diplomacy was facilitated in the 1990s as a result of the Arab Peace Process. If you want a large strategic reason to do this it is Iran.

Israel & 2012 (VIDEO)

Israel Policy Forum — Thu, 12 Jan 2012 19:41:34 -0500

On January 11, 2012, IPF convened a discussion in New York City on "Israel & 2012." Jane Eisner, editor-in-chief of the Forward newspaper moderated the conversation with former Israeli Consul General Alon Pinkas, former State Department Advisor Aaron David Miller and former National Security Council Senior Director Michael Doran.

Click here to view Part 2 of the discussion.

Israel & 2012 (VIDEO) Part 2

Israel Policy Forum — Thu, 12 Jan 2012 19:35:30 -0500

Israel & 2012 (VIDEO) Part 3

Israel Policy Forum — Thu, 12 Jan 2012 19:20:25 -0500

Hamas' Dilemma

The Pulse — Fri, 23 Dec 2011 16:14:44 -0500

Hussein Ibish spoke with Steve Spiegel about how regional dynamics are impacting Palestinian reconciliation efforts amid reports that Hamas is considering joining the PLO. To listen to the audio, click here. Below is a full transcript.

SUMMARY POINTS

Hamas is being forced to adjust its longstanding ties to Syria and Iran as the region is increasingly aligning along sectarian lines.
Fatah is also under pressure as Muslim Brotherhood movements are gaining influence throughout the Arab world.
There is significant tension within Hamas between the external leadership and internal leadership.
Reports of an Interim Leadership Framework leading to Hamas and others joining the PLO is likely an effort to show the Palestinian public that efforts toward unity are being made—but it would be very difficult for Hamas politically to become a part of PLO and maintain its posture as a resistance movement.
Mahmoud Abbas’ meeting with Palestinian prisoners released in the Gilad Shalit deal is also intended to bolster domestic political support. Abu Maze and others within the PA and Fatah have come to the conclusion that there is nothing they can do or say that will make headway with this Israeli government.
Hamas’ hopes that the Muslim Brotherhood will not only influence but rule politics in the Arab world are far-fetched.
The United States remains the only viable broker for a peace agreement that can produce what the Palestinians need—and independent state and an end to the occupation. This is a fundamental reality. The Palestinians cannot afford a long-term crisis with the United States.

What is going on among the Palestinians between Hamas and Fatah? Is this a major change? What is happening?

Hamas has been forced to seriously readjust its regional role because it can no longer remain part of the Syrian-Iranian alliance of which it has been a core member for almost two decades. Its relationship with what is now essential seen, by most of the other Arab Sunni Islamists – and Sunni governments – in the Arab World, as a Shiite alliance led by Iran of entirely non-Sunni actors, mostly Shiites. Certainly this is a non-Sunni alliance and maybe in so many ways an anti-Sunni alliance. Now, Hamas ideologically is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood of Palestine, and it just couldn’t continue under these circumstances to rely on the old narrative of a culture of resistance versus a culture of accommodation. That narrative, which allowed it to uniquely be aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood movement on the one hand, and this sort of Shiite or quasi-Shiite Iranian alliance on the other, has broken down.

The region is realigning in my view very strongly along sectarian lines. This is most clear in Syria, where only non-Sunni actors now support the Assad regime, and almost all Sunni actors –including Turkey and the Arab Islamists and Arab governments – are opposed to the Assad regime. This put Hamas in an impossible situation vis a vis the headquarters of its politburo, its external political leadership – Khaled Meshaal and his colleagues – they really cannot stay in Syria in the long-run and they cannot rely on Iran as a principle patron or source of much of anything. So, they are literally and figuratively on the move.

There’s also pressure on Fatah. There is real concern about the role of the new Egyptian government – as the Muslim Brotherhood gains a great deal of influence there … you can see the Muslim Brotherhood gaining ground not just through the elections but generally in Egypt and analogous in parties Tunisia and other places, so there is also a lot of pressure on Fatah.

The Palestinian demand in terms of the Arab Spring was not for regime change but for unity. This is something that the groups have been working on for awhile. What they did earlier this year was agree to make an agreement. But what they found is that they couldn’t agree on a national unity government of technocrats or anything like that. Now they are talking about holding elections in May, and they claim they have formed committees to oversee those elections.

There is new information that Hamas – and possibly Islamic Jihad and others – may try to join the PLO. Now this is very complex. And there even might be what is being called and “Interim Leadership Framework” of the PLO that could be a kind of a supra organizational committee including PLO leaders, Fatah leaders, Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders, and maybe even others, which would probably be more for show than anything else. But again, responding to that call for unity.

One final word on the question of unity: I think everyone agrees that Palestinian unity is important. Certainly all the Palestinians do. And, I think even the Israelis do. I mean everyone has complained about the division within the Palestinian national movement. The question is not whether the Palestinians should re-unify – whether that’s necessary or important for peace or for any constructive purpose – the question is: on whose terms is that re-unification going to come? That very much remains to be seen.

So I can’t answer the question as to whether this is cosmetic or the beginning of a serious transformation. Insofar as Hamas has to realign itself with other actors: Turkey, Qatar, maybe Jordan, Egypt, etc., it is going to be dealing with a group of countries relying in fact on support of a group of countries with very different relationships to the regional status quo, to the United States, to Israel, than Syria and Iran did. It’s going to have to make some pretty big changes. The less they have to make changes, I think, the happier they’ll be. Different parts of the organization are more ready for change than others. But, they might have no choice but to make some very painful adjustments and you can see at least the cosmetics of that happening. Now how far it goes? Again, I think, in the end, the regional re-alignment will be the most influential factor in determining where all of the different Palestinian movements end up going.

Jordan, Egypt – even Qatar – are government that have contacts with Israel. How does Hamas become associates with these governments without making changes on their policy vis a vis Israel? Particularly when these countries want close relations with the United States?

I think the answer is they can’t. The question is, in a sense, do you decide to fully re-align and really embrace a transformed role within the region, sort of give up on your hardcore anti-status quo positions, and really reconsider attitudes not only to US but to Israel as well, which would make it possible perhaps for Hamas to join the PLO. If Hamas joined the PLO under the current circumstances that exist now, it would almost certainly mean agreeing to the PLO’s existing positions: the letter of mutual recognition that Chairman Arafat sent to Prime Minister Rabin in ‘93 recognizing the State of Israel, or at least not opposing that. I mean they wouldn’t necessarily have to issue a statement enforcing it, but they would be joining an organization for which that is a central pillar of its policy, and in effect committing to the Quartet conditions that they have resisted for so long.

Now in a certain sense strategically in terms of having the kind of support: the headquarters, the material and financial support that they need, this is an easy choice to make, and is probably something that they would really want to do. On the other hand, there is a heavy political price to be doing that.

Because insofar as Hamas has been presenting itself as the alternative natural leadership – the rival – potential national movement of the Palestinian people to the PLO and Fatah. They’ve had to do it by outbidding the nationalists on the struggle with Israel: on saying they will never recognize Israel, which they continue to maintain; that they think only in terms of a long term truce and not a peace agreement with Israel; that they continue at least in rhetoric if not in practice the use of armed struggle etc, etc, and have refused to accede to the Quartet conditions.

How could they do that so easily?

There is a big problem for them in doing it. In terms of recognizing Israel, they could get away with recognizing that the aim is a two-state solution. I don’t think they would actually have to issue a statement recognizing Israel. I think they would have to accept the principle of a two-state solution—basically what Netanyahu has done. Netanyahu has not recognized a Palestinian state but he’s recognized at his Bar Ilan University speech and many other occasions in the last couple of years the goal of a two-state solution. I think that would be sufficient. Certainly they would have to renounce violence, particularly terrorism and absolutely crucially the legitimacy of existing PLO agreements, particularly as members of the PLO they couldn’t really reject outstanding treaty commitments undertaken by the PLO.

