US-Syria: Slow and Opaque Engagement

Following the publicized visit by two important Obama Administration foreign policy officials to Damascus this weekend, influentials in the Syrian capital eagerly expressed enthusiasm at what was widely interpreted as a "breakthrough" and a "victory" in the bilateral relationship.  During my brief visit at the same time, my fifth over the last 12 months, my communications with Damascenes, an experienced few, there was pleasure that the visit took place, but far more careful and cautious reactions to what the visit meant in the short- and long-terms.  Their advice was go slow, be careful, develop a sense of trust.

Rightly so, considering the fact that, for the last 30 years, the nature of relations between Damascus and Washington have been consistently hostile and the issues currently challenging the two governments are numerous and difficult, filled with widely differing interpretations and emotions. Distancing and disengagement as policies do not end quickly as witnessed by President Bashar al-Assad harsh remarks two days after the official Americans departed.  He startled Washington, by linking directly an agreement between the Palestine and Israel to one between Syria and Israel, meaning there would be no peace until the Palestinian issue is resolved first. An agreement is only a document and doesn't mean trade or normal relations, he said.  These were new words injected into one of several crucial challenges facing the two sides.  Indeed, in normalizing Syrian-US relations, I believe keeping expectations in check is realistic advice; much hard work and patience lie ahead as the road of goodwill is paved.

In a larger context, the study and review of diplomatic engagement is now underway by the Obama Administration toward six strained international situations bequeathed by Bush and company, two-thirds of them in an extended Middle East-Sudan, Iran, Syria, and Palestine, as well as North Korea and Georgia/Russia.  A premise of these policy initiatives is that after eight years of few to zero geopolitical results that advantages the United States, it is time to try official talking, dialoguing in a civil manner, creating trust, and eventually serious negotiating.

Besides the need to resolve several conflicts in the Middle East, an Obama objective, the area is being approached by the Administration as an interdependent region.  What happens in one area affects what happens in another.  This has always been true of the Arab-Israel conflict; it is now seen regarding Iran, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton discovered first-hand in her meetings in Sharm el-Sheikh, Israel, Palestine, Turkey, and at the EU in Brussels.  She was confronted by Arab and other foreign ministers that Iran as a nuclear power and supporter of terror groups is hot-topic number one in the region.

Some American foreign policy analysts are calling for the Obama Administration to engage Iran, Syria, and Israel-Palestine full-speed ahead.  Two special envoys have been picked to pursue this point; since Inauguration Day, George Mitchell has already visited Israel and Palestine twice and the Secretary once.  The roads ahead, however, are cluttered and not easy to drive.

Syria is a case in point.  Yes, Syria is a pivotal player in the region but, as the Syrian leadership is making clear to the Americans, disengagement cannot be overturned and upgraded overnight.  A number of Congressional and non-profit delegations have recently visited Damascus to explore what can be done; the weekend official delegation was also exploratory, but came away sullen.   What can be exclaimed is that the end of American isolation of Syria has commenced.  But until major adjustments and changes in behavior are made by Syria, according to Administration officials, a new policy day in the bilateral sphere will not begin.

We are thus only at the early talks phase.  Talks are not a substitute for substantive give-and-take in the international arena.  From the American perspective, officials are asking these questions: Will Syria stop foreign fighters from traveling through its international airport and crossing its borders into Iraq to cause havoc and oppose the sitting elected government in Baghdad?  Will Syria control and secure its borders not only with Iraq but also with Lebanon.  Will Syria change its supportive arrangements toward Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and other groups in order to begin the process of exiting from the U.S. terrorist list, a place it has been since 1979 and a move that would have direct consequences on Palestine's current divisions and weaknesses as a crippled entity?  Will Syria allow for a free and fair forthcoming election in Lebanon?  How will Syria participate or not in the U.N.-sponsored Tribunal investigating the death of Lebanon's Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri?  What are Syria's nuclear intentions; is it pursuing a nuclear option or was that last year's news?  Can Syria and Israel at long last bring to a mutually satisfactory conclusion all of the Golan Heights territory for a full peace?  Then there is the anxiety-creating issue of Iran.

The ending of American isolation of Syria's regime by official contact in Damascus this weekend has not brought clarity of thought or clear directional signals.  The process to improve a severely strained relationship will move slowly and remain opaque for many months to come.  Perhaps by the end of 2009 we will know answers to these policy questions and will determine whether or not normalization will be the cardinal reality of the Damascus-Washington relationship in 2010.