Nimrod Novik on Talks Between Hamas and Fatah, Israel and the Palestinians

Steven Spiegel - Do you think there will be some kind of unity government? Are these talks proceeding long enough to mean that there is a change?

Nimrod Novik – There is an opportunity for a unity government, which doesn’t mean there is an opportunity for unity. To establish a joint government will not be a precedent, we have had that before. Before it collapsed, but it did not entail real unity between the two entities that if one wants to be optimistic is a long way off. Unity between the two involves – and this is probably the most difficult part of it all – what Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) likes to call “one weapon, one authority.” For Hamas to accept Fatah authority or P.A. authority over the forces in Gaza is not something that at the moment is in the cards. Worse yet, even though Khaled Mashaal did sign with Abu Mazen in Doha, the agreement is not the first one that has been signed. You find opposition to the same agreement not only if Fatah, but much more so in Hamas where people in Gaza don’t see eye-to eye with those who are now leaving Damascus.

When you say people in Gaza you mean, Hamas in Gaza?

Yes, Hamas officials in Gaza. The rift between the two wings of Hamas has become far more pronounced since the Damascus wing lost its base, and lost much of its power. The Gazans in turn felt more emboldened that they were the ones who shoulder the responsibility, who have faced Israel, so to speak, and who feel that they must have a greater say in Hamas politics. When they see Khaled Mashaal changing policy – like his declarations a few weeks ago that he is putting on hold the armed struggle, or deciding Haniyeh, the senior official from Gaza, will no longer be the Palestinian Prime Minister, which he was when the previous unity government was formed – that is not something they take lightly and they seem to feel that they are in a position to challenge Damascus, the outsiders so to speak, the ‘Diaspora Hamas,’ on these issues. It is not just that Hamas and Fatah are finding it very difficult to bridge differences— it is within each that you have problems that are not likely to allow real unity to emerge anytime soon.

There is a lot of talk about Hamas changing its stripes. Is Hamas trying to change its stripes? There is lots of discussion in the press, the media and certainly in the blogosphere. First of all, is it true? And if someone is trying to change their stripes it sounds like the old Damascus crowd, which was seen as the most radical that is actually is trying to become more moderate than the Gaza Hamas. Is that accurate?

If we take public statements at face value than that is the situation. If we scratch the surface, I think we will find other explanations for what we hear. Yes, it was Haniyeh who led the more moderate wing for a long time until the last weeks or couple months, when he suddenly became far more belligerent in his statements. I think this is a tactical move concerning intra-Hamas politics rather than a change of strategy of Hamas. I think the strategy of Hamas has been evolving even before the so called “Arab Spring,” even before they found themselves in a very tough spot when Iran demanded that they stand with Assad and their identity and they chose not to follow that all the way, having to evacuate from Damascus. They have been evolving way before that, gradually changing their position, not going all the way to accepting the three conditions of the international community, Quartet, Israel etc. But sliding in that direction, by ending that armed struggle, again in various phases and by accepting Palestinian state on the borders of 1967 within a long term, interim agreement. Long term for them, they were talking 20 to 40 years. We have seen evidence of that for a long time. Today it is even more so, given that they find that the mother organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, now faces the responsibility of having to run Egypt, with 85 million people who need to be fed every day. Suddenly, it is changing its tone on the likelihood of peace with Israel. They realize the Muslim Brotherhood is in no mood for Hamas to get them into trouble with Israel, so on the one hand their mother organization is on the rise throughout the Arab World, and on the other this carries with it some burden of responsibilities.

How do you explain Haniyeh turning to be more hawkish?

I believe Haniyeh was looking for a way to distinguish himself from the Khaled Mashaal crowd and thought that perhaps that as Mashaal had lost favor in Iran, he might be the one that would get the dollar loaded suitcases from Tehran.  So he is trying to out-maneuver and switch roles with Khaled Mashaal as a tactical way to survive politically.

I am wondering who is in favor of this unity? Is it unity with Haniyeh or is unity with the Damascus crowd?

It is like asking who is in favor of a permanent status agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians. The negotiations that took place in Amman—What you had was that those engaged in those negotiations had no illusion that this would lead to a deal. However, they had reasons that forced them to sit at the table and pretend to be doing the real thing. While they were planning the blame game from the outset, each was looking at which one would walk away from the table, being blamed by the witnesses for having caused a failure. You had the Palestinian street in both Gaza and the West Bank affected by the so-called “Arab Spring” and blaming their miserable situation for intra-Palestinian rivalries. They think they will not be able to stand up to the Israeli occupation and roll it back as long as the two are divided. They want to see unity and therefore are thinking of an election at any time, being it in 2012 or beyond. The two sides need to show the public it is not them who are to blame for the absence of unity, so they keep propelling this illusion of unity, they keep taking steps that don’t go as far as violating the red lines that make one or the other, subservient to the other.

Salam Fayyad is going to lose his job in this whole arrangement, isn’t he?

Salam Fayyad is prepared to lose his job. He may emerge as a deputy prime minister. He may be the minister of finance, nobody knows. He may resent it all and just walk away. I don’t think anyone knows exactly how it will play out.

You are the long-time president of the ECF, the Economic Cooperation Foundation; it is a lot more than economics, it gets involved in many activities especially with the Palestinians. What is all of this going to lead to? Will it lead to the end of American aid, lead to Israelis holding back tax-revenue, what is going to happen here? I understand that the Palestinian public may believe the best way to elections and to confront the Israelis is to have a unity government, but in the international context it may be the best way for them to take a major step backwards. What do you think?

