Lebanon: Pol. Tensions Heighten as the Parl. Elections Approach

The tension between the two major Lebanese political blocks has been on the rise during the few weeks preceding the Parliamentary elections--scheduled to take place on June 7th. Similarly, the tone of the political debate has become progressively more confrontational, as the main political coalitions--the March 14 forces and the Hezbollah-led March 8 opposition--find themselves in sharp disagreement over key foreign policy and domestic issues.

Over the last few months, the parties were involved in a national reconciliation process to resolve their differences, but to no avail. In particular, the two blocks failed to reach an accord over the establishment of a common defense strategy, falling short of agreeing on the regulation of armed militias and "resistance" groups. On this regard March 14 leaders have been promoting the idea of disarming all militias and armed groups alike, including the Iranian-backed Hezbollah; a proposal that is categorically dismissed by all opposition forces.[i] Similarly, the two camps are still strongly divided on how to relate to Syria; with the March 8 forces urging to improve political ties between the two countries and pushing to improve security coordination,[ii] and the March 14 coalition being more cautious against boosting Lebanese-Syrian relations.

In this sense, the two political coalition do present a dramatically different political platform and vision for the country; thus raising both the parties' stakes in winning the elections, as well as the chances for political tensions or violent clashes. As explained by Hezbollah's Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on December 18, 2008: "The next parliamentary election is not about seats for the majority and seats for the minority. Rather, it is about political options over which the parties differ. (...) [w]e stress the need for permanent readiness to build a strong army, a strong resistance, and a strong people to resist the Israeli occupation and threat, to reject the settlement [of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon], and to work persistently to confront the challenges that Israel imposes thorough its aggression on Lebanon.[iii]"   

Similarly, the international community has understood the greater political significance of Lebanon's elections, both at the local as well as at the regional level, and it has consequently invested significant political and financial capital in supporting the two political coalitions. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have been investing funds to support the political campaign (and the buying of votes) of, respectively, March 14 and March 8 forces.[iv] Over the last week, Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejhad has openly expressed his confidence in Hezbollah's victory, adding that this result will strengthen the resistance path and shift the regional balance of power.[v] Western supporters of March 14 forces, including the United States, have also been voicing concern over the potential impact of a Hezbollah victory, emphasizing how the political course chosen by Lebanon could be a watershed  political event that will shape regional politics.[vi]

The highly polarized political arena, together with the international pressure exerted on Lebanon increase the potential for internal frictions and clashes among the existing sectarian-political groups. Furthermore, an additional element that further contributes to enhancing the degree of uncertainty and the level of domestic tension is the extreme ambiguity over the elections results. Although both coalitions have been equally ensuring they will "triumph" in the June elections; it is however clear that the two political blocks will in fact be separated by only a small number of votes.

The Lebanese electoral system has a confessional basis, according to which each ethnic-religious community within Lebanon is assigned a number of fixed seats, with the Christian and Muslim sectors of the population allocated the same quota of seats. In the upcoming elections, Sunni votes will be largely distributed within March 14 forces, while the Shia ones are pre-assigned to the March 8 coalition. In this context, the Christian vote (traditionally split among both camps) will play a decisive role in shaping the electoral results-but it will be very hard to anticipate how these votes will be distributed and which political camp will prevail.

Additionally, electoral predictions are further complicated by one of Lebanon's most pervasive voting patterns: vote-buying.  Lebanon's anti-corruption record is in fact particularly weak when it comes to preserving the integrity of elections, as virtually all political parties are engaged in buying votes. Among the reasons why vote-buying is extremely widespread in Lebanon is the fact that the country does not rely on unified, pre-printed ballots, leaving parties the right to distribute their own pre-printed ballots to "clients" and supporters-making it relatively easy to ensure that the money invested in buying votes does not go to waste.[vii]

In the past two elections (2000 and 2005), the electoral results were also skewed by the existing demarcation of electoral districts, established in the years Syrian "tutelage" and based on gerrymandering to favor pro-Syrian candidates.[viii] The 2009 elections, however, will be held according to the newly approved electoral law, which replaces the 14 Syrian-based districts with 26 smaller administrative districts, established on the basis of the 1960 electoral law.[ix] This reform will likely make seat allocation more proportional and representative, as it will prevent occurrences of one political group winning with a narrow majority all the seats in a large electoral district, thus leaving the other groups under-represented.[x] Although this reform represents an important step toward a more efficient electoral system, the law also contains a series of core flaws, such as the failure to address the question of how to move beyond confessional politics-which still represents one of the major sources of internal inter-ethnic strife.

In sum, as the electoral date approaches and both the political debate within Lebanon and the degree of international pressure intensify, the fragmented nature of the Lebanese society and the confessional nature of the political system contribute to increasing the chances for the elections to be disputed by the losing faction, a possibility that could easily escalate into an armed clash among different groups. Preventing this occurrence will be the first key political challenge for the winning coalition. 

[i]  Agence France Presse, March 2, 2009 (Available at LexisNexis)

[ii] The Daily Star, November 12, 2008. (Available at LexisNexis)

[iii] Lebanese National News Agency Website, December 18, 2008. (Available at LexisNexis).

[iv] [iv]Robert Wrigh, "Foreign Money Seeks to Buy Lebanese Votes," The New York Times, April 23, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/world/middleeast/23lebanon.html?_r=1

[v] As-Safir, May 29, 2009. http://www.assafir.com/Article.aspx?EditionId=1246&ChannelId=28734&ArticleId=2793&Author=%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF+%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%84

[vi] Mark Landler, "Clinton Says Moderation Is Lebanon's Best Hope," The New York Times, April 26, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/world/middleeast/27diplo.html

[vii] Robert Wrigh, "Foreign Money Seeks to Buy Lebanese Votes," The New York Times, April 23, 2009.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/world/middleeast/23lebanon.html?scp=1&sq=Foreign%20Money%20Seeks%20to%20Buy%20Lebanese%20Votes,%EF%BF%BD%20&st=cse

[viii] Doreen Khoury, "Lebanon's Election Law: A Cup Half Full," The Daily Star, October 10, 2008. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=96630

[ix] International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), "The Lebanese Electoral System," March 2009. http://www.scribd.com/doc/14792510/Lebanese-Electoral-System

[x] "Assessment of the Election Framework," Democracy Reporting International and Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections, December 2008.