Israel’s Best Friend Ever…

With much at stake, we Israelis have been eager to identify friends, and equally quick in appointing enemies. All too often though, history has proven us wrong. 

Few still remember that the emergence of George Shultz as U.S. Secretary of State was greeted with concern in Jerusalem. "An enemy" was born. After all, his previous tenure was with a construction giant whose business depended much on Saudi government contracts. Yet, few before him or since have enshrined their commitment to Israel in more meaningful ways: he initiated the two most important forums for bilateral consultations on Israeli security and economic needs. Both exist to this very day.

President Jimmy Carter is another "enemy." His bizarre anti-Israel twist of recent years is allowed to overshadow his unprecedented contribution to Israeli security when, as president he brokered the peace treaty with Egypt.

Finally, it was "the enemy" Jim Baker whose objection to our settlement policy was deemed more important than his statesmanship which dragged President Hafez Assad of Syria, along with virtually the entire Arab World to a peace conference with Israel's hard line Prime Minister Shamir.

Conversely, President George W. Bush, the most recent holder of the title "Israel's best friend ever in the White House" left a legacy with little evidence for contribution to that which is most relevant to Israeli security: reduced Arab-Israeli tension.

All this may suggest that something is wrong with our instinctive labeling of friends and enemies as well as with our definition of both.

The time may have come to recognize that to go beyond friendship in sentiment alone, a president will do well to define U.S. interests and national priorities, and to invest political capital, time and energy in the most important issue for us, Israelis: peace with our neighbors and stability in our region.

President Obama seems to be doing just that. Unlike any recent predecessor, he took a chapter from the writings of distinguished expert practitioners -- from Bill Quandt in the 1970's to last year's manual for Arab-Israeli peace making by Daniel Kurtzer, accentuating the importance of year one in a first term and the need to spell out U.S. interests in a clear and balanced way -- and made it a reality.

Indeed, in his first 150 days in office, the Obama administration has sent an unambiguous message---and got everyone's attention: "we take this thing seriously and are determined to make a difference."

I am not privy to the thinking of all leaders in the region, but those who matter most seem to have gotten the message. For some (e.g. Presidents Abbas and Mubarak) it is most reassuring; for others (first and foremost Prime Minister Netanyahu), quite troubling. Indeed, having ignored messages regarding expectations delivered by Congressmen and other U.S. visitors, and having chosen to follow in-house advice to the contrary, Netanyahu went to Washington equipped with the traditional talking points, designed to score points, rather than with a blueprint for a grand deal adequate to the Obama vision.

He blew the first meeting, but it is certainly not too late. The foundation for a solid U.S.-Israel alliance is there; the issues are not likely to evaporate; and the two leaders are destined to work with each other for some time to come.

Conversely, having made a settlement freeze the prerequisite for a regional strategy, Washington needs to realize that the change in Netanyahu's position was easier and faster to accomplish than may have been assumed: he seems to already be where the administration had wanted him. Further threats and pressures are not likely to produce better results. Worse yet, they may prove counterproductive in solidifying Israeli domestic opposition and in sending the wrong signal to neighbors who may freeze in the hope that Washington will do their job.

It is time to strike a deal.

While Netanyahu is victim to previous Israeli governments (including his own) misusing "natural growth" as cover for settlements' expansion and for establishing new ones as extensions of old, he seems ripe for an honest definition of the term. Let the two sides establish a clear demarcation of the build-up areas of existing settlements within the blocks; let them agree upon - and closely monitor -- the halt of construction beyond those boundaries; and let outposts' removal be implemented in a swift and irreversible way.

Such a genuine freeze will accomplish four objectives: it is doable for the Netanyahu administration; it sends the right signal to the Arab world; it ends the 'creeping annexation' (should peace also evade the current administrations in Jerusalem and Washington); and it can unleash the administration's broader regional strategy.

As a freeze is a prerequisite for reciprocal moves by the main Arab players; as those moves are essential in signaling to us, Israelis, that promises of post-peace normalization are for real; as broad public support is important in encouraging, and if need be pressing our government to move farther in taking the risks for peace; as a dynamic peace process is essential for solidifying a broad regional coalition in facing Iran on the one hand and holding the Palestinian hand on the other, better to have that deal than to keep on fighting for an elusive better one.

Conversely, continued bickering and further delay of stabilizing measures may doom prospects for the new U.S. regional structure. Suffice is to consider the consequences of yet another round of bloodshed in the Israel-Hamas context, to appreciate the need for swift action (and a more nuanced approach to intra-Palestinian dynamics).

Finally, the Obama-Netanyahu grand deal should include one more component; the one Netanyahu rightfully accentuates most: enabling Israel to be the 'fly on the wall' in the emerging U.S.-Iran dialogue. While Israel's low profile and utmost discretion are essential for any prospect of success, the promise of full partnership in consultations and briefings may go a long way.