I rarely dare to predict about the past, let alone the future. Let me make a comment about it without trying to predict what will happen, just to try and perhaps shed some light, on what are Abu Mazen’s motivations when he goes that way. Abu Mazen found himself corned, by the fact that the peace process was yielding him no dividends; the Gilad Shalit deal was the crowing jewel of that reality from his perspective. Here Hamas is being rewarded for kidnapping an Israeli solider, by getting the release of over 1,000 prisoners. His security cooperation with Israel, which is exemplarily, is not being rewarded by anything. He started to create options for himself and to open up options. One option was that he started to internationalize, go to the UN, go to UNESCO, he didn’t anticipate the harsh reaction, certainly from Congress or Washington and Congress in particular. He was stunned by some of the results, but he felt that he had no alternative if he wanted to show his constituency that he was doing something. It will not produce a Palestinian state, but it may produce some national pride, recognition, whatever. Then came this finding that Khaled Mashaal was an opportunity to open up another option. Now if I am Abu Mazen I am faced with three options: “I can go international, I can go bilateral with the Israelis if they are serious, or I can go with Hamas and do domestic unity.” In striking the deal with Mashaal he was very careful, trying to square several circles. The least of which is not to create a Hamas-Fatah government with which the international community will not deal. But to create a government of technocrats, that is acceptable to Hamas and Fatah. If that was not enough he agreed to stand at the head of the government so the international community has someone that they know and trust. The conventional wisdom here in the region is 2012 will not see a serious peace process and the question of those who are still engaged is how do we create an alternative to the peace process that keeps options open for the morning after when the U.S. is back from lunch, when the Israeli elections are over perhaps, that options are not foreclosed, that the bilateral relations between Israel and the Palestinians do not slide into an eruption of violence again. How can we identify some measures that can be enough for Abu Mazen to stay at the table and not too costly for Netanyahu to refuse to go for it? Everyone is working on it right now. I am sure you are all familiar on two of these, two clusters of such measures. One was the Quartet decision to bring the parties to the table to talk about border security first.

That is the Jordan talks?

That is the basis for the talks, thus far. They produced some progress (I will talk about these in a second), but in my judgment the biggest mistake was they chose the wrong issue, as long as that issue was in isolation. As long there was no ‘safety-net,’ for that issue. As long as that issue is not accompanied by smaller measures that can be implemented concurrent with the continuation of the negotiations. Borders and security first to me perceive as the political horizon, something to keep on talking about, keep on making progress if you do, if you don’t you don’t you keep on talking. While at the same time you implement certain measures on the ground, that help the Palestinians stay at the table, that improves life in the territories that contributes to state building from the bottom up, that everybody claims to be supporting, that Salam Fayyad claims, that Netanyahu is on the record supporting. But that was missing; the only thing that was the agenda was that in three months you guys should put a map on the table. Now the moment you pronounce that you also announce the date of the funeral of this process, because there is no way in the world that in 2012 Prime Minister Netanyahu can put a map on the table. For if he puts a map, that is real for the peace process he doesn’t have a coalition. If he has a map that accommodates his coalition, he doesn’t have a peace process. That reality should have been clear to everybody. It shouldn’t be supported by clutches to walk on, I don’t know how many of you have seen the very good article Dennis Ross in the Washington Post, when he suggested the menu of steps Israel should do. The menu was very good; it was something the administration has been trying to do for 2.5 years without much success. But again he too presented it in isolation from the rest of the context of the situation. Again, Prime Minister Netanyahu is not in a charitable mood of making unilateral gestures. Somebody should have taken Dennis Ross’ menu of gestures of Israel to the Palestinians, add to them a menu of Palestinian commitments to, and make that into a safety-net for talking about borders and security. First, to allow those negotiations to continue for the rest of the year and perhaps into 2013, until the environment is different for a peace process. This was not done. I know the people who are working on it as we speak, trying to remedy, to create a context that would allow those negotiations in Amman to proceed.

Which people are working on it, can you tell us?

Tony Blair is working on it, our Prime Minister’s office is working on it, the Mahmoud Abbas team is working on it, the Egyptian team which is entrusted in supporting the peace process is working on it, and Washington is certainly in the picture.

Let me talk about the negotiations in Amman. They drew too much attention, Netanyahu representative in Amman, Molcho, while unable to present a map for the reasons I suggested earlier, did present principles in which a map could be based. In those principles, he went farther than Netanyahu ever did until that point. Now, he did not go as far as Ehud Olmert or perhaps as far as Ehud Barak would like, but he went farther than Netanyahu ever did in primarily two areas: One, in defining Israel’s future borders in terms that are associated with the fence, which is everything outside of the fence will not belong, will not be Israeli sovereignty. That is not enough, but for a beginning of a Netanyahu negotiating team it is interesting. Second, he is no longer asking for sovereignty along the Jordan River, he didn’t even ask for Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley. He spoke of an Israeli military security presence along the Jordan River, which is a far narrower definition, and the terms did not preclude the possibility that the Israeli security presence along the Jordan River would be within an international force.

In other words we have some positive indications, but basically what you are saying is to expect more of the same in Gaza, in the West Bank and in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Is that fair?

Yes, it is.

Note: This phone conference took place on February 8, 2012.