An Outline of Suggestions for U.S. Policy Following Israel's Elections

The U.S. and the Israeli setting: The Coming Week:

• The Administration can choose to await the outcome of the Israeli elections (in terms of coalition formation) and live with the consequences or try to affect them.
• Absent a Deus ex machina, Bibi Netanyahu seems boxed into securing a Right-Extreme Right coalition first (within 7 days, while President Peres is prohibited from launching 'consultations') in order to force the president's hand into empowering him to form the government.
• Commitments made in pursuit of the endorsement may not evaporate the morning after. While the focused and experienced Avigdor Lieberman may seek vague commitments on matters of principle and clear ones on portfolios, the ideological Right will demand ruling out territorial concessions (anywhere), settlement freeze, outpost removal and the like.
• Once Bibi makes those commitments, Kadima and Labor may not be able to join his coalition.
• The alternative, a Bibi led Likud-Kadima based coalition, requires Livni to yield without trying. For if she tries through presidential consultations, Bibi is boxed...etc.
• As our political system in Israel is known to prove more creative than this amateur observer, the dilemma between the two coalitions may outlive the presidential decision on whom to empower to form the coalition, thus will be with us for the ensuing 42 days.
• External intervention may help Livni do what she may realize is unavoidable anyway and help Bibi do what he needs: form a broad centrist coalition rather than be blackmailed into an impossible policy by every coalition partner of 4-5 MKs.
• It takes a couple of public statements and a few private phone calls from Washington to send the message and serve as the external ladder for Israeli leaders to do what they know they should but are too weak to initiate on their own.
• Gen. Jones' (2/24) and Hillary Clinton's (3/2) visits may be most timely for that.

Assuming:

•  A Right-Extreme Right coalition:
  • Externally, it will try to present an agenda whereby all peace efforts are to be placed on 'hold' until:
    
    • tranquility is secured;
    • institution building and reform are completed;
    • economic development strengthens the moderates;
    • and, in general, the Palestinians get their act together and can be considered a viable partner.
  • Internally it will try to shift the focus to the domestic agenda accentuating the economy and (the now very popular) electoral reform. Yet, the accent on the economy is likely to fly in the face of pressures on the budget typical of narrow coalitions (where Shas demands welfare programs and the ideological Right seeks funds for settlements).
  • It will go back to the 'good old days' of creeping annexation via settlement expansion.
  • As the globe is unlikely to agree to stop revolving, this coalition will face violent expressions of frustration and/or intra-Palestinian competition over 'occupation resistance', which will be dealt with firmly & harshly. It will generate & be vulnerable to external pressure.
  • For internal (i.e. budget) and external reasons it is likely to be short-lived.
  • However short-lived, it will leave its successor an even messier situation

• A Likud (led)- Kadima based coalition:
  • Will be more likely to succeed on the same domestic agenda;
  • Will be more amenable to - and able to deliver on - a slow but progressive peace process.
  • Will be particularly open to pursuing a deal with Syria; will not offer much give on the Palestinians; but will cooperate with 'strengthening the moderates'; and be careful with settlements' expansion.

Consequently:

• Assuming the U.S. seeks to mark a departure with the past in signaling that it no longer pursues peace in the Middle East as a favor to the natives, but as a U.S. strategic interest, this must be clearly articulated from the outset.
• Here too, the upcoming Jones and Clinton visits of the coming weeks will be carefully watched by all, those forming the next Israeli administration included.
• They need to hear that a pro-active engagement entails important security (and other) rewards, but there is no free lunch: the benign approach to commitment violation is over; the U.S. is going to monitor compliance and violators shall be subjected to potent sanctions from the U.S. diplomatic toolbox.
• The Palestinians are expected to deliver on:
  • Fighting terrorism;
  • Block weapon smuggling;
  • Institution reform - security and civilian alike;
  • National reconciliation, so as to present a central authority mandated to speak for all.
• Israel is expected to deliver on:
  • A settlement freeze, including 'natural growth';
  • An early and complete removal of unauthorized outposts;
  • Improve life on the West Bank by easing security measures.

Iran:

• The Iran issue shall be high on the agenda of any Israeli government, which will seek close coordination with Washington.
• President Obama's three conditions for normalization with Iran (no nuclear; no support for terror; no threats on Israel) can serve as the basis for such coordination.
• The Government of Israel may be amenable to a deal whereby in return for full coordination on Iran it will be more forthcoming on matters of importance to the United States government (below).
• Thus, the Mitchell mandate should include exclusivity on coordination with the Government of Israel regarding Iran.

• A substantial expansion of the Dayton program;
• Coordination with the Government of Egypt and the US Government regarding Gaza:
  • cease fire stabilization;
  • reconstruction; and
  • smuggling prevention;

• Continued negotiations with the Palestinians (obviously, with a Right-Right coalition, the US Government and the Government of Israel shall agree to disagree on the likely outcome);
• Continued negotiations with Syria;
• Willingness to explore venues for promoting the Arab Peace Initiative.

The U.S. Agenda:

• All within a U.S. agenda that involves:
  • Engaging Hamas once its commitment to non-violence is tested;
  • Presenting bridging ideas once direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are no longer fruitful;
  • Host (with Turkey) direct Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations.
  • Do it all under the umbrella of the Arab Peace Initiative.