But here’s the political problem: Insofar as they have been trying to challenge the PLO as the national leadership for the Palestinians, they’ve had to do it from a position of outbidding them on a national strategy for independence, liberation, etc. They can’t really hope to get a majority of Palestinian support based on Muslim social conservatism. That’s just not going to work for them among the Palestinians. So it’s almost asking them to give up their brand. Then Palestinians would basically be confronted with two organizations: one Islamist social conservative, reactionary and with a bunch o social attitudes that I think are not shared by a majority of Palestinians; and the other a socially conservative but nationalist group– fighting for the same goals: a two-state solution through non-violent means and a state along Israel. I think they’d risk losing their brand. I don’t know how they recoup that if they went along with all of this. At the same time, how much of that brand of resistance they can keep if their main sponsors are countries like Qatar, turkey, Jordan and Egypt is very hard to understand.

So I think their in a tricky spot. And I also think there are many different fissures within the Hamas movement, it breaks down along multiple axes of course personal, political regional, etc. The biggest is the division between the external and internal leadership. The external leadership has known for many months that it’s got to leave Syria it can’t maintain its relationship with Iran anymore, it has to look for a new home, new sponsors and a new profile—they have no choice. For them it’s not a matter of calculating costs. It’s a matter of existential necessity. The leadership in Gaza, I think, insofar as they are loyal to the external leadership would maybe go along with this because they see the primacy of that leadership. But the people who see themselves as independent Hamas leaders in Gaza, I think stand to lose a great deal. They are sitting pretty in Gaza. They don’t have the same kind of emergency crisis of even knowing where to physically be that the external leaders do. I think you can see a lot of tension between internal and external forces. Particularly the internal hardliner in Gaza Mahmoud Zahar, whose been subject to what ware called ‘severe disciplinary measures’ – I don’t know exactly what those are – but for criticizing the recognition by the external leadership of the authority of the PLO to negotiate with Israel and worse still the authority of the external leadership of the political bureau. He basically said here in May the leadership is here in Gaza and the people outside are just a part of that. So he kind of inverted what most people in Hamas see as the hierarchy. And that was considered unacceptable but I think it was a reflection of the tension of this kind of movement where the external leaders see an urgent necessity to adjust themselves to the political reality and the internal leaders only pay the price. It is almost like a tab is being run up by the external leaders on the credit card of the internal leaders, so to speak.

Meanwhile, what Israelis are paying attention to is Mahmoud Abbas meeting with former prisoners released in the Shalit deal, which is having a devastating impact on Israeli opinion. How do you explain this – why do this?

I think Abu Mazen, like Hamas – and not just Abu Mazen, a lot of Fatah’s leadership, the Fatah Executive and Central Committees – have been feeling also the pressure of national legitimacy. A lot of what they have done in the past year has been efforts to shore up their base, their national legitimacy, and their broad public appeal. And I think they came to the conclusion - seen most dramatically expressed in the UN bid – that the point of these exercises was domestic political support. I think you have seen this in a ratcheting up of rhetoric. There have been a number of efforts by Abu Mazen to reach out to the Israeli public particularly in the few weeks after his UN speech. He gave interviews to Israeli media where he was very forthcoming saying some remarkable things, including that the rejection of the Partition agreement (in 1947) was a mistake. Everyone knows that his own village –Safed – would have been in the Jewish state. So for him to say that in particular given that he was alive at the time – this is a big and important thing for him to say. But it didn’t have any effect. I think the Fatah leadership came to the conclusion that there is nothing they can really do or say that will make serious headway with this Israeli government.

They’ve come to the conclusion they have nothing to work with. So while they don’t want the tax revenues to be withheld, which are 70-75 percent of their budget, and they don’t want a break in relations. I think they don’t mind doing things that are politically popular among the Palestinians, but maybe not particularly good for relations with the Israelis. It’s very significant though that Salaam Fayyad is still the prime minister and that this has been a major issue between Fatah and Hamas – Hamas being a group that cannot stand Salaam Fayyad – that security cooperation continues, that the state and institution building program on the ground continues. And, that nothing in the core deep structure of the status quo that has been built over the last couple of years by the Fayyad government of the PA has been dismantled or broken down. There have been hiccups like the finance minister withholding tax revenues, some of the US aid being withheld because of a procedural hold put in place by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, and some other things. But these are hiccups. The deep structural cooperation is still there. But at the political level there’s a sense that the Arab Spring has put huge pressure both because of regional changes and the reactions of the Palestinian public on both of these groups to move quickly to deal with what is a crisis of legitimacy for Fatah, and not only a crisis of legitimacy for Hamas, but also a crisis of identity, of branding and of who they are.

It is a much deeper crisis for Hamas which is why I think you see a great deal of movement on their side in terms of how they’re appearing to adjust themselves or preparing people for potentially big adjustments. But again, I think they will try to keep it to a minimum because how they maintain their political strength after that becomes s hard to imagine.

If they did do that. They would be pitting all their hopes on the notion that Muslim Brotherhood parties would come to power not only in Egypt but in many Arab states, and the Arab world would at least be 30-50 percent Muslim Brotherhood ruled, not just sharing power but really ruled by Muslim Brotherhood parties. Then they could present themselves as part of that world, and that could be another kind of brand.

But that doesn’t look like it’s happening, frankly. I don’t agree with those people who think the Islamists are taking over everywhere. It doesn’t look that way at all. I think if that’s what they are betting on they are making a losing bet. Sure, Islamists parties are going to do well in any early elections, but in Egypt the presidency is still in the armed forces, the Islamists have a big chunk of a body that has very little authority. In Tunisia, they did well but are in a coalition with a bunch of secular organizations.

This hope that the Muslim Brotherhood will simply sweep into uncontested leadership in the Arab world is I think a very, very far fetched one. So Hamas will have to be very careful about placing all of their bets on that. Though it is significant that Hamas did do something that is has never done before which is join the umbrella ‘international Muslim Brotherhood-parties’ group. Everyone knows they are an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine but they never joined the international Brotherhood movement, and they did do so in the past few weeks. And that’s significant and it’s all part of a movement to re-brand. But I think it’s a very delicate operation for them filled with risks. I don’t think they quite know how they are going to handle it, which is why so much of this might prove to be cosmetic and for public consumption. I will remind you it’s been about a year since Hamas and Fatah were supposed to form a unity government, release each other’s political prisoners – which they haven’t been able to do, find a new prime minister – which they haven’t done, have new elections, which they re talking about but haven’t done. They have formed in any number of committees doing different things but not one item has happened, not even the release of political prisoners, let alone the removal of Fayyad or elections or anything.

If Hamas doesn’t break with its past, Palestinians will lose funding—even from some Europeans. How would they deal with that?

Obviously, it would be highly ill-advised to say the least for the PA to enter into an agreement with Hamas that would result in a loss of all US aid and a lot of international aid from Europe and expect aid form Arab states and Turkey will cover that. And, to deal with a crisis in relations with the US that would result in something more than money. The EU combined is the biggest donor to the Palestinians but the US is the single largest donor. If you also exclude tax revenues from Israel, you are talking about a potential complete economic breakdown and it is hard to see if that could be sustained.

It’s hard to see how the PA would deal with that and survive. You can only not pay your security officials and others for so many weeks before they stop showing up to work—it’s as simple as that.

But in addition to that there is a reality that the United States is the only real, viable broker for a peace agreement, and in the end the Palestinians cannot get what they need – an independent state and an end to the occupation – without an agreement with Israel. I don’t think anybody doubts that at a certain level a third party is needed. Sometimes third parties can complicate things, but at a minimum, you need the US for bridging proposals, for guarantees, and to create a mechanism to hold the parties to account for actually doing what they have promised they would do, something that is desperately needed now. And, to reassure the Israelis, because the United States is the only country that Israel trusts. Now there are a lot of people who say that the United States is not an appropriate third party, although we need a third party. What they need to understand is there is no alternative. It is not as if the United States is hoarding this selfishly or beating back lots of competitors. I can only think of France as any other country of any note at all that has expressed an interest in doing this. And France alone cannot do it. The EU isn’t interested. The UN as a multilateral organization isn’t interested in it. Nobody else. Its not isn’t a question of the US being indispensably positioned to do it, it’s also the question that there isn’t a rival for doing it. The Palestinians cannot in their long-term interests afford a huge and extended breakdown or crisis with the United States. But ultimately they need cooperation with the United States, not just financially and technically, but ultimately politically if they are to get what they need. No matter how frustrated they are this is a very fundamental reality.

