Building a Bridge from Disengagement to Two States

Israel Policy Forum's work must at all times be focused on the prime target as articulated by President Bush: a two-state solution, encompassing Israel as a Jewish state and Palestine as an independent state for Palestinians, living in peace and security with one another. Even in a more limited time span, such as the next few months, we must work to prevent either side from taking steps that would block the emergence of a two-state solution.

Therefore, we believe the administration should concentrate on ways to pursue three familiar steps, each consistent with the Quartet's Roadmap. Failure to make serious progress on each of these steps has, in the past, contributed to serious setbacks on the arduous road to peace.

The three steps, which should be implemented in tandem rather than in sequence, are as follows:

1. Unambiguous and effective efforts by the Palestinian Authority to control terror and prevent attacks on Israelis;
2. An Israeli freeze on expanding existing settlements, including roads and other associated infrastructure, and the removal of unauthorized settlement outposts;
3. Efforts to help grow the Palestinian economy so that the PA can provide jobs and basic services for Palestinians. These efforts would also help strengthen the PA's position among the various Palestinian factions, including Hamas.

CONFRONTING PALESTINIAN TERRORISM

The current Palestinian government under Mahmoud Abbas is strong in its denunciation of violence and in its moderate approach to Israel, but weak in implementation of measures that would stem terrorist groups. Abbas's strategy of co-opting different factions into the political system is appealing in theory, but it has not been effective enough, and Israel has felt obliged to undertake military actions of its own against terrorist groups in the territories.

WHAT CAN BE DONE, ESPECIALLY IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE JANUARY ELECTIONS?

We recommend that the position currently held by General William Ward be strengthened, so that his successor will be empowered even more to help the PA on further reorganizing its security forces, training these forces, emboldening them to take action against the terrorist groups and coordinating security with Israel. At his recent meeting with Abbas, President Bush hinted at a widened role for Ward, and we commend that decision.

At the same time, we recognize that sweeping calls for an end to terrorism have often fallen on deaf ears. The United States must therefore accelerate its pressure on Hamas, with the goal of extending well beyond January whatever quiet will exist in the period leading up to Palestinian elections.

We further suggest that immediate moves be taken by our government to isolate Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and to encourage the PA to confront them militarily. Although PIJ is the smallest of the terrorist groups, it has perpetrated the most violence in the past weeks and months. It is also the terror group with the closest ties to Syria and Iran, and pressure to cut off support for PIJ should be incorporated into existing campaigns directed against those states.

The Palestinian public may well be supportive of Abbas if the PA takes concerted action against Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Surveys of the Palestinians portray a generally negative attitude towards violence, largely because it leads to increased hardship in their day-to-day lives. By moving against PIJ, Abbas could also help resuscitate the ceasefire and perhaps even encourage a greater willingness on the part of Israel to see if his accommodating approach can succeed.

At the same time, it is totally unacceptable that organizations associated with the ruling Fatah should be engaged in terrorism. The US should therefore press the PA to constrain the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades from acting independently of PA security forces. Fortunately, the PA has recently expressed a willingness to consider such a move, though so far it has not acted on it.

Taking these steps should make it easier for Abbas to assert that major steps against Hamas should not be taken until at least after the elections. Assuming that Hamas abides by a ceasefire, then there is a better chance of Jerusalem and especially Washington going along with his strategy. An approach like this is vitally important to Abbas if he wants to overcome skepticism about his methods and the perception of internal weakness. If he does not act forcefully against them, PIJ and its backers will continue to have an interest in keeping the pot boiling during the period preceding the elections as a way of creating chaos, and weakening both Hamas and the PA.

FREEZING SETTLEMENTS AND DISMANTLING OUTPOSTS

Successive American administrations have tried and failed to secure a settlement freeze. Why is this possible now?

Israel has never before been in a post-disengagement environment in which settler influence has actually declined, especially with the public. It has also never before had a moderate (though admittedly weak) Palestinian Authority as a partner. The flip side of an Israeli inclination towards unilateralism is a greater willingness to take steps that limit the occupation, and a greater appreciation that settlement expansion serves to increase the influence of Palestinian extremists.

In the aftermath of disengagement, Israel has been pressed to take various steps in order to bolster Abbas's standing. Many of these measures, such as prisoner releases, curtailing targeting killings or withdrawing the IDF from additional areas in the West Bank, involve security risks of one kind or another. Israel will have to factor in these risks when deciding whether or not to take any of these steps.

On the other hand, freezing settlement and dismantling illegal outposts have no security drawbacks. Instead, as an ever-larger number of Israelis have come to realize, settlements can actually create security and political problems, such as the need to assign more soldiers to defend them.

There are a variety of ways to handle the dismantling of outposts and a settlement freeze. The former should certainly be the first step and the easiest way to begin a new process. We believe that a comprehensive freeze on all settlement construction throughout the West Bank would then convey a critical signal to the Palestinians that Israel intends to seek a two-state solution, would strengthen the PA politically, and would make it easier for the PA to pursue its anti-terror operations.

ENHANCING THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY AND PALESTINIAN SOCIETY

It is generally accepted that improvements in the Palestinian economy will aid the Palestinian Authority and its standing at home. We have reviewed recent reports and discussions from leading scholars and, of the various proposals made, we believe these should be moved on immediately:

1. A Housing Fund for the large-scale upgrading of the situation in the Gaza refugee camps. Not requiring new infrastructure, this project can be started almost immediately. It would utilize the large Gaza labor force that used to be employed in construction in Israel, and generate some local "backward linkages" to supply floor tiles, solar heaters, simple electricity installations, etc. It would both create immediate employment and incomes and within a short time also raise standards of living by easing housing conditions.
2. An Investment Bank that would mobilize both outside and within currently dormant Palestinian domestic financial resources for investment in employment and income-creating factories. The development of the Palestinian economy has been severely hindered by the absence of a financial intermediary that could reduce the financial risk by distributing its funds among many projects and would also have the expertise needed to evaluate them. At the moment, prospects are too costly for the individual investor. Potential businesses that might be supported would range from fisheries and shrimp farms to the return of textile industry and sheet metal works.
3. A Social Welfare (or Educational) Charity to compete with Hamas in providing services such as kindergartens and clinics in Gaza. An estimated $10 million per month is needed for such an initiative.

The chances of these programs succeeding also depend on indirect Israeli cooperation. We believe the US should encourage Israel to endorse the World Bank recommendations that call for the creation of a safe passage for people and goods between the West Bank and Gaza, access to foreign markets through a seaport and border crossings with Egypt, and an easing of movement throughout the West Bank. We also understand the relationship between diplomatic and security issues on one hand, and economic aid and investment on the other hand. We think our country needs to help bridge the gap to which Special Envoy James Wolfensohn referred when he said: "In substance, the parties are not far from agreement, but they are finding that old habits die hard."

CONCLUSION

The US should embark on these steps immediately and vigorously. The three steps are interrelated; the success or failure of one will have an impact on the success or failure of the others. The program presented here would allow the United States to help build and reinforce the first section of the bridge that began with this summer's disengagement and must end with a viable and realistic two-state solution.