Yes You Can, Mr. President

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2010 Must Be Showtime for Mideast Peace

Assistant Director, IPF - NY

As 2009 draws to a close, we are bombarded by the annual litany of commentary features recapping the year in Hollywood movies to the year in international conflict, and everything in between.

When it comes to the Middle East peace process, current conventional wisdom suggests the 2009 recap might go something like this: 

US-Iran Negotiations: Simulation Exercise at INSS

Ephraim Asculai, Emily B. Landau, and Tamar Malz-Ginzburg

INSS Insight No. 154, December 29, 2009

Despite the tendency to denote any simulation exercise on security issues a "war game," the recent simulation designed and held at INSS did not focus on the option of a military attack. Rather, it developed the scenario of a bilateral US-Iranian negotiation over Iran's nuclear program.

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Reading Obama Wrong

It seems to me that none of the key figures in the Israeli leadership (Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Minister of Foreign Affairs Avigdor Lieberman, or Minister of Defense Ehud Barak) "get" Barack Obama. This is no surprise. Israel was one of the only countries in the world that preferred Obama's opponents in the primaries and then in the general election. In fact, if Israelis could have chosen our President, they would have  given George W. Bush a third term. (On the other hand, 78 percent of Jewish Americans voted for Obama last November).  


I don't know why Israelis have never taken to Barack Obama. My guess is that they view him, correctly, as one of those American liberals who, given the choice, prefer diplomacy to war. This is not to say that a Bush will never choose diplomacy or that an Obama will never choose war. It is just that for Obama, war is an option only  after every other option has been exhausted. That is not how recent Israeli governments have operated.

That does not make Israel a war mongering country, but it is no peace-monger either. For instance, the recent war with Hamas might never have happened if Israel had lived up to its side of the ceasefire agreement and eased the blockade on Gaza. (Hamas almost completely stopped firing its missiles but Israel maintained the blockade).

This is a fairly typical pattern. For years, successive Israeli governments have not exerted themselves to avoid war. Even Sharon's unilateral Gaza withdrawal proves that point. If Israel wanted a peaceful Gaza, it would have negotiated withdrawal with President Abbas. Instead, it pulled out without even notifying Abbas. It was, obviously, not surprised when Hamas moved right in.

Why belabor these points? Simply to demonstrate that the Israeli government and Barack Obama do not have the same approach to handling conflict. George W. Bush was enthusiastic about the Israeli approach and gave Israel carte blanche to do whatever it wanted to do. That is except on Iran where, to his credit, he put his foot down and vetoed an Israeli attack.

In any case, while Americans are still celebrating Obama's presidency (his popularity is in the stratosphere), the government of Israel need only get over 43's departure and learn how to deal with 44. That requires understanding Barack Obama. And, so far, there is no evidence that it does. To use a phrase common in Israel,  it is time for the government to replace its hard disc--the one with all the information about how to deal with the Americans.

Once it does that, it will understand that its current modus operandi is, at best, counterproductive. At worst, it will significantly damage the U.S.-Israel relationship, eroding a friendship that took decades to cement.

Since coming to power, the new government has alternated between telling America that the U.S. approach to the two-state solution is dead and that our Iran policy soon will be. Netanyahu seems unable to utter the phrase "Palestinian state" while Lieberman flatly says that the Annapolis roadmap is a dead letter. As for Iran, Netanyahu says that he is fine with the United States pursuing diplomacy for a decent interval, but then Israel may have to attack.  He makes clear that attacking or not attacking will be his decision, as if an Israeli attack will not be viewed by the entire world as a joint U.S.-Israel venture and as if U.S. interests-including 130,000 troops in Iraq-will not be jeopardized.

But it's not as dire as it sounds. The Israeli threats are serious, but not that serious.
I do not believe they will reject the two-state solution and I expect Netanyahu will be forced to utter the dread words "Palestinian state" very soon. Nor do I think Israel would attack Iran in defiance of U.S. wishes unless it itself was under a direct and imminent threat of attack (in which case the United States would support Israel anyway).

As far as Netanyahu's latest demand-that he will only endorse the two-state solution if the Palestinians recognize Israel "as a Jewish state," it is just silly and designed only to buy time. As a U.S. official was quick to respond, "nations don't recognize other nations as anything in particular. How a nation state defines itself is the business only of the country itself."  It is also profoundly un-Israeli to depend on the Palestinians to give Israel legitimacy as a Jewish state. If Israel wants to be a "Jewish state," it will be. If it decides at some point to become the secular state of the Israelis, it can do that too.

So why this confrontational approach? Why try to appear as inflexible as possible?
Simple. It's gamesmanship. The Israeli government wants Obama to believe it is making huge concessions when it announces its acceptance of the two-state solution and follows America's lead on the Iran nuclear issue. This is an old game.