The Iranian Nuclear Threat: Views from Israel & the US

Israel Policy Forum — Thu, 01 Dec 2011 17:12:40 -0500

On Tuesday, November 29th, IPF convened a debate and discussion on the Iranian nuclear threat with Tel Aviv University Professor David Menashri, Atlantic Council Senior fellow Barbara Slavin, and Philadelphia Inquirer columnist Trudy Rubin. Click here to watch the program on CSPAN.

Rob Danin on the Role of the Quartet

The Pulse — Tue, 25 Oct 2011 21:59:21 -0400

Rob Danin
Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations
Former Head of the Office of Quartet Representative and worked closely with Tony Blair in Jerusalem

Here are some key excerpts from the phone conference to listen to the full call click here.

The Quartet

The Quartet had met Washington in the summer and had failed to come up with a statement. They were trying to produce a statement that was a little more ambitious, not just a boilerplate statement of the usual sort of things, but try to provide a bath way forward. [This was] an effort to give something to both sides so that they could claim victory and move into negotiations.

To get the parties into the negotiations the Palestinians would the 1967-armistace line (the green lined) affirmed as the basis for negotiations . . . and Israel would get very robust assurances that its security needs would be addressed in a final status issue. President Obama called in the two sides to start with borders and move forward. [However], the Quartet was unable to embrace the Obama Plan. The State Department announced that a meeting would be held in Jerusalem on Wednesday, October 26^th with the Quartet. Tony Blair will be there and they will meet on getting the negotiations back on track.

I have never seen the Quartet more actively engaged since it started in 2002, The United States, Russia, the United Nations and the European Union and I think one thing that has made it possible is the enhanced role of the Quartet [on the other hand] the White House has been too active. This has created an opportunity for the international community to play a larger role. The task ahead is quite difficult, having to do with Palestinian politics, Israeli politics and Global politics. The Quartet is actively involved and will be meeting. The release of Gilad Shalit opens up so very interesting opportunities, when it comes to Gaza.

Israel as a Jewish State

Question: A lot of people were disappointed when the Quartet was not able to come to some agreement [this past summer]. Why couldn’t they agree?

Answer: Two core issues, one was the notion of the 1967 and its role negotiations and the second had to do with the characterization of Israel as a Jewish state. These were two issues that were very problematic. The inability to embrace a formula on those two elements had been articulated by President Obama in May and had thwarted the Quartet from agreeing on a statement.

In September they did over come that, but did not agree on the issue of the Jewish state. United Nations Resolution 181, which had called for the partition of Palestine into two separate states, one Jewish, one Arab in November 29^th 1947, it laid the basis for Israel’s creation 27 times. The Arab world has refused to call ‘Israel,’ Israel and has called it the Jews or the Jewish state. Now we have come 180 degrees and now the Palestinian’s are struggling to referring Israel as a Jewish state and prefer to call it Israel.

Within the international context there are some now within Europe and Russia in particular who have a very hard time with ‘A Jewish State.’ It is very poorly understood by the international community, Israel has not helped to define it very well either. Who is a Jew, which makes the definition of Jewish state become ambiguous. Within the Quartet, you have not divisions, but reflections of different views within the Quartet, part of the role of the Quartet is to come to a unified view. Ultimately it was these issues that became so problematic.

The Palestinian demand of having the 1967 line as a basis for negotiations was met by the Quartet. The Palestinian’s missed an opportunity to declare victory, the two issues became linked, you could only have the 1967 line with Jewish state and since Jewish state become so radioactive it was all taken out in order to create the pathway to negotiations with a reference to the Obama language that does have Jewish and does have 67 lines and has all of these issues addressed. Getting the parties back on the path of dialogue is important.

The United States as a Moderator

Palestinian politics have shifted a great deal largely due to two basic reasons, the Palestinian analysis of the institutional framework and right now the Palestinians are disenchanted with the United States, they feel they will pay a price politically by entering into negotiations. Palestinian’s are very focused on timelines, which is why the Quartet inserted them. Israel is concerned that the Palestinian’s want to pre-negotiate all the outcomes of the negotiations. The Palestinian’s believe they will lose credibility by entering into negotiations.

The Arab spring has unsettled many of the Palestinian leaders including Mahmoud Abbas who was very close to Hosni Mubarak. The Palestinian people want unity and the Palestinian leadership on Fatah and the Hamas side want to be seen to be trying to reach unity, but nobody wants to pay the real price. For Hamas the price is giving up sole control over Gaza and for Fatah it means letting Hams into the West Bank. Both of those a priced too high for both sides. In the period ahead we are going to see more efforts at Palestinian unity, but I don’t think they are going to lead to very much.”

Gilad Shalit

Question: Where does Gilad Shalit fit into the context of the Quartet activities?

Answer: I think Hamas and Israel are gearing themselves up for the next round. Hamas has issued orders to capture more soldiers. Hamas is feeling more embolden and strengthened this pulls Abbas away from Israel and towards a tougher position. Palestinian request for statehood is still in the Security Council and will come out of the Security Council at some point and the Palestinian authority is going to be more hardnosed about this and will likely take it to the general assembly. Palestinian will have enough votes to become a non-state member of the General Assembly.

Note: This phone conference took place on October 18, 2011.

Remembering Tom Kully

Steven L. Spiegel — Mon, 17 Oct 2011 17:06:36 -0400

I
Tom Kully (left) with Steven Spiegel at an IPF event in New York City in 2006.

I met Tom Kully on a cold, wintry Friday night in Jerusalem over a decade ago. A small group was gathering at the Citadel to walk over to a nearby home for dinner. By the time we reached our destination, I felt as if Tom and I were old friends. I had met someone who understood the subtleties of the Arab-Israeli dispute and American policy toward the Middle East better than most specialists I knew. He was inquisitive and curious, always asking questions, probing to find a better answer than had already been given. His alternative ideas were always challenging and thought-provoking.

And he was such a wonderful listener; Tom would listen so carefully that he could see through any weaknesses or contradictions. I appreciated that Tom wasn’t shy about saying if he thought you were wrong.

Tom and I became close friends: we met in Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and Washington DC, often at Israel Policy Forum functions, but just as often privately. We discussed the latest political and strategic developments affecting the US, Israel, and the Middle East. Often, Tom, as a vociferous reader, had read the article I was going to read, something that had just come out, pointing to the latest political developments with great insight and acumen.

Before he became too ill to travel extensively, I invited Tom to attend an international conference I was running. I was amazed at how enthusiastic he was to meet other participants from countries throughout the Middle East, Europe, and North America. Tom was a natural at such gatherings: his thirst for knowledge, information, the perspectives of others was contagious and stimulating. Many of the regular participants commented about how he had enhanced discussions and contributed to the positive atmosphere of the conference.

Of course, we would often mention the irony that the initials of his illness and the organization that had introduced us were the same: IPF. And I saw the same qualities in Tom as he fought his disease as I had seen in him when he was trying to find ways to bring peace to the Middle East. His determination and fortitude permeated everything that he involved himself in, and were a model for all those of us who were privileged to see him in action. Tom persevered until he was so cruelly taken from us.

We will all miss him. I know that I will miss his penetrating, probing mind and the camaraderie he offered me. Perhaps even more, I will miss his kindness, his concern, and the generosity of spirit and the philanthropic attitude that he embodied.

