Proposal to the President

President-elect Obama faces daunting problems at home and abroad, prime among them the deepening economic recession. But, whether or not the new administration sought to confront the Arab-Israeli conflict, the war in Gaza arrived on the new President's desk even before he assumed office.

There are many other reasons for the President-elect to address the Arab-Israeli conflict from his first weeks in office. Simply put, the festering Arab-Israeli conflict threatens major American interests - among them the security of Israel and our other regional allies - while working to end it will advance American interests throughout the Middle East and beyond. Additionally, regional leaders will wish to test the new President's mettle. They will not shrink from providing the new President with the opportunity to show his hand, if only to determine if the President's pledge of change applies to the Middle East or if, in this volatile region, continuity will be the order of the day-continuity few in the region would welcome.

During the past eight years, the United States has appeared to have no sense of urgency about ending the Arab-Israeli conflict. President Clinton left office with an Israeli-Palestinian deal almost within reach. The Bush administration did not pick up where Clinton left off, giving the impression that the United States was indifferent to the worsening conditions (the second Intifada) on the ground in Israel and the Occupied Territories. This seeming indifference helped turn public opinion against the United States throughout the Muslim world to the disadvantage of a myriad of U.S. interests. The Obama administration can turn the situation around, but only if it acts swiftly and with determination.  We must leave no doubt that the United States intends to turn the page in its dealings with the Middle East.  The era of neglect - benign and not so benign - must be seen as over.

THE CRISIS IN GAZA

We, of course, do not know now what precise circumstances President-elect Obama will confront on January 20. We do know that economic, political, and security conditions in Gaza are such a dire, festering sore that it would take a miracle to have them resolved by then.

In this light, the Obama administration should lead an international effort to arrange a two-phase process: an immediate ceasefire, followed by a longer term armistice. Thus, if a ceasefire has not been established by the time Obama takes office, his team should work assiduously, through intermediaries, to establish a viable ceasefire. This effort should include moderate Arab states pressing Hamas to stop firing missiles and mortars at Israel.

More important, we urge the new administration to arrange, also through intermediaries, a long-term armistice (at least ten years) in which there will be absolutely no attacks on Israel of any kind and the end to the smuggling of weapons by Hamas, in exchange for the lifting of the blockade by Israel in a way that will not recognize Hamas as the legitimate authority in Gaza. This would be an important early achievement.

THE FIRST 100 DAYS: A GAME PLAN FOR THE PRESIDENT-ELECT ON THE MIDDLE EAST

The following is a list of steps President-elect Obama should take in his first 100 days, in addition to the ones listed above concerning the Gaza crisis. They were derived from discussions in Israel Policy Forum's Washington Roundtable, which consists of former U.S. diplomats, other former officials and academic experts on the Middle East (see endnote).

1. The President should state, in his inaugural address or State of the Union message, that it is his determination to immediately begin building on efforts of previous Democratic and Republican administrations to achieve a comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbors.
   
   He should make specific reference to the Arab League Initiative which can serve as an umbrella for negotiations-along with reference to all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions. He should state his support and encouragement for both the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the indirect negotiations between Israel and Syria. He needs to convey that it is a new day and that America will seize any realistic proposal to play an active role to advance negotiations.
2. As early in his term as possible, after the February 10 Israeli elections, the President should send a trusted emissary on a listening trip to the capitals of the Arab states and Israel, including Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Morocco, Qatar, Lebanon, Palestine, and Israel. This trip would provide the opportunity for the emissary to report to the President on his/her assessment of the potential for early action on specific issues and tracks. The emissary's findings, when added to the insights gained from inevitable early Washington visits by foreign leaders,  will lay the groundwork for the Obama administration's more detailed approach to the Middle East during its first months in office. They will inform the President's decisions as to what is feasible and what is not.
3. The President should give a speech in late February or March to lay out a vision of overall peace for Arabs and Israelis, together with future policy directions for Iraq and for U.S.-Iran relations. Prospects for early movement toward peace between Syria and Israel and the Palestinians and Israel, and U.S. readiness to do whatever is needed to enhance those prospects, should figure prominently. The President should also signal that he views developments in the Middle East broadly and intends to pursue a policy that addresses the complexity of the security dilemmas facing the region in a comprehensive manner. The speech should focus on not only obtaining a durable and just peace between Israel and its immediate neighbors, but also stability and development throughout the rest of the region. This speech could be delivered here or from a Middle East capital, as has already been suggested by the President-elect.
4. The President should announce that we will return an Ambassador to Damascus to facilitate a more productive Syrian-American relationship. In making such an announcement the President should make it clear that Syrian actions with respect to Lebanon, Iraq and Israeli-Palestinian peace talks will profoundly affect the nature of our bilateral relationship. He should declare at the same time that the United States fully supports Israeli-Syrian negotiations toward a peace agreement, and hopes to be able to play an active role to help advance them.
5. The President should continue and even intensify the efforts which have involved Generals Dayton, Jones, and Fraser to improve and unify the Palestinian security and police force, thereby creating for the first time a rational and viable Palestinian security structure. The new efforts in Jenin, Nablus, and Hebron, where the Dayton-trained forces are being deployed, should be backed as well as the economic efforts of former Prime Minister Tony Blair. It is critical for the U.S. to encourage efforts that will result in the release of Gilad Shalit, kidnapped by Hamas in June 2006, as quickly as possible. The President should and can call on Israel to a) dismantle outposts b) freeze settlement construction c) crack down on all settler violence and incitement. But he should also send a clear message to Hamas that so long as it engages in violence against Israel, it can expect no change in American attitudes toward it. A genuine end to violence, however, would be recognized by the United States and reciprocal moves would be considered.
6. The President should announce his intention to re-establish formal diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran on a reciprocal basis as soon as the Iran government is ready to do so.  He should announce his support for broad negotiations with Iran, without prior conditions, on all outstanding issues including those involving Iran's nuclear program, its activities vis-à-vis Iraq and Afghanistan, and its overall stance toward Israel (with specific reference to Iran's support for Hezbollah and Hamas).