It is like Israel's oft-repeated offer to dismantle illegal settlements? That is supposed to be a "concession," for which America is supposed to be grateful. In the past, that tactic has worked and America quickly eased up on its feather-like "pressure." Of course, the illegal outposts are still there, to be offered as a concession the next time the Israeli government feels the need to keep U.S. diplomacy at bay.

In any case, Obama does not play this game. Unlike his recent predecessors, he seems to understand that he holds the cards in the U.S.-Israeli relationship. He's in his first year in office. He is incredibly popular. His party controls Congress. And American Jews are crazy about him-and not so crazy about Netanyahu and Lieberman.

The latter two can huff and puff all they want but they are not going to blow Obama's house down. And they know it.

It's a new ball game and Obama controls the ball.

Some evidence. Any previous President who might have thought to hold a White House seder would have invited the "usual suspects"-the Jewish organizational figures, legislators, and big donors who are the backbone of the status quo lobby. Obama invited his Jewish friends and staff-and not one member of the old crowd which usually represents Jews at this kind of event.

Obama wasn't "sticking it" to anybody. He simply knows the Jewish community too well (his entire career in Chicago was advanced by Jewish friends) to believe that it is represented by any one group or coalition of groups-and certainly not the "Israel is always right" establishment.

It is then no surprise that, according to a report in Yedioth Achronoth yesterday, Obama is not impressed with the tough talk coming out of Jerusalem. In fact, Rahm Emanuel is quoted as saying, "In the next four years there is going to be a permanent status arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians on the basis of two states for two peoples, and it doesn't matter to us at all who is prime minister." That is pretty much what Special Envoy George Mitchell told Netanyahu and Lieberman in Jerusalem yesterday. The United States is committed to the two-state solution and to implementing it very soon. It has no intention of debating it with Avigdor Lieberman or anyone else.

So Israel needs to stop with the threats and treat Obama as the most significant ally Israel has in the world. In the end, assuming Obama hangs tough, Israel will be closer to both peace and real security than if it stays on the path to collision with its ally and arsenal. The worst mistake its leaders could make is to assume that they can strong-arm the new President. They can't, so long as he is popular with the American people and understands his own strength. 

Lyndon Johnson famously told his staff that he had two years after the largest landslide in U.S. history to implement Medicare, Civil Rights, Voting Rights and his other top priorities. He figured that after that, he might not have the "juice" to put over his program. So he got it all done in those first two years and, two years later when he was much weakened by Vietnam, he had already transformed America.

Obama should follow that model and wrap up an agreement by 2011.

As for Israel, it will have to trust America. Isn't that what allies are supposed to do?

 

 

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Comments

Improbability and the Art of Zero Risk Diplomacy

  

Israelis have no predilection for war, though as you have pointed out, serious errors of judgment have been made in recent years in the decision making process regarding military intervention.

In contrast to what is written here though, I would suggest that one must view the Israeli position today in the light of one major factor: the general consensus in Israel that the events surrounding the cause of Intefada Al Aqsa point very clearly -and ominously- to the Palestinian leadership itself as deeply involved in premeditated planning, execution, endorsement and financing of the conflict at the time. In previous articles you have described how, when the peace process with the Palestinians was most advanced it all fell apart in 2000. And while inexcusable settlement activity was not curbed and the matter of Jerusalem and the refugees still remained a troubling problem, it was unfathomable then (as it still is today) that there was a casus belli for literally abandoning the Oslo process and resorting to a violent uprising inherent in the actions of Palestinian leadership back in 2000. When, later, documented proof came to light of the above, the Israeli left found itself ideologically bankrupt and this partly explains why it has fizzled into a remnant of its former self these last few years. Likewise the rise of Hamas in Gaza is less the product of Sharon's unwillingness to negotiate with Abbas and more an indication of the highly volatile and unpredictable nature of Palestinian national aspirations as they evolve. Any doubts by moderates in Israel who suggested that Israel itself was at fault, were put to rest following the emergence of the Hamas hate-state in Gaza and the consistent rocket attacks over the years.

The nature of the events of the second intefada, its scale and the premeditated nature of attacks on innocent victims is not fully appreciated outside Israel. But it was acknowledged and understood by George Bush, following 9/11. It is this more than other factors that must be understood when looking at the Israeli position. The somewhat out-of-sync position of Israelis regarding Obama at the time of elections in the US, the emergence of Lieberman as a player, the current reticence in acknowledging the two-state solution and the complete dormancy of the peace movement all have their roots in these events.

While we may discard Netanyahu's latest demand for Palestinian recognition of the Jewish State as "gamesmanship", the underlying Israeli position is driven by serious concerns from what is deemed a series of empirical proofs that risk-taking by Israel in enabling Palestinian self-government has until now, backfired with a very heavy cost in human life.