Tom’s memory will live on in the Israel Policy Forum, and we all extend our deepest condolences to his family.

"Securocrats" and the Two State Solution

The Pulse — Thu, 15 Sep 2011 13:48:58 -0400

In his column at the Forward titled "A Palestinian State Even Securocrats Can Accept," JJ Goldberg writes about IPF's symposium Monday night in New York, and specifically former Mossad Director Efraim Halevy's message, which he describes as "If the strategic map of the Middle East looks like a lemon, make lemonade":

I don’t think I’d be going out on a limb to suggest that Israel is having a bit of a rough patch lately, what with its Cairo embassy in ruins, terrorism flaring in the south and new troubles brewing at the United Nations. I could drone on about the dangers, but I don’t need to. I happen to have a handy list, itemized the other day at the Harvard Club by former National Security Council anti-terrorism chief Richard Clarke.
In Clarke’s view, Israel faces seven main threats right now: the rupture with Islamist-led Turkey; chaos in Egypt; the “Hezbollah government” in Lebanon; extreme instability in Libya; the looming declaration of Palestinian statehood at the United Nations; the “ascent” of soon-to-be-nuclear Iran, and “the diminution of American power and influence.”
Clarke was addressing a day-long symposium on Israeli security sponsored by the liberal-leaning Israel Policy Forum. By the time he was done, everyone in the room — a collection of dark-suited business types, American and Israeli military and intelligence officials and assorted wonks — seemed ready to run home and crawl under their beds for a year.
The gloom was promptly lifted, however, by a positively chipper presentation from the next and final speaker: Efraim Halevy, former director of Israel’s Mossad intelligence service, a man not usually known for spreading sunshine.
Halevy’s basic message: If the strategic map of the Middle East looks like a lemon, make lemonade. Or, as he put it: “In a situation where the most probable outcome is the least desirable and the most desirable is the least probable, you go halfway. Sometimes a half a cup of coffee is better than a full cup of coffee” — that is, when a full cup isn’t available.
There are several layers of meaning to this little maxim. At the most overt level, he was talking about the possibility of Israeli-Palestinian peace. For Israel today, he said, “the best possible solution is a complete peace between Israel and Palestine. But I think it’s the least probable.” The most probable solution, he said, is “no solution — more of the same,” muddling along toward “either a one-state solution, with all that entails, or chaos.” That’s the “least desirable,” but “the most probable.”
So what’s he offering in his half-cup of coffee? He didn’t spell it out at the Harvard Club, but he’s done so in Israel several times recently. He believes Israel should offer to recognize a Palestinian state within provisional borders, and then enter state-to-state negotiations over the issues in dispute: borders, water rights, demilitarization, refugees, Jerusalem.

Click here to read the entire column

Efraim Halevy: Obama showed "leadership of historic dimensions" to save Israelis in Cairo embassy

Israel Policy Forum — Tue, 13 Sep 2011 20:14:39 -0400

Last night at Israel Policy Forum's symposium in New York on "Security and the New Middle East," former Director of the Mossad Efraim Halevy spoke directly about President Obama's efforts to "extricate" the six Israelis trapped inside the Israeli embassy in Cairo last Friday night:

“We’ve been talking these days about Turkey and about Egypt. And I would like to say something about the event which took place last Friday evening or through the night in Cairo, which I think to a large extent was a seminal event, not only in the history of the Middle East but also in the history of the relations between Israel and Egypt, and between Israel and the United States of America.
During that night, as you know, our embassy was surrounded and was on the verge of being stormed. And the Prime Minister went to the special command center in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and from there he actually ran and commanded this operation of trying to extricate our staff from the embassy. And, at the end, there were six people left, six people of the security detail of the embassy. They were there inside the last room, which had been the ultimate room in the embassy. And, they had one steel door, which was between them and the mob.
And the Prime Minister took many very, very important decisions that night. Successful decisions, very responsible decisions. And for that he has been lauded, and rightly so I think by the public in Israel and by the population at large for his cool and his measured way of handling this crisis.
But one of the decisions he had to take in the end, he wanted to take, was to find ways of extricating his people, our people, out of that embassy. And he turned to one man, to the President of the United States, and he spoke to him. And the president of the United States, without having much time to consult with Congress, and with the media, and with the analysts and with all of the other people who have to be consulted on major and grave decisions. He took a decision to take up the telephone and get on the line with the powers that be in Egypt, and get them to order the release of these six people, and the detail of the Egyptian commando forces entered and saved them.
I think that this decision by President Obama was a unique decision in many ways. Because I don’t have to tell you, and this was just said time and time and over again this afternoon/this evening, that the United States is not in a position the way it was many years ago in the Middle East, it has its problems, it has its considerations, and rightly so. But I believe the leadership that the President of the United States showed on that night was a leadership of historic dimensions. It was he who took the ultimate decision that night which prevented what could have been a sad outcome—instead of six men coming home, the arrival in Israel of six body bags.
And I want to say to you very openly and very clearly that had there been six body bags, there would have been a much different Israel today than we have been used to seeing over recent years. This would not have been one more incident, one more operation, one event. And the man who brought this about was one man and that was President Barack Hussein Obama.
And I believe it is our duty as Israelis, as citizens of the free world, to say, not simply thank you President Obama, but also we respect you for the way and the manner in which you took this decision.”

For Peace’s Sake, Let’s Be Constructive

The Pulse — Wed, 01 Jun 2011 15:25:09 -0400

By Peter A. Joseph and James E. Walker, III

Following Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s address to a joint session of Congress, prospects for an immediate resumption of negotiations with the Palestinians appear slim. However, there were markers, albeit nuanced and subtle, set by both President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu in their respective remarks that create opportunities for progress in the diplomatic discourse. Those who recognize the critical importance of achieving a two-state solution for the Israeli, Palestinian and American peoples should remain focused on constructive possibilities, not the rhetorical obstacles

To be sure, many of us are deeply disheartened with the ongoing stagnation of the peace process, and for good reason—no progress has been made in years. As President Obama stated, “a lasting peace that ends the conflict and resolves all claims is more urgent than ever.” The window of opportunity for a two-state solution is rapidly closing, and patience among the Palestinians and the international community is running dangerously thin. Achieving a lasting peace – or even progress toward it – will require courageous leadership from Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, both of whom must take considerable political concessions which can be eased, in part, by broad public support and encouragement.

Regrettably, important messages delivered last week by Obama and Netanyahu were muted amidst the deafening chatter of critics and politicians. President Obama’s speech on the Middle East at the State Department was misrepresented to suggest that he called for Israel to return fully to the 1967 borders. The media firestorm, fueled by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s harsh response and the ensuing political partisanship, caused much of the President’s remarks to go ignored. Obama’s opposition to a United Nations General Assembly vote for Palestinian statehood, his recognition of the obstacle that Hamas currently poses to peace, and his continued unwavering support for Israel’s security were extremely significant declarations in support of Israel, and should be recognized as such.

We should not make the same mistake with Netanyahu’s remarks. For the first-time ever, the Prime Minister of Israel, a longtime, hardened Likud champion of “Greater Israel” has publicly recognized that “in any peace agreement that ends the conflict, some settlements will end up beyond Israel’s borders.” This should not be overlooked. Neither should his pledge that “creativity and goodwill” can lead to a resolution of the contentious issue of the final status of the city of Jerusalem, nor his recalibration that Israel must retain forces along the Jordan “River” rather than the Jordan “Valley.” The Prime Minister’s words are critically salient and, rather than enable the language of hurdles to render the language of concessions meaningless, advocates of a two-state solution should be focused on cementing these new positions as welcome steps forward.

Significantly, Netanyahu’s visit to Washington successfully strengthened his domestic base. He returned to Israel with his popularity soaring on the heels of the imagery of a joint session of Congress providing him with numerous standing ovations. If a Prime Minister of Israel is to make any steps toward peace, he will need the substantial, broad support of the Israeli public—and right now, Bibi has it. Going forward, he needs to be encouraged to use it. President Abbas must do the same. All of the parties, Israel included, have a vital interest in helping to foster an environment in which difficult concessions can be made.

