Ken Pollack's Case for War ... and Peace

Issue # 114

Kenneth Pollack, who for the past fifteen years has served as an Iraq analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council, has written an extraordinarily timely - and valuable - book on the question of what the United States should do about Saddam Hussein.

The book's title, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq is somewhat misleading, in that it suggests a one-sided argument or even a polemic.  That is precisely what the book is not.  Yes, Pollack concludes that the best available option for the United States is to invade.  But he explores every other possible option as well, without unfairly stacking the deck in favor of his own view.  In fact, Pollack's endorsement of invasion is so balanced that opponents of that approach will be able to cite him to make the argument that the risks of war outweigh the benefits.

In short, this is a strikingly honest book, which should be read by anyone trying to understand the current situation and seeking to come up with his own conclusion about the best course America might take. (From what I have seen on the Metro and in other places around Washington, everyone here is reading it!)

One aspect of the Pollack book which has so far been overlooked is his belief that American efforts to counter Saddam Hussein are hindered by the perception in the Arab world that the Israeli-Palestinian situation is deteriorating and that the United States has abandoned the role of honest broker.

This comes through loud and clear in Pollack's discussion of the requisites of a successful United States invasion of Iraq.  He first states that the United States cannot do it alone.  "Many on the far right of the American political spectrum argue that the United States can and should overthrow Saddam Hussein entirely on its own.  We can't, and we shouldn't.  Since we do not share a land border with Iraq and Iraq's coastline is too small and difficult for a massive amphibious assault, we would have to get to Iraq through someone else's territory.  That means having at least some allies in the region willing to allow the United States to use their territory to launch an invasion... [A]n invasion of Iraq would require a new coalition to support it - one that could be as small as just the GCC (Gulf) states, Turkey, and Egypt, but that would be preferably as large as we could make it."

For Pollack, support from the Gulf states (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and their smaller neighbors) is the sine qua non for any invasion.  But he does not believe the United States will have that support unless the Gulf states receive something in return. "They would want the violence between the Israelis and Palestinians to have died down enough that they felt able to deal with whatever unrest the invasion caused among their people.  The Gulf states are legitimately concerned that as long as the Israelis and Palestinians are regularly trading blows, their own populations will remain so agitated that any additional unpopular event could spark serious domestic disturbances, even a popular uprising against the government, if the regime was seen as being on the 'wrong' side of the event."

Pollack rejects the idea that Arab demands on the Palestinian issue would be exorbitant.  They will not require that "Israel must have signed a comprehensive peace agreement with all of its Arab neighbors before an invasion can get under way, only that there cannot be weekly terrorist attacks followed by Israeli security responses.  Instead, both sides must have the sense that they are moving toward an eventual settlement, and the United States must be actively involved and be seen as behaving in a reasonably evenhanded fashion.  Because most of the Gulf elites want to see the United States invade Iraq, it is unlikely that they will set the bar very high in terms of the status of Palestinian-Israeli relations prior to an invasion."

Pollack vehemently dismisses the notion that "by agreeing to take actions on the Palestinian-Israeli dispute before moving against Iraq we are giving the moderate Arab states a veto over our actions."  It's not blackmail, he writes.  "What this claim misses is that the Gulf states do have a veto over whether or not we invade Iraq.  If they forbid us to use their territory to invade Iraq, we essentially cannot invade."

Pollack could not be more clear.  For him, there is linkage between the Iraq situation and the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate.  Of course, he is not the only one making that point.  Both Brent Scowcroft and Anthony Zinni - among others - have said that America's task in Iraq will be infinitely easier if it is preceded by a U.S. push for an end to violence and the resumption of negotiations.  Of course it would.  It is hard to imagine that any serious person would make the opposite case, i.e., that taming down Israeli-Palestinian violence would not advance U.S. efforts vis-à-vis Saddam Hussein.

Nevertheless, there seems to be some sentiment in Washington which favors putting the Israeli-Palestinian issue on the backburner until after the Israeli election.  In theory, that makes sense.  But, in fact, it does not - especially when one considers that the United States may move against Iraq at any time.  Waiting until after the January 28th election could effectively shut the window to any diplomatic moves before war begins.  And that, if you believe Pollack, would complicate U.S. efforts.

There isn't much time to waste.  If the President's decision is to go to war, he is going to need the moderate Arab support - support that will be far more forthcoming if America is actively engaged in promoting Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.  If, in the end, inspections do the job, the support of those same Arab states will be critical to keep the pressure on Saddam Hussein to achieve Iraq's disarmament without an invasion.  Either way, perpetuation of the Israeli-Palestinian status quo is harming U.S. interests.  That is why the President offered his June 24th vision.  And that is why it's time to implement it.