The urgency now placed on resolving this problem and finding a formula to proceed with reaching a two-state solution may be feasible insofar as the Obama administration's willingness to move it forward and indeed the Netanyahu government's eventual acceptance of the concept in general. In many respects these are factors that are both manageable and within control of the US and Israeli governments.

The wild card here is the unpredictable Palestinian political ethos. A unified governing entity that accepts a future peace with Israel is still to emerge as a stable, fully representative Palestinian leadership with which to work.

Without that - there may be process but no Israeli government will allow a state to emerge which at a whim may turn into an existential threat. And this in close range of its major population centers and its strategic assets.

Without Hamas

It's worth the efforts being made to create a Palestinian unity govt.  However, if that cannot be done soon, thinking should change.  Obama, Israel and the Arab states should help the PA create a state in the W. Bank alone that lays claim to Gaza as well even though the Strip isn't under its control.  Israeli battering hasn't spurred Gazans to rise against Hamas but the sight of Palestinian sovereignty, pride, peace and growing prosperity in the W. Bank alongside an Israel that withdrew will be the strongst possible inducement to Gazans to withdraw their support for Hamas even if they can't militarily drive it out.  Hamas, without the support of Gazans and w/ the lie given to the doctrine that only "struggle" can bring results for the Palestinians, will increasingly wither on the vine.

Reading Obama Wrong

M.J.

Really good piece.  Keep blowing Joshua's horn, and maybe some walls will come tumbling down.

Lee

 

A Palestinian State and Protection of Israeli security

I would appreciate it very much if you would devote one or more of your columns to explaining Israel's realistic security concerns and how those concerns would be successfully addressed after the creation of a Palestinian State, particularly one that might soon be controlled by Hamas and armed by Iran (protection of Ben Gurion airport from hand held missiles, destabilization of Jordan, loss of strategic advantages of topography, how prevent smuggling of missiles if don't control Jordan valley, etc., etc.). Repeatedly calling for a two state solution is not persuasive without a clear exposition of the real risks and how those risks can be managed effectively. Hyperlinks in the article to relevant studies by think tanks would be also very helpful. I agree the current occupation is disastrous. I sincerely wished to be convinced, however, that the two state solution--at least in the near term--would not be appreciably worse.

 

Land and Security

If high-trajectory, short range rockets continue to be used successfully, their range will eventually be expanded by Hamas and Hezbollah to reach anywhere in Israel whether or not Israel controls the W. Bank.  However, Israel's new Iron Dome anti-rocket system that can neutralize the Quassams and Katyushas will be operational next year, an even stronger variable making the W. Bank irrelevant as a territorial shield.  Whatever happens in a new Palestinian State, if anything, that threatens Israel will lead the IDF to go in; the IDF  has always taken the fight to Arab territory throughout Israel's history.  But a Palestinian State will change the rules as never before: 1. the Palestinians will have the strongest incentive ever to get on w/ their lives and not provoke Israel; even now Quassam fire from Gaza, you notice, is way, way down  (after a face saving interval for Hamas just after the war); no rockets from Hezbollah these days either.  2. Israel will save IDF lives, money and moral integrity to be done w/ occupation duty and free to have all the settlement activity it wants in the Galil and Negev; plenty to do there.  3. With a FINAL status agreement endorsed by the Arab states under the Saudi initiative, the rationale for anti-Israel activity will evaporate for all Muslims except  Hamas and Iran who will be increasingly isolated or who, under Obama's cajoling diplomacy, will finally moderate their positions.  4.  With a Palestinian State, world support and acceptance of Israel will be unprecedented; every time there's a move towards peace, let alone peace itself, more countries establish relations, open trade etc e.g., after Oslo, much of Africa, some Gulf states, Japan, China, India.  Israel's high tech economy was largely consolidated w/ new foreign investment made and economic relations established after Oslo. 

Getting Obama

What Obama, Mitchell and PJ Rosenberg fail to take into account is the the Two State Solution has become unworkable.  I personally feel that it is the ideal solution, and probably the ONLY solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem.  It is just that it comes 40 or 30 or 20 years too late.  The situation has changed, irreversibly I'm afraid.

What does Israel do the morrow of its withdrawal from the West Bank when the first Kassams fall on B-G International Airport?  The threat of retaliation did not deter Hamas and Islamic Jihad prior to the July ceasefire.  No Israeli government in its right mind can agree that an irredentist Hamas be given carte blanche to set up launching sites 10 miles from B-G or 15 miles from metropolitan Tel Aviv (not to mention that all of Jerusalem would also be vulnerable).  Who or what would put a stop to it?