The White House has demonstrated that it is not going to give up in its efforts to resolve this intractable conflict—too much is at stake. Fortunately, notwithstanding the destructive partisanship that has been on display this past week, President Obama enjoys widespread support from the American Jewish community and the public at large in his efforts to move the parties to actions that may be politically difficult. The constant critique of the Administration's motivations and intentions when it comes to its approach to the Middle East does not serve Israel's security interests, or its long-term dreams of peace and stability.

There have been plenty of voices of discouragement pointing to the failure of the parties to reach an agreement throughout the past two decades. The time has come to give the parties the political capital to override the cynics and demonstrate the leadership necessary to achieve success—it is long overdue.

Peter A. Joseph is President of Israel Policy Forum.

James E. Walker, III is an Executive Committee member of Israel Policy Forum.

When Peace Met Partisanship

The Pulse — Fri, 20 May 2011 19:26:54 -0400

By David A. Halperin and Peter A. Joseph

The criticism of President Obama’s speech this week, in particular the reaction to the statement that “the borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps,” underscores the lamentable, polarized discourse in our nation – and in the Jewish community – when it comes to Israel and the pursuit of a lasting two-state solution.

A majority of Americans, Israelis and Palestinians have long supported the concept of a two-state solution. The contours of the agreement have more or less been known for years, outlined in the Clinton Parameters announced by President Clinton at IPF’s Gala in January 2001, in the Geneva Accords, the Ayalon/Nusseibeh plan, and even the progress indicated by the leaks of the Olmert-Abbas talks. Each concludes that a border agreement will be based on Israel’s incorporation of major settlement blocs close to - but beyond - the 1967 Green Line in return for a mutually agreed land swap. Every president since Lyndon Johnson – Republican and Democrat alike – has opposed Israeli settlement construction in the territories captured by Israel in 1967 exactly because it made a land-for-peace agreement all the more difficult to achieve. And every president for decades has enjoyed bi-partisan consensus for the United States’ unwavering commitment to Israel’s security, and support for its pursuit of lasting peace.

To be sure, semantics are critical in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. President Obama’s articulation of the date “1967” in his speech was significant. But the dishonest – and dangerous – politicization and demagoguery on display over the last 24 hours in response to this speech, and the dishonest suggestions that Obama has placed Israel’s security in jeopardy by imposing on Israel a full return to the ‘67 border, has been shameful.

In the moments during and just after the speech, many conservative pundits actually applauded President Obama for such comments as his strong opposition to the Palestinians’ attempt to gain recognition at the United Nations General Assembly, his statement that the “Palestinians have walked away from talks,” and his challenge to the Palestinians after the Hamas-Fatah unity agreement to provide a “credible answer” to the question, “How can one negotiate with a party that has shown itself unwilling to recognize your right to exist?”

For example, on Twitter, Noah Pollak, the Executive Director of the Emergency Committee for Israel, and a fierce critic of the President, wrote “I don't think there's anything in this speech that Netanyahu will find surprising or even disagreeable,” and later that “If someone had said to me yesterday, "you'll be defending Obama on Israel tomorrow" I would have laughed.” John Podhoretz of the conservative Commentary Magazine, joked on twitter that the speech sounded as if Obama was saying, “Let me be clear: I don't want to go into 2012 in a broigus with Israel.” Danielle Pletka of the conservative think-tank the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) wrote on her blog that the speech was “not bad” and another AEI blog post reported that “On balance, the speech was quite fair to Israel, especially when one compares it to the 2009 Cairo speech.”

However, the partisan anti-speech chorus grew when presidential candidates Mitt Romney, Tim Pawlenty, and Newt Gingrich all disparaged Obama for his remarks, with Romney stating “President Obama has thrown Israel under the bus.” Representative Allen West (R-FL) even wrote that the speech “could be the beginning of the end as we know it of the Jewish state.” So much for bi-partisanship…

So, why the turnaround? Prime Minister Netanyahu’s terse statement in response to the speech – issued before the speech even concluded – signaled a looming United States-Israel clash, particularly in advance of his upcoming address to a joint session of Congress. To be sure, the President’s speech was criticized by the fringes on both sides of the political spectrum. But conservatives in particular quickly recognized the political opportunity of Netanyahu’s reaction to exploit an issue with which the President has struggled, seemingly in hopes of capturing the Jewish community’s attention (and its support).

Thankfully, most of the American Jewish community is not buying it. The Anti-Defamation League and the American Jewish Committee in particular should be commended for their responsible, principled statements. But the heated politicization of the past 24 hours has also established a new nadir in the Jewish community’s discourse on Israel.

As Israeli military officials themselves have attested, Israel’s security is not jeopardized by “mutually agreed” land swaps based on the 1967 border. It is not threatened by a President who consistently reaffirms his “unshakeable” commitment to Israel’s security, or to enhancing U.S.-Israel security cooperation to historic levels. However, Israel is indeed threatened by the polarization found in Washington and in the Jewish community today, which undermines the strong bi-partisan consensus support for Israel, and its quest for peace, which has held fast for decades.

President Obama clearly intends to keep his word. He said he would track down Osama bin Laden—and he did. He has said his commitment to Israel’s security is unwavering—and it is. In his speech in Cairo in June 2009, he called on the parties to “to act on what everyone knows to be true.” Everyone knows the general contours of a peace agreement—and so the President said it (and even then, only on borders and security).

Without a two-state solution, Israel will become more isolated and less secure. Its future as a Jewish democracy will be placed in jeopardy. But if articulating the mere date “1967” causes such a politicized backlash – in the U.S., in the Jewish community, and in the region – the President may yet be driven to stand down from the pursuit of a two-state solution—and that, we’re afraid, is exactly what the President’s detractors have in mind.

David A. Halperin is Program Director & Policy Analyst at IPF

Peter A. Joseph is the President of IPF

With Speech, Obama Moves Closer to Israel's Position

Steven L. Spiegel — Fri, 20 May 2011 19:15:14 -0400

President Obama in his speech on May 19 has come closer to many Israeli positions than in the past, so it is a bit bizarre that the press has generally reported it as creating a crisis in American-Israeli relations.

In agreement with Israel, the President did not offer in detail a list of American positions on all key issues as many in the foreign policy community had urged him to do, he rejected the idea of an imposed peace—a favorite rallying cry of Israel’s opponents for years, he did not call for immediate Israeli concessions on settlements, he denounced the Palestinian plans for a UN General Assembly vote in favor of their independence in September, he spoke out against Palestinian efforts to delegitimize Israel, advocated a “non-militarized” Palestinian state, questioned the Palestinian unity agreement between Fatah and Hamas and put the burden of proof on the Palestinians. Obama pointedly asked, “How can one negotiate with a party that has shown itself unwilling to recognize your right to exist?” He framed the conflict in a classic Zionist perspective, arguing that – “a lasting peace will involve two states for two peoples: Israel as a Jewish state and the homeland for the Jewish people, and the state of Palestine as the homeland for the Palestinian people, each state enjoying self-determination, mutual recognition, and peace”. The President spoke about the close US-Israeli relationship and its need for security. As some Palestinians are already complaining, he did not celebrate close relations between the U.S. and Palestine. No shared history and values; no “unshakeable” commitment to their security.

And perhaps most surprising of all, and ignored by the press, Obama proposed that negotiations should begin by addressing the issues of territory and security and that these should be settled during a transition period before the parties move on to Jerusalem and refugees. This format is precisely what many Israelis and their supporters have argued for years. The President said nothing about provisional borders, but that was the vision of the roadmap, whose second stage would constitute a “provisional” Palestinian state, and it has been vehemently opposed by the Palestinians. The controversial sentence in the speech came when the President said that “We believe the borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders are established for both sides.” Several objections have been raised to this sentence by the Netanyahu government, but all of them involve putting words in the mouth of the President and making it appear that he said what he did not say.

