An Israeli View: Bibi's rival

Israel's relations with the Palestinian Authority combine security cooperation with diplomatic warfare. While the West Bank is relatively calm and its economy is growing, bitter rivalry prevails at the political level. The mutual dislike and mistrust between Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas was clearly visible in the failed New York summit imposed upon them by American President Barack Obama last month.

Netanyahu's predecessors, Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert, portrayed Abbas as the "good Palestinian", a moderate leader who rejects violence and a more convenient interlocutor than the bad guys, Yasser Arafat and Hamas. During Olmert's reign, Abbas was the most frequent foreign visitor to the prime minister's residence in Jerusalem. All this ended when Netanyahu took office six months ago. Bibi views Abbas not as a peace partner but as a diehard adversary of the state of Israel.

A senior Israeli official told me that Abbas is responsible for the anti- Israel campaign abroad and called the Palestinian president "a certified Holocaust denier"--referring to Abbas' 1982 PhD dissertation in which he doubted the number of Jews murdered by the Nazis. While the story is well known, it is no coincidence that it was raised from the ashes at a time when at the top of Netanyahu's PR agenda is the fight against Holocaust denial. It undermines Abbas' legitimacy, equating him with Israel's arch-rival, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinezhad.

Politically, Netanyahu and Abbas promote opposing agendas. Abbas demands a deal on all outstanding issues based on the 1967 borders, while Netanyahu wants to preserve the territorial status quo under the guise of "economic peace", a "bottom-up process" or a "demilitarized Palestinian state" within unspecified borders.

From an Israeli perspective, Abbas has committed two mistakes: rejecting Olmert's September 2008 proposal, which went further than any previous Israeli final-status blueprint; and giving an arrogant interview last May to Jackson Diehl of The Washington Post in which Abbas pledged to sit tight until Obama pushes Netanyahu out of office. This was a boon for Netanyahu--the ultimate evidence that Abbas is a hopeless rejectionist committed to the "right of return" who will never compromise. Israeli public opinion, when it bothers to think of Abbas at all, views him as a figurehead who is kept in his powerless Ramallah office by Israeli bayonets. Netanyahu pays no domestic political price for shrugging him off.

Netanyahu played the same trick as Sharon did in 2001. Both opposed a final- status deal that would strip Israel of its control over the West Bank and East Jerusalem, yet were able to portray the Palestinian leaders--Arafat at Camp David, Abbas in his negotiations with Olmert--as naysayers. This "no partner" policy generates priceless domestic fruits as it facilitates a virtual consensus behind the right-wing prime minister's position and quells the left -wing opposition.

The Palestinians exploit their advantage in the arena of UN and global public opinion as a balancing act against Israel's military superiority and alliance with America. Previous Israeli governments accepted as a fact of life the duality of talking peace and security cooperation while sparring diplomatically. Netanyahu, who began his career as Israel's UN ambassador and top TV propagandist abroad, does not. Along with Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, Netanyahu has launched a policy of "diplomatic activism" aimed at counterattacking the Palestinians in their home base: the media and multilateral forums.

The first test for the new policy was the Goldstone report on Israel's "Operation Cast Lead" last January in Gaza, which chided Israel for alleged war crimes. The report, commissioned by the UN Human Rights Council, was a public relations disaster for Israel, portraying it as a brutal police state led by war criminals and committing grave crimes against humanity. Netanyahu decided to fight back, targeting Abbas. Israel accused the Palestinian leader of doublespeak: even as he is kept in power by Israel's security organs, he asks the UN to indict his protectors as war criminals.

Backed by a combination of direct threats and American-supported diplomatic maneuvers, Israel demanded that Abbas hold off on initiating UN follow-up proceedings to the Goldstone report. This succeeded beyond expectations: Abbas backed off from the UN discussion, in effect deferring the Goldstone follow- up. But then Abbas became the target of a backlash, as Hamas and other political opponents accused him of bowing to Israel's will.

The response came several days later, when the PA led a diplomatic counteroffensive over Jerusalem. Citing plans of right-wing Jewish extremists to visit the Temple Mount during Sukkot, the PA prompted Washington and Amman to pressure Netanyahu to forgo a visit to Silwan and to keep Jewish visitors away from the Muslim holy shrines. The feared explosion of violence was prevented, at least for now.

But the diplomatic fighting goes on. Israel now demands that during peace negotiations, Abbas refrain from acting against it in multilateral bodies and international courts. For Netanyahu, this represents a proper "code of conduct". The Palestinians, naturally, refuse to forego this trump card vis-a -vis Israel. In addition, Netanyahu plans to counterattack the global network of pro-Palestinian NGOs that is leading the campaign to delegitimize and boycott Israel. By holding Abbas responsible for their actions, even if indirectly, Netanyahu would use Israel's considerable leverage over the PA to restrain these anti-Israel activists.

While obviously preferable to violence and bloodshed, this diplomatic cat and mouse maneuver ensures that even when negotiations resume, they risk becoming a blame game rather than a vehicle for mutual trust and understanding.

- Published 12/10/2009 © bitterlemons.org

This column is re-printed with the permission of bitterlemons.org