Signs Of Hope For Peace; Obama Must Lead

This week's edition of The Economist tackles the Israeli-Palestinian peace process with two articles addressing the current state of negotiations and the role of American diplomacy.

The first article, "Not quite as gloomy as they look" recaps the progress made in negotiations one year ago between Israel's former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.   The article notes that Olmert presented what many believe to be a generous land-for-peace proposal to Abbas. However, according to the Palestinians, Olmert never presented detailed maps of the proposal, and they therefore felt they could not agree to the proposal in the face of continued settlement construction and with the impending collapse of the Olmert government.

The article reports that while settlements remain a major obstacle to advancing negotiations, so too does the deep divide between Palestinian society, with Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah leading the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and Hamas controlling the Gaza Strip. 

Despite these obstacles, the article sees signs for optimism:

Mr. Olmert, who came closer to a deal than anyone realized, was once a Greater Israel man. Some say Mr.  Netanyahu may be persuaded to follow his predecessor down the same path. Many Palestinians once believed that time was on their side and that Israel would one day disappear. Now even Hamas seems to concede that Israel is there to stay. Large majorities of Israelis and Palestinians now want two states, side by side. It is still possible that one day they will get their way.

The second article in this month's Economist, titled "Get Stuck In, Mr. President," gives President Obama high-marks for his commitment to diplomacy thus far, but goes further to call on him to step-up his personal efforts.  The article urges the President to consider outlining a new set of American understandings toward peace in the Middle East akin to the "Clinton Parameters" outlined at the end of the Clinton administration (which President Clinton announced publicly at Israel Policy Forum's Annual Event on January 8, 2001).

Following his Cairo speech to Muslims, he should address the Israeli people directly, telling them why a Palestinian state is their only long-term guarantee of security. Ideally, he would also persuade Israel's government to lift its siege of Gaza, now that Hamas has, at least temporarily, stopped firing rockets at Israel. In return the leaders of the Arab world, including Syria (which he is rightly wooing), should be bullied into offering Israel tokens of good faith, such as permission for overflights and reciprocal commercial offices. They could also push much harder to help reconcile the two Palestinian groups-and, by the by, insist that Hamas unambiguously disavows violence and, at least de facto, says it accepts Israel.

Above all though, Mr. Obama must soon spell out in detail his vision for the two states-and how it can be achieved. Building on the "parameters" laid down by President Bill Clinton in 2000, along with various other convergent scenarios such as the Arab League's initiative of 2002 and the unofficial Geneva Accords of 2003, he could delineate the contours of an agreement. It is not just that many Palestinians and Israelis would embrace this basic plan. At the moment politicians on both sides define themselves by the extremism of their most unreasonable opponents. With an authoritative Obama plan, both Israeli and Palestinian voters would have a new measuring stick. Mr. Obama has begun to point the way. Now he must add the details and start banging heads together.