Some claim that he called for Israel to return to what are admittedly indefensible lines in 1967. Where did he say that? There is no other line that can serve as a starting point beyond 1967, but with “mutually agreed” swaps, the lines could change substantially. And the President said that “Israel must be able to defend itself—by itself—against any threat.” That means secure and defensible borders; otherwise, Israel could not defend itself.

Another argument is that the President came out against any settlers remaining in territory that is now in the West Bank. It has been widely assumed since Camp David that Israel would keep the main settlement blocs along the old lines where 80% of the settlers live. The President’s formulation is completely consistent with that assumption.

The President also explicitly does not state that these swaps have to be equal, so that as has been discussed between the parties since Camp David, there would be swaps of territory, and until now Israel has never agreed to a precise 1:1 swap. The President’s sentence still gives the Israelis the opportunity to argue for unequal swaps and does not compromise that claim. The Clinton Parameters included percentages of Israeli withdrawal, as did the Olmert Plan of late 2008. All of these proposals were based on percentages of the 1967 lines; everyone argued on that basis. For example, the Clinton parameters called for a solution that allocated between 94 and 96% of the West Bank to an independent Palestinian state with all of Gaza and a land swap of 1 to 3 percent. In the broader Obama conception, the Israelis could get more or less, but his enumeration is closer to the Israeli conception of not appearing to impose a final determination before negotiations begin through proposals from outside. In a letter to PM Sharon of April 14, 2004, President Bush declared that Israel should be able to keep existing “population centers” in the West Bank, which for Israelis was code for the large settlement “blocs”.

Despite the critics, in no way does President Obama’s formulation contradict that promise, but President Bush and everyone else could not discuss the West Bank without having the 1967 frontiers in mind because without those lines there is no West Bank.

In his address to IPF on January 7, 2001, revealing the Clinton Parameters, President Clinton noted that a settlement would have to include “Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza, the vast majority of the West Bank, the incorporation into Israel of settlement blocs….To make the agreement durable, I think there will have to be some territorial swaps and other arrangements.” Sine the delineation of Gaza and the West Bank are based on the 1967 lines, there is no difference between Obama’s formulations or his two predecessors.

It is true that the President discussed “the full and phased withdrawal of Israel military forces,” but he does not say from where, and that cannot be determined until there is an implementable agreement. There has been much discussion over the years concerning the Jordanian-Palestinian border. Some have called for NATO including American forces to be stationed there. But the President by declaring that Israel must be able to defend itself alone shows the same concerns as Prime Minister Netanyahu. The PM insists on an Israeli presence on the border; the President has actually enhanced his claim by saying that only Israel can provide for its security. In any case, those issues are to be settled in negotiations.

The Prime Minister has also objected because the President did not discuss the other part of the Bush letter to Sharon in April 2004, when he promised Israel that the Palestinian refugees should be resettled in Palestine, not Israel. But the speech wasn’t about refugees or Jerusalem. It proposed a process in which they are left until later. It would have been inappropriate to enter into the refugee question, because then the President would have had to address Jerusalem, and for Israel there are fundamental disagreements with Israel over Jerusalem, but almost no daylight on refugees. Moreover, it cheapens American commitments to Israel for any American President to have to repeat all commitments we have ever made every time he addresses issues pertaining to Israel. Besides, it was unnecessary to cite the refugee question because of the strong US agreement with Israel on this point. Prime Minister Netanyahu should drop this particular objection to the President’s speech.

The Palestinians rejected the Clinton Parameters and the Olmert Plan, and by referring to the 1967 borders, the language is more acceptable to them. It is basically meaningless, but the language—not the substance—may lead them to accept Obama’s formulation. For them, the problem is that they have gained a pyrrhic victory enclosed in a series of American steps toward the Israeli position. They’re not celebrating in Ramallah, and they shouldn’t be. The puzzle is why the Israelis are so unhappy? It is not conventional for one of the parties to a dispute to take the intermediary’s words and try to frame them in a way far more against its interests than the original. That’s not a diplomatic victory game. As Congressman Howard Berman says, “The peace process dimension of the speech puts the ball squarely in the Palestinian court.”

The Case for Borders First

The Pulse — Wed, 18 May 2011 19:20:12 -0400

By David Avital, IPF Executive Committee Member

President Barack Obama’s speech Thursday about the Middle East, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s impending visit and Special Envoy George Mitchell’s recent resignation, makes this a unique moment for Washington to set a new Mideast policy direction focused on one goal: a borders agreement.

Rather than view the U.N. General Assembly meeting in September as a threat to derail Middle East peace, Obama could use the opportunity to move both sides forward and promote a return to negotiations on the border before the U.N. vote.

Even as more than 140 nations at the U.N. stand ready to recognize a Palestinian state, Palestinian leaders still indicate the Palestine Liberation Organization’s preference of talking with Israel. But after a prolonged stalemate, each side is reluctant to break away from its deeply entrenched, public position.

While the momentum toward recognition is strong, Washington can capitalize on the historic opportunity offered by the Israelis and Palestinians current vulnerabilities by developing a plan for Israel to applaud Palestine’s recognition rather than be threatened by it.

The road to peace begins with clearly defined borders.

For the Jewish state, this agreement could stem the increasing isolation of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. It would enable systematic negotiations to begin with settlers living in areas due to become part of Palestine, while construction in areas expected to remain part of Israel could continue. This also allows the Israelis to sustain the status quo on key issues like security.

The approach could also establish a context for greater Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation, consistent with Netanyahu’s vision of an “economic peace first.”

However, the alternative – a U.N. vote in favor of a Palestinian state which the U.S. and Israel oppose – could unleash what Defense Minister Ehud Barak described as a “diplomatic tsunami,” engulfing Israel in de-legitimizing campaigns and international legal battles against Israel’s “occupation” of a newly sovereign nation.

Read the entire op-ed at Politico

Reactions to the Hamas-Fatah Unity Deal

The Pulse — Fri, 29 Apr 2011 15:11:22 -0400

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu:

The Palestinian Authority needs to choose between peace with the people of Israel and peace with Hamas. You cannot have peace with both, because the Hamas aspires to destroy the State of Israel, and I'll say it openly.

Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas:

(I) will continue our policy of one authority, one gun and the rule of law as long as I am president. … I heard that Netanyahu said that Abu Mazen [Abbas] should choose between Israel and Hamas. I heard this for a few months and I made the answer that Hamas is part of the Palestinian people. I can’t exclude them. Like or dislike, agree or disagree, they are part of our people. You, Mr. Netanyahu, are our partner. We can’t exclude you, so we have to take both sides – not to choose between this and that. But please, Mr. Netanyahu, you have to choose between settlement activities and peace.

Hamas Official Mahmoud Zahar:

Our program does not include negotiations with Israel or recognizing it … it will not be possible for the interim national government to participate or bet on or work on the peace process with Israel.

White House Spokesman Tommy Vietor:

The United States supports Palestinian reconciliation on terms which promote the cause of peace. Hamas, however, is a terrorist organization which targets civilians.

Israel's Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman:

The international community must not legitimize the government whose face is the face of [Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas,] and whose arms are the arms of Hamas, who launches missiles at citizens and stains innocents with blood.

German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle:

Hamas is “not a dialogue partner for us because we don’t work with organizations that fight with violence against Israel’s right to exist.

Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu

I also told (Secretary of State Hillary Clinton) and underlined that this reconciliation should be supported by the international community in the strongest way … “It is not right to hesitate here. Back in 2007, the Mecca agreement was made. Palestine has passed through a very long, troubled and painful period since the international community unfortunately did not sufficiently support this [Mecca] deal. Now, support has to be given to this [Wednesday's] agreement … Israel should also see the Palestine reconciliation as a positive development. Up until this very moment, the Israeli side has always complained that they haven't been able to find a counterpart on the Palestinian side; they have complained about the split. Now given that the Palestinians have this unity, everybody should feel happy about it.