CONCLUSION

There is no need to choose between "Israel-Palestine First" and "Syria First."  At one time, the Palestinians would view any emphasis on Syria as indicating a lack of interest in their plight. No more. Mahmoud Abbas, and Fatah in general, understands that an Israeli-Syrian agreement would result in at least some disruption of ties between Damascus and Hamas-controlled Gaza. This could only benefit Abbas and enhance chances for Palestinian national unity and a final status agreement with Israel. Middle East diplomacy is not a zero sum activity. Movement on one front not only does not hinder progress on another; it advances it.

The Arab League Initiative recognizes this fact, which is why it addresses virtually all aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict simultaneously. Even issues relating to Iran - the nuclear question and its relations with the United States and Israel - are inextricably connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and can be addressed as such.

These initial steps during the President's first 100 days would lay the groundwork for a new era in U.S. Middle East policy.

CONTRIBUTORS

Marshall J. Breger                                     Lenore G. Martin
Ambassador Wendy J. Chamberlin             Ambassador Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr.
Stephen P. Cohen                                     Jeremy Pressman
Thomas A. Dine                                        MJ Rosenberg
Frederic C. Hof                                          Steven L. Spiegel
Scott Lasensky                                         Ambassador Edward S. Walker, Jr.
Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis

Those listed as contributors have assisted in the preparation of this document, but each participant in the project whose name appears above may not agree with the text in its entirety.

CONTRIBUTORS

Marshall J. Breger: Professor, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America

Ambassador Wendy J. Chamberlin: former United States Ambassador to Pakistan; former Director of Global Affairs and Counter-Terrorism at the National Security Council; and former Assistant Administrator in the Asia-Near East Bureau for the US Agency for International Development

Stephen P. Cohen: President, Institute for Middle East Peace and Development; Author of the forthcoming book "Beyond America's Grasp: a Century of Failed Diplomacy in the Middle East," Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2009

Thomas A. Dine: Senior Policy Advisor, Israel Policy Forum; former President of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; former Executive Director of AIPAC

Frederic C. Hof: lead drafter of the Mitchell Report (Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee); former U.S. Army Attaché in Lebanon; former Director for Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestinian Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense

Scott Lasensky: Senior Research Associate, United States Institute of Peace

Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis: former U.S. Ambassador to Israel; former Director of Policy Planning at the State Department

Lenore G. Martin: Professor of Political Science at Emmanuel College; Associate of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and Associate of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies both at Harvard University; co-chair of the WCFIA/CMES Middle East Seminar and the Seminar on Turkey in the Modern World at Harvard University

Ambassador Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr.: former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain, member of the U.S. delegation to the 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference

Jeremy Pressman: Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut

MJ Rosenberg: Director of Policy Analysis, Israel Policy Forum

Steven L. Spiegel: Director of the Center for Middle East Development and Professor of Political Science at UCLA; National Scholar, Israel Policy Forum

Ambassador Edward S. Walker, Jr.: former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs; former United States Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.

Notes:
Those listed as contributors have assisted in the preparation of this document, but each participant in the project whose name appears above may not agree with the text in its entirety.

Titles are listed for identification purposes only.

Israel Policy Forum (IPF) is an independent, non-partisan American organization that promotes active U.S. engagement to achieve a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and peace and security between Israel and its Arab neighbors.