A Palestinian View: Weakening the Islamist

The recent dramatic developments in Iran have absorbed the world for many different reasons. The US administration is hoping for an Iranian leadership that Washington can engage with because this is necessary for the new American approach to the region. The Arabs, meanwhile, especially neighboring Arab countries, are hoping for a leadership in Iran that will be less aggressive and ambitious in influencing the Arab publics and inciting people against Arab governments.

Israel is interested in seeing an end to the leadership of Mahmoud Ahmedinezhad, who has been a thorn in the side of the country. Europeans are hoping that a change might open the door to reconciliation and agreement over the nuclear issue.

When it comes to the Palestinians, it's a little more complicated. Since the Palestinians are themselves divided on almost everything, the two different Palestinian political camps have different reactions to the developments in Iran.

And while there seems little immediate or direct effect from the events in Tehran on the domestic Palestinian situation or Palestinian-Israeli relations, Tehran has nevertheless been a significant factor in recent internal Palestinian disputes. Hamas, whose leadership is hosted in Damascus, the most prominent ally of Iran, has received both material and political support from the Iranian government. When most countries in the world including some Arab governments boycotted the Hamas-led government in 2006, Iran both supported it and received many of its ministers in Tehran. Upon returning, these officials often carried suitcases filled with cash.

In addition, Israel and others have at different times accused Iran of giving equipment and military training to the Hamas resistance wing, the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades. That equipment included rockets, according to Israel, which were used in military confrontations between the two sides.

The ongoing domestic unrest in Iran does have one significant effect in both the Palestinian and Arab public domains. It distorts the image of Iran to a certain extent. The way the government has been treating protestors and the divisions in the leadership over how to contain these events weaken the argument of Islamists in the region who have been holding Iran up as a model for future anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist Islamist Arab states. As far as this issue is concerned, the damage is irreversible regardless of the outcome of the ongoing protests in Iran.

In the medium term, and in spite of the many similarities between the different competing groups in Iran, the outcome will certainly have an effect on the Iranian role in the Arab and Palestinian streets. Much of the current popularity of Iran results from the rhetoric of Mahmoud Ahmedinezhad, whose verbal attacks on Israel have wide resonance. The possible absence of both him and his rhetoric, one of the potential outcomes of the current unrest, may also reduce the popularity of Iran in Arab and Palestinian circles. A possible defeat for the hard line represented by Ahmadinezhad is certainly bad news for the Islamist political movements in Palestine and the Arab world.

For all these reasons, Palestinians and Arabs are closely following developments in Iran. And while the different trends are trying to avoid taking sides, the Iranian turmoil is already influencing public debates across the region and the outcome of the turmoil in Iran will influence the balance of power in the region.

Published 22/6/2009 © bitterlemons.org

This column is re-published with the permission of bitterlemons.org