Michael Mann, Spokesman for European Union Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton:

We have consistently called for reconciliation and peace under the authority of President Abbas as a way to end the division between the West Bank and Gaza and we have also consistently underlined the need for security and stability across the region.

United Nations Special Coordinator Robert Serry:

Reunification is essential for achieving a two-state solution that should be reached through negotiations.

The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg:

Prime Minister Netanyahu has some breathing space. He can claim, with more legitimacy than he had earlier this week, that Israel is under siege; this will stabilize his coalition, and possibly even bring in the opposition leader, Tsipi Livni, to his coalition;

It's not good that Netanyahu has breathing space. Breathing space, for him, means paralysis in the peace process (so-called). Israel must find, now -- not later, but now -- a formula that will allow it to withdraw its settlers from beyond the security fence, and to create conditions for the emergence of, at the very least, a more autonomous Palestinian entity, one that would become independent as soon as Israel can figure out a way to neutralize the Iranian threat.

The Third Intifada might be only a matter of months away. The first intifada was one of stones; the second, suicide bombers on buses. This next one will be the Intifada of rockets. I think it's coming.

It is not Hamas that is changing. It is the Palestinian Authority, which is sidelining Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, the man most responsible for bringing the Authority the international credibility it needs to declare independence. This is not to say that Hamas is all-powerful; it is watching with trepidation as its second-most important ally, Bashar al-Assad, appears in danger of losing his throne, which would not be a bad thing for anyone except the Assad family.

Time Magazine’s Joe Klein:

3. This profoundly changes the global Middle East peace game. Can Barack Obama now come out in favor of a comprehensive Middle East peace with Palestinians sworn to Israel’s destruction? I don’t think so. Does Prime Minister Netanyahu have to yield to such international pressure, in advance of the probable UN vote to declare Palestine a state in December? I don’t think so–especially with the uncertainties caused by Arab spring on every one of Israel’s borders. I suspect that nothing less than a formal Hamas declaration of Israel’s right to exist would bring the Israelis to the peace table anytime soon.

Ha’aretz’s Avi Isaacharoff and Amos Harel:

Barring any further surprises (and there will undoubtedly be many ), a year from now, the Palestinians will hold a free election for their president and parliament. According to the Jerusalem Media and Communications Center, a Palestinian organization, Fatah enjoys the support of 34 percent of the Palestinian population - and Hamas, 15 percent. Abbas personally has the backing of 17.9 percent of the population, as compared with 11.4 percent for Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh.
The lopsided disparity in favor of Fatah could change before the election for any number of reasons. The first is Abbas' declaration that he does not intend to run for another term. At the moment, no successor has emerged on the Fatah horizon. But Abbas might - and not for the first time - retract his planned retirement. Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, who is not a member of Fatah, could become a consensus candidate, but only if the movement's senior members overcome their hostility toward him.
Another scenario is also possible: that fear of suffering a humiliating electoral defeat will spur Hamas to present quick achievements. Since support for the armed struggle against Israel is not currently running high among the Palestinian public, an alternative option is to try to complete a deal for the return of Gilad Shalit to Israel. Hamas will need a "victory photo-op." Hundreds of prisoners being released from Israeli prisons would definitely make for a winning image.

Israeli Analyst Daniel Levy:

The Fatah-Hamas deal will, inevitably, meet with a rocky reception in the US. Congress may move to defund the PA, security assistance may be withdrawn, and official Israeli talking points ("they chose peace with the terrorists over peace with Israel") will be warmly received on Capitol Hill. But will this reconciliation deal, if it holds, really be a negative development for the Palestinians, the US or even Israel?
For the Palestinians themselves, internal unity seems a prerequisite for developing a new national platform and strategy, and for reviving a legitimate, empowered and representative PLO. Unity creates one Palestinian address, the likelihood of a more robust negotiating posture, and provides an on-ramp for Hamas to engage in the political process, should it so choose. Crucial to any strategy will be a Palestinian adherence to international law and, in that context, to non-violence.

Week-In-Review - April 16-22

The Pulse — Fri, 22 Apr 2011 17:33:12 -0400

The White House’s Seder…and rumors of a peace plan

President Obama continued a new White House tradition, conducting a Seder for the third year in a row with staffers who first held a Seder with then-candidate Obama on the presidential campaign trail. The White House issued a statement during the holiday, and President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke by phone. The official readout of the call stated that: “Prime Minister Netanyahu expressed his deep appreciation for U.S. funding for the Iron Dome rocket and mortar defense system, which he noted has successfully intercepted several rockets aimed at Israeli communities. The President congratulated the Prime Minister on this impressive Israeli technological achievement and expressed his pride that Israeli-American cooperation made it possible. With the signing of the fiscal year 2011 budget appropriation, the President approved $205 million in U.S. funding for Iron Dome, which is above the annual package of Foreign Military Financing for Israel.”

Meanwhile, a New York Times report on Thursday indicated that the White House is considering drafting a new peace plan in a bid to stave off Palestinian efforts to gain international recognition at the UN General Assembly in September. Responding to the report, President Shimon Peres told reportersthat Israel should create a peace plan of its own, rather than wait for the United States.

Also this week, Foreign Policy reported in-depth on Wikileaks documents that outline the various efforts by the United States to limit the scope and impact of the Goldstone Report. Ambassador Susan Rice, the focal point of much those leaks, addressed a special UN session this week with remarks on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, stating, “We continue to consult with the Israelis and the Palestinians, as well as to work with the Quartet and our partners in the region, toward our shared goal of a two-state solution. Negotiations between the parties remain the only path to a solution that resolves all issues and establishes a sovereign state of Palestine alongside a secure state of Israel as a key part of a comprehensive peace among Israel and all of its neighbors.”

And, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton appeared on Charlie Rose on Wednesday, in which she reiterated that “negotiations are the only way,” to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace. She added that Israelis and Palestinians should return to "the hard work of determining borders, determining the security requirements and dealing with all the other issues that they have to face.”

Abbas Says ‘No’ To An Intifada

While visiting Tunisia this week, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas renounced violence stating, “As long as I head the PA, I will not agree to a new Intifada, no matter what the format … I will not accept security or military anarchy in the West Bank or in any other Palestinian area. People who talk about an armed Intifada are not thinking about what is good for the Palestinian people.”

He added: “The month of September will be an important way station on the way to a declaration on the borders of the Palestinian state and its establishment on all of the land occupied in 1967,” noting that he believed that 140 states would support recognition of Palestine as an independent state. “If, in September, the UN recognizes southern Sudan, but not the state of Palestine, that will be a big disappointment,” he said.

Meanwhile, a new poll issued this week by the Ramallah-based Jerusalem Media & Communication Center (JMCC) indicated that support for violence against Israelis has dropped among Palestinians. From Ha’aretz’s report:

“Since the Gaza war the ratio of Palestinians who opposed "military operations" against Israel rose from 38.1% in January of 2009 to 51.8% in April of 2011. Accordingly, the poll states, "the ratio of Palestinians who support military operations decreased from 53.3% in January 2009 to 37.1% in April 2011."

The poll also refers specifically to Palestinian support of rockets and mortar bombs launched from the Gaza Strip against surrounding Israeli communities, stating that the ratio of Palestinians who believe they are useful in achieving the national goals went down from 50.8% in January 2009 to 25.4% in April of 2011.

In addition, the survey also showed that "the ratio of Palestinians who believe that these rockets harm the national interests went up from 20.8% in January 2009 to 38.6% this month."

This week also marked the Sixth Annual Conference on Popular Resistance in Bilin. At the conference, PA Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad stated, "The international community must be committed to promoting a Palestinian state withing the 1967 borders and supporting the planned deceleration of independence coming September."

