An Israeli View: Try including Hamas

Hamas represents a significant segment of Palestinian society, which is basically conservative and religious. It is difficult to ascertain accurately how large this segment is. In the January 2006 elections, 44.45 percent voted for the Hamas list. That percentage was composed of hardcore supporters along with floating votes that change their voting patterns frequently. In the last PSR survey, Hamas was supported by 33 percent of those surveyed. It can be assumed that at least a third of the Palestinians generally support Hamas and its policies--a level of support that cannot be ignored.

This implies that, first, it is doubtful whether any Palestinian leader would be capable of concluding a permanent status agreement with Israel without Hamas. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, for example, could not conclude an agreement with Israeli PM Ehud Olmert last year because he was not capable of making the necessary concessions on sensitive issues, such as resolution of the refugee problem, knowing that a formidable political adversary would use his concessions against him. Concessions can be made only from a position of political strength.

Second, even if an agreement is concluded, Hamas can play the spoiler and prevent implementation. This argument became particularly valid after the Hamas military takeover of Gaza in 2007. Thus, no Israel-PLO agreement can be implemented in Gaza, and Hamas can use its control to initiate military escalation and prevent implementation even in the West Bank. There is also grave concern in Israel that any withdrawal from the West Bank would lead sooner or later to a Hamas takeover there, at which point the agreement would be worthless.

Third, with this level of support Hamas is not going to disappear soon. The current paradigm adopted by the government of Israel after the 2006 Hamas electoral victory, combining economic pressure on Gaza with support for the Abbas government in the West Bank, is failing. The level of support for Hamas has decreased only in a limited way; actually, support for Hamas increased again in the West Bank after the recent fighting in Gaza. Anyway, these fluctuations in political support for Hamas have no real effect on the robustness of its control over Gaza.

This explains why including Hamas in the political process is quite essential. But is it also feasible? I would argue that, since it joined the Palestinian domestic arena, Hamas has shown a clear interest in being included in the political process; this interest was only strengthened when Hamas won the 2006 elections, thereby itself becoming the government. This is reflected in the prisoners' document and the Hamas-Fateh agreement that allowed the establishment of a national unity government. Both sanction negotiations with Israel, to be carried out by President Abbas.

Then too, Hamas offers the idea of a long-term armistice ("hudna") with Israel. This became the movement's official position when Khalid Mishaal, Hamas political bureau chief, said in a speech on June 25 that Hamas supports the establishment of a Palestinian state along the 1967 lines, with Jerusalem as its capital and a solution of the refugee problem based on the right of return.

This is the basic PLO negotiating stand, though it differs with some current PLO positions. For Hamas it brings about an armistice, not an end of conflict. During negotiations with Israel, the PLO also agreed on interpretations and implementation mechanisms for these principles that Hamas does not adhere to, such as a swap between limited-size settlement blocs and Israeli territories to be transferred to the Palestinian state, as well as practical solutions to the refugee problem that would allow only a small number to return to Israel.

Hamas' positions can be interpreted in two ways. Proponents of engagement of Hamas would argue that they indicate acceptance by Hamas of the two-state solution--in effect, this is Hamas' way of climbing down from its ideological tree. Hamas needs time and proof of success of the two-state solution to modify its ideology any further. Opponents of engagement would argue that this is a tactical move by Hamas aimed at gaining recognition by the West and eventually bringing about an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, yet without giving up its ideological principles and while maintaining the option of resuming the war with Israel later.

These two alternative interpretations lead to the last question: does including Hamas in the political process serve Israeli interests? My answer would be that it is worth trying as long as it means including Hamas but not replacing the current Palestinian partners in the process. Only Hamas participation will enable us to determine whether it has really reconciled with the two-state solution, at which point it is better to realize that solution with Hamas included and supportive.

At first, Hamas will probably prefer to stand on the sidelines and let the PLO negotiate with Israel. But it could later be drawn into more active participation, depending on the political situation in the PA and the nature of the relationship between the two rival Palestinian political camps.

Published 6/7/2009 © bitterlemons.org

This column is re-printed with the permission of bitterlemons.org