An Israeli View: A Critical absence of urgency

On the thirteenth anniversary of the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, at a memorial ceremony on Mt. Herzl in early November 2008, then-PM Ehud Olmert delivered one of his last speeches in office. He sought to leave the mark of his vision regarding the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the solution required by the state of Israel.

Olmert spoke directly and courageously about the need to divide the land and return to "the core territory of the state of Israel prior to 1967, with adjustments mandated by the reality created" since then. He underlined the need for international recognition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state that is divesting itself of the burden of occupation and does not consider the West Bank and Gaza Strip to be part of its future territory. Olmert mentioned the compromises that Israel would have to implement regarding Jerusalem too, and reiterated his belief that only an agreement that guarantees two states to the two peoples would enable Israel to maintain its legitimacy as a Jewish and democratic state.

The prime minister's speech was delivered a few weeks prior to elections, in the twilight of his government's tenure and after he had announced his resignation. It was already fairly certain that Binyamin Netanyahu would reoccupy the prime minister's office within months. At this time, negotiations between the Fateh leadership and Olmert and his entourage over a permanent status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians had also ended. Early on in these negotiations, in view of the Fateh-Hamas schism and the reality in Gaza, there was a general sense on both sides that these talks that had begun after the Annapolis conference were theoretical, almost academic in nature, and that ultimately they could produce no more than a "shelf agreement" that both sides would be hard put to get their publics to ratify and implement.

Recent interviews granted by Olmert and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas reflect the changes that have been registered in the Israeli position since the previous attempt to reach a final status agreement, between PM Ehud Barak and President Yasser Arafat at Camp David in 2000. According to Olmert, Israel agreed to withdraw from and turn over to a Palestinian state some 93.5-93.7 percent of the West Bank and to apply the principle of territorial swaps to 5.8 percent.

One particularly sensitive issue on which the two sides registered progress was Jerusalem. The proposal discussed would render the Holy Basin area non-sovereign and administered jointly by Israelis, Palestinians, Saudis, Jordanians and Americans. Olmert agreed that Israel would absorb a larger number of 1948 refugees than mentioned in the past, though still within the framework of a compromise that would effectively prevent the right of return of Palestinians to sovereign Israeli territory and facilitate the return of most of them to the Palestinian state.

In order for these negotiations to have succeeded, the two sides would have needed three key missing elements or components. The first is time: shortly after the beginning of the Annapolis talks Olmert was caught up in proceedings to remove him from office; by the time of the outbreak of the war in Gaza in late December 2008 the talks had ended. Both sides continue to argue that time ran out and that a few more months of talks might have produced a complete and detailed agreement.

But time was not the only missing factor; both sides were also lacking the necessary political capacity. Olmert arrived at the negotiating table as acting prime minister and without significant political support from the Israeli public. After the disappearance from the scene of Ariel Sharon, followed by the Second Lebanon War, it was hard to conceal Olmert's lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the Israeli public; at times his approval rating was as low as three percent. Under these circumstances, the Palestinians understood that even if they attain a far-reaching agreement with the Israeli leadership, the likelihood that Olmert would get the approval of the Israeli public and win the battle with the Israeli right wing led by Netanyahu was slim.

For their part, the Palestinians entered the negotiations divided geographically and politically, with the Fateh-Hamas rivalry generating bloodshed and near-civil war. Thus even had Abbas committed to a peace agreement that comprises the Gaza Strip, the actual chances of implementing such a deal were also slim.

The third component missing from the negotiating process was boldness. During the short time a window of opportunity was open, the two sides failed to take the obvious extra step and agree to the final concessions needed for a deal. The sense generated by remarks made after the talks ended is that there was a readiness on both sides, even the courage to go far, but there was also a hesitation to finalize an agreement and test the publics' readiness to approve it. Despite the pressure of time, the two sides seemed to detach their negotiations from external realities and did not seem pressed to make a decisive move.

Conceivably, it was the absence of an American role in these direct bilateral negotiations that eliminated a sense of pressure and a sense of commitment on both sides to close the deal. Sometimes without such external pressure, and in view of the fact that the atmosphere and preliminary declarations generated by Annapolis fell on such willing ears, the leaders simply do not have a sense of urgency about making painful decisions and ending the conflict.

After this latest round of negotiations, the Israeli and Palestinian peace camps feel frustrated and disappointed. If Abbas and Olmert did not succeed in reaching agreement, it is doubtful that their successors will find more congenial partners for making a better deal.

Published 29/6/2009 © bitterlemons.org

This column is re-printed with the permission of bitterlemons.org