Mahmoud Abbas also spent time in France this week in an effort to woo French recognition of a Palestinian state. Earlier in the week, The Los Angeles Timeshad reported that the Quartet may consider recognizing the State of Palestine, and on Thursday Palestinian Representative to the United Nations Riyad Mansour urged the Quartet to adopt a European peace proposal calling for a settlement freeze and a return to the 1967 borders, with land swaps, as a basis for a negotiated agreement.

Also Thursday, a group of Israelis held a rally in Tel Aviv in support of independence for a Palestinian state and independence from Israel’s occupation. The rally also spurred counter-rallies.

Turkey - Israel Relations

Turkish President Abduallah Gul wrote an op-ed in The New York Times this week in which he wrote:

"I call upon the leaders of Israel to approach the peace process with a strategic mindset, rather than resorting to short-sighted tactical maneuvers... Sticking to the unsustainable status quo will only place Israel in greater danger. History has taught us that demographics is the most decisive factor in determining the fate of nations.... It will be almost impossible for Israel to deal with the emerging democratic and demographic currents in the absence of a peace agreement with the Palestinians and the rest of the Arab world. Turkey, conscious of its own responsibility, stands ready to help."

The op-ed comes just days after Turkish Prime Minister Reccep Tayyip Erdogan released his AK Party's "Manifesto for 2023," summarizing his party's strategy in the Middle East and beyond ahead of Turkey's June 12 elections (which the AK Party is expected to win). Notably, Israel was not mentioned in the document at all. Gul's column also comes as another Gaza-bound flotilla intends to leave from Turkey in late-May. Israeli officials condemned the effort this week, stating that extremists were among the organizers and expected participants.

In Other Notable News:

Two Palestinians were detained early this week for the brutal murder of the Fogel family in the West Bank settlement of Itamar.
Settlers established a new settlement called Regev near Itamar. Ha’aretz reported that “The (settler) leaders have decided to urge Likud MKs and Likud Central Committee members to exert massive pressure on Netanyahu, as they did to prevent the continuation of the construction moratorium, and make the summer session of the Knesset a decisive one for Netanyahu.” The effort was soon after dismantled.
A Wikileaks document indicated that then-Opposition Leader Benjamin Netanyahu was considering joining Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s coalition if he ramped up efforts to strike Iran’s nuclear installations.
Iranian military Brig. Gen. Ahmad Reza Pourdastan told a meeting of foreign attaches that “Today no enemy has the requirements and the desire to carry out a military attack against the powerful Iran and military aggression against Iran is highly unlikely and even impossible and is synonymous with the suicide of the aggressor.”
Netanyahu appointed a Mossad official, David Meidan, as head negotiator regarding the release of Gilad Shalit, as Shalit family heavily criticized the prime minister for inaction.
A poll indicated that Shimon Peres is the most popular political figure in Israel with an approval rating of over 70 percent, while Ehud Barak had the lowest approval rating, near 30 percent. Meanwhile, Benjamin Netanyahu was named on of Time Magazine’s list of the world’s 100 Most Influential People.

Week-In-Review - April 8-15

The Pulse — Fri, 15 Apr 2011 18:17:34 -0400

The week began with the success of the new Iron Dome system in Israel where the two batteries stationed in Ashkelon and Be’er Sheva downed eight incoming rockets from the Gaza Strip last weekend. It is believed that 12-15 batteries would be needed to cover the entirety of Israel, and Israel this week pressed for the accelerated development of more batteries, with the help of $205 million in aid from the United States as part of the budget passed by President Obama this week. By Monday, a tacit agreement was believed to be reached to calm the mounting tensions along the Israel-Gaza border between Hamas and the IDF. Subsequently, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman told reporters he opposed any tacit cease-fire stating “Defining the goal as ‘quiet’ is a big mistake…Quiet means a war of attrition. We must not agree to this.”

On Tuesday, Senate Foreign relations Committee Chairman John Kerry spoke at a conference at the Brookings Institution on the US strategy to head-off a United Nations General Assembly recognition of a Palestinian state, stating, “It is very possible that President Obama will even step out ahead of that (Netanyahu's upcoming visit to Washington) and possibly -- I say possibly -- make his own contribution to where he thinks the process ought to go.” He added, “I think we can get to borders and the fundamental issues fairly quickly and it’s conceivable that between now and September we will do that." Later that day, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told the conference that the “the president will be speaking in greater detail about America's policy in the Middle East and North Africa in the coming weeks.” In response to Clinton’s remarks, a Palestinian spokesman for President Mahmoud Abbas issued a statement stating that "We are calling for a clear American position on Palestinian statehood within the 1967 borders with east Jerusalem as its capital and a firm position on Israeli settlement.”

Wednesday kicked-off the start of a conference of donors to the Palestinians in Brussels. In advance of the meetings, United Nations Special Coordinator for the Mideast peace Process Robert Serry issued a report stating: “In six areas where the UN is most engaged, government functions are now sufficient for a functioning government of a (Palestinian) state.”

The report comes shortly after the IMF and World Bank issued similar reports in advance of the conference. In Brussels, Palestinian Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad called for donor countries to contribute $5 billion over the next three years, urging them to “take full advantage of the success we have achieved in the state building process by issuing that birth certificate. Take advantage of the new found spirit of self-empowerment in the region.” Meanwhile, a poll was released indicating that 51 percent of Americans oppose “unilaterally declare an independent Palestinian state without a signed peace treaty with Israel.”

Also Wednesday, Israel’s Attorney General announced that Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman would be indicted if a final hearing does not clear him of thecharges he is facing, which include fraud, money laundering, and breach of trust. In 2009, Lieberman stated that if charged, he would resign.

On Thursday, Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu formally announced that he has been invited by House Speaker John Boehner to address a joint session of Congress during his visit in May. The prime minister stated that the speech will address how to “bring a secure peace between us and our neighbors. Not a peace on paper, not a peace of ceremonies and lawns, but a peace that will last and ensure our future and security.”

The United States Senate passed a resolution calling for the United Nations to rescind the Goldstone Report following Judge Goldstone’s Washington Post op-ed in which he wrote, “If I had known then what I know now, the Goldstone Report would have been a different document." Resolution 138 calls on the UN "to reflect the author's repudiation of the Goldstone report's central findings, rescind the report and reconsider further Council actions with respect to the report's findings."

Meanwhile Turkey and Israel once again traded barbs over an expected flotilla convoy to be headed for Gaza at the time of Netanyahu’s US visit. The convoy is expected to consist of 15 ships. After Israel formally asked Turkey to halt the convoy, a Foreign Ministry spokesman told reports, “We listened to the message given by the Israeli side and told them this is an initiative by civil society."

Today, an Italian activist in Gaza was found dead after being murdered by Islamic radicals in Gaza believed to be affiliated with Al Qaeda. A Hamas official suggested Israel was to blame as an effort to scare-off future flotillas. Also, Hamas is reportedly split over negotiations for the release of captured Israeli Cpl. Gilad Shalit.

Meanwhile, after quiet along the Israel-Gaza border for much of the week, rocket fire returned to Israel today with two rockets landing near Ashdod.

Obama is Clearly on Israel's 'Side'

Peter Joseph — Fri, 01 Apr 2011 17:01:41 -0400

Jackson Diehl’s March 28 op-ed column, “Man in the middle,” was perplexing given President Obama’s record of support for Israel, particularly in the midst of the upheaval that has engulfed Israel’s neighborhood.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates’s visit to Israel last week was just the latest sign of the unprecedented military cooperation that has been established between the United States and Israel. Under Mr. Obama’s leadership, military coordination and U.S. military aid have reached historic levels. Meanwhile, joint covert operations are widely believed to have set back Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. Even more, as the regional unrest has reached a fever pitch, the Obama administration vetoed a U.N. resolution condemning Israel’s settlement construction, much to the consternation of the Palestinians and the international community

Mr. Obama’s actions demonstrate that he is pursuing a negotiated Middle East peace exactly because he recognizes the threats to Israel’s security and is determined to address them.

Click here to view the letter on the